

THE “PHILOLOGICAL TURN” IN THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF QING DYNASTY AND WORLD PHILOSOPHY

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1 Talking about Chinese Philosophy as World Philosophy

Is there philosophy in China? An answer to this question is self-evident. Even if the concept of “philosophy” (*philo-sophia*) originates from Greece, since the time when the Jesuits discovered philosophy centred around the “Four Books” (四書) of Neo-Confucianism (Jp. *Sōmei rigaku* 宋明理学) in the late 17th century and called Confucius a “philosopher,” the tradition of Chinese thought was recognized as philosophy and books on Chinese philosophy that frequently appeared in modernity indicated that philosophy existed in China since antiquity. Therefore, we should simply answer “yes there is” to the question of whether or not there is philosophy in China. I think that Karl Jaspers’s view of philosophy, which Notomi Noburu closely examined in his *The History of World Philosophy* Volume 1 (Chikuma Shobō, 2020), gives the most precise but primitive and universal meaning of philosophy. He even thinks that philosophy is the reason for a human being to be human prior to the question of whether or not there is philosophy in China. Let us recall Jaspers’s arguments just to be clear of this point. What kind of changes took place in human beings during the so-called axial age? He says,

What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognising his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence.¹

In other words, this means that “the point in history which gave birth to everything which, since then, man has been able to be, the point most overwhelm-

1 Jaspers 2010, 2.

ingly fruitful in fashioning humanity” indicates the epoch-making significance of the axial age.² At this point of time, human beings have entered the age of human spirit based on philosophy from the age of myth. Jaspers calls this activity of spirit by way of the verb “to philosophize.” In other words, he demonstrates that philosophy is not a mode of academic discipline that is given to a certain culture and tradition as a privilege, but it is an activity that can take place in anyone so long as she is human at all. Especially when we look at the condition by which this axial age promoted humans “to philosophize” as the “limit situation,”³ we can say that this type of “limit situation” increasingly existed everywhere and probably it will remain the same in the future. World philosophy should be thought of as that which questions the world by taking the existence of the individual in the limit situation as its starting point.

Accordingly, for this special issue advocating “world philosophy,” claiming that “there is a philosophy in China,” or “Chinese philosophy is philosophy,” so long as we do not reject the thesis of “Chinese philosophy as world philosophy” no longer has any positive meaning. So long as the fact that humans who “philosophize” continue to exist in China, which equates to the fact that humans are living in China, the proposition that “there is philosophy in China” has no meaning and, if philosophy is this kind of activity, then to call it “Chinese philosophy” and frame it as a particular knowledge (知) deriving from that region, could undervalue the individuality (and universality) of “philosophizing.” There are philosophical activities in regions that do not share the Greek orthodox view and Chinese philosophy is one such philosophy, just like there are Islamic, Indian, and Japanese philosophies, and they are rich great trees that constitute the forest of world philosophy as various systems of philosophy differ from Anglo-European philosophy; even to admit this will not suffice. This is because “world philosophy” is not a sum total of various philosophies, but a single dynamic system (just as large and small animals and plants constituting the forest in nature symbiotically live based on their organic mutual relation). And therein to break through the “internal crisis of philosophy,” we “aim at rediscovering and indicat-

2 Jaspers 2010, 1.

3 Ibid., 9. [This translation renders *Grenzsituation* as “borderline situation”.]

ing the concepts and words for encountering the world."⁴ Accordingly, world philosophy is precisely at the same time the movement of the globalization of philosophy through translations. Also, "it is not that there is a single philosophy that is shared by everyone in the world, but the movement that takes place when a certain idea enters a different cultural domain and is translated" is exactly the reason why philosophy can be philosophy; to grasp philosophy as world philosophy is necessarily nothing but to understand philosophy as the dynamism of "change."⁵ If that is the case, then there lies the danger of contradiction between declaring that "Chinese philosophy exists" and regarding Chinese philosophy as the organic constituent of world philosophy. Even then, if we are going to accept the thesis of "Chinese philosophy as world philosophy," we would have to call for a conversation of interpretation that internally transforms the philosophical system called "Chinese Philosophy"—whose existence is for the time being self-evident—and give (re-)birth to it as something different. So long as we must recognize Chinese philosophy as translational negotiations between itself and others and as the process of change based on them, the boundary of "China" is naturally ambiguous and malleable. We could say that the proposal to reread "Chinese philosophy" as *Hanyu zhhexue* (Jp., Kango Tetsugaku 漢語哲學) or the idea of Sinophone philosophy (Ch., *Huayu yuxi zhhexue* 華語語系哲學) are attempts to make a conversion of knowledge concerning the concept of Chinese philosophy.⁶

2 What is "Philology"?

Hence, "Chinese philosophy as world philosophy" is a project of Chinese philosophy's change, where it tries to conceptualize a new philosophy from the China-world (Jp. *Chūgoku sekai* 中国世界) perspective. This article will attempt to carry out this project by considering the concept of a discipline called "philology" (Jp. *bunkengaku* 文献学). But in order to do so, we must make it clear why thinking about philology will lead us to world philosophy.

4 Nakajima and Notomi 2020, 23.

5 Ibid., 25.

6 Heubel 2008, 175–187. For Sinophone philosophy, see Ishii 2020, 12–32.

The term *bunkengaku* in Japanese is needless to say the translation of the English term “philology.” However, it is not very clear what this philology itself is in the first place. In Chinese, there is a corresponding term, *wenxianxue* (文献学), but if we ask whether or not it corresponds with the English term, “philology,” the answer is not always in the affirmative. In this article, unless indicated otherwise, *wenxianxue* (Jp. *bunkengaku*) is talked about as the translation of “philology” in English, but I would like to note here that this term itself should be the object of reconsideration.

The term, *wenxian* 文献, itself is said to originate from Ma Duanlin’s (馬端臨, 1258?–1323) *Wenxian Tongkao* (文献通考, 1317). Zhang Shunhui 張舜徽 (1911–1992), who first judged this to be the case, argued that the study of texts (文献) in premodern Chinese academia is precisely “proofreading” (*jiaochouxue* 校讎学). Based on this argument, Chinese *wenxianxue* as a continuation of the tradition of *jiaochouxue* does not only deal with comparative corrections of the manuscripts, but also with their organization, editions, and commentaries in general.⁷ Zhang Shunhui builds his theory based on the editorial work of *Bielu* (別錄) and *Qilüe* (七略) by Liu Xiang 劉向 (79–6 BCE) and Liu Xin 劉歆 (50 BCE?–23 CE), and thereby talks about the history of Chinese philology in one sweep, but his aim was to constitute “The General History of Chinese People” (*Zhonghua Renmin Tongshi* 中華人民通史). However, we must pay attention to the fact that, while acknowledging the general viewpoint that *wenxianxue* 文献学 in China is the synthesis of enumerative bibliography (*muluxue* 目錄学), descriptive bibliography (*banbenxue* 版本学), and text editing (*jiaokanxue* 校勘学), Zhang draws an immense picture of academic study that tries to raise this study even to the level of the methodology of describing history. We can observe his project that plans to synthesize *wenxianxue* 文献学 with the description of history in this manner by the fact that *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo* (中央研究院歷史語言研究所) can be called the “Institute of History and Philology” in English.

Wang Fansen 王汎森, who served as the director of this Institute, emphasizes that the historiographical work of Fu Sinian 傅斯年 (1896–1950) and Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890–1969), who supported the early days of its estab-

7 Zhang 2009, 2–3.

ishment, made internationalism its baseline. Their historiography was different from mere nationalism, but by making full use of Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Mongolian, among other languages, they tried to demonstrate a "multiethnic nature." Wang argues that it is not the authentic role of philology to focus on describing the history of a particular group of people (Jp. *minzoku* 民族) nor should it be an academic discipline that bolsters orientalism. Instead, he says that it should be "a reflection on history, non-regionality, and both methodologically and conceptually multidimensional."⁸

Looking at the situation in this way, Zhang Shunhui and Wang Fansen do not necessarily agree with each other on the direction to which the description of history should tend, but they both recognize that philology is a method that is inseparable from the study of history. This directly has something to do with the fact that Wang Fansen and philology that the Institute of History and Philology aims at accepts German philology as the study that relates to antiquity (*Altertumswissenschaft*). However, what we must recall here is that Wang himself had already argued that "philology and the study of classics should not be seen as the same" when German philology was at its golden age.

According to Sheldon Pollock, who edited *World Philology*, the reason why philology became an independent discipline in academia owes much to the contribution of Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824). In his youth, Wolf entered Göttingen University and registered himself as a "philologist" and thus, formally speaking, became the first student of philology in Europe in 1777. Apparently, Nietzsche wrote in his notebook that "April 8, 1777, when Wolf invented the term, *studiosus philologiae*, marks the birthday of philology."⁹ Thanks to Wolf, philology became independent of theology by becoming a critical study that was also liberated from the metaphysical soil. Later, this field was passed to Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), who plotted "philosophy of philology," and then to August Böckh (1785–1867). Böckh, who studied under Wolf, established the concept of philology as the whole of knowledge concerning human thought expressed through language in *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (1772–1929). The heyday of German philology in the 19th cen-

8 Fan-sen Wang, "Forward", in Pollock, Benjamin A. Elman, and Chang 2015, ix.

9 Murai 2014, 47.

tury, which is represented by Nietzsche, among others, was possible because of this historical development.¹⁰

Böckh clearly states that philology should not be taken as the study of antiquity (*Altertumsstudium*).¹¹ We should pay attention to the fact that the leading figure in the 19th century, who tried to systematize philology, added a critical consideration to the general understanding of philology. Böckh's argument is lucid. In short, *philologia* (φιλολογία) literally means the love of speech (Jp. *genron* 言論), but it does not imply the love of what is old. Even if it aims at investigating antiquity, this investigation itself has to be determined by modernity, and researchers cannot straightforwardly approach antiquity without the mediation of modernity. In general, Böckh argues that “every critique and interpretation is in fact philological ... and the formal act of a philologist is entirely reduced to critique and interpretation: hence, philology cannot be limited to the study of antiquity.”¹²

Then, what is philology? Böckh answers,

The authentic task of philology, I think, is to know what is born of human spirit, namely, to know what is known.¹³

Just as the institute of history and philology shows the two to have an affinity, if the study of history and philology comes to have a close connection with each other, Böckh's point is precisely the basis of this. If we refer to the definition of philology as the “(re)cognition of the known,” the act of writing a history has no choice but to be exceedingly philological. However, this is not an attitude of pursuing “antiquity” as itself being valuable or the purpose, but rather should be about committing to contemporary problems and embracing the fact that we are always determined by contemporaneity as the given condition. If that were not the case, neither philology nor the description of history would be possible.

If we look at it in this way, the philosophy that Jaspers defines by regarding the activity of spirit that “philosophizes” as the reason for a human being to be human is not necessarily accompanied by the fact that it would be recorded in

10 Pollock, Benjamin A. Elman, and Chang 2015, 6–7.

11 Böckh 2014, 8.

12 Ibid., 8–9.

13 Ibid., 16.

letters, and when the process of "philosophizing" is recorded, it seems like the effort to know it would have to be precisely philological. Is this really the case? As if he were expecting this, Böckh says the following:

Philology is based on the fundamental motive of a well-educated people. A group of people without education can do *philosophhein* (φιλοσοφείν), but not *philologeîn* (φιλολογεῖν).¹⁴

This quote seems to support the reason why philology is the study of *bunken*. However, I do not think it is yet sufficient to tie both philology and *bunken* (namely, written record) together as being the same. This is because it is not necessary for *philologos* (φιλόλογος) to depend on letters. The object to which *philo* (love) tends is *logos* in general, or precisely language in general, and it should not be limited only to written letters. In other words, *philologia* originally has the meaning of "to like language or discussions": hence, "to know the known" could point at the correspondence between words in general generated by "philosophizing."¹⁵ Let us refer to Böckh one last time:

Philology and philosophy are mutually limiting. That is because a human being cannot know the known without knowing and also without knowing what others know, one cannot simply obtain knowledge.¹⁶

This is to say that, where there is philosophy, there has to be philology at the same time. We could say that philology is the most immediate and indispensable method that makes "philosophizing" possible. If we think along Böckh's understanding, we could understand that interpreting philology as the study of *bunken* narrows the nuance of the original term. Of course, this is not merely a problem of translation. The founder of modern philology (*bunkengaku*) in Japan, Haga Yaichi 芳賀矢一 (1867–1927) was greatly influenced by European philology and through him philology was understood as the academic discipline that deals with the language and literature of a specific nation (民族).

14 Ibid., 18.

15 For the translation of *philologia* and *philologos*, I followed Yasukata Toshimasa's "love of talking" and "love of discussion". Cf. *ibid.*, 8, 19, etc.

16 Ibid., 26.

The abovementioned *World of Philology* regards this type of philology as a continuation of the globally shared trend that established its foundation between the 13th and 17th centuries and flourished through the epoch-making establishment of the modern university by Humboldt in the beginning of the 19th century. In this genealogy of philology, the trend from the 13th to 17th century especially was a shared phenomenon not only in Europe, but also in various regions of the world; this book, which is entitled with the term “world” and seeks the possibility of new philology takes this fact as its methodological hypothesis. Skillfully, this text does not provide a unifying definition to the question of “what is philology?” Rather, while acknowledging the discordance, such as tropology, text editing, and interpretation that make it impossible to seek a simple unity, it puts the basis of “world philology” on the fact that, in the practical act of reading, the philological praxis as “family resemblance” that transcends regions, was seen in the world during these historical periods. In this case, philology was tentatively summarized as the “interest in various problems of grammar and wording, the history of written texts, diverse reading, and interpretations of them.”¹⁷

3 Philological Turn in Qing Dynasty

Continuing with what we have discussed previously on the genealogy of philology, I would like to return to Benjamin Elman’s famous thesis of “from philosophy to philology” and reflect on this. What we have to keep in mind first is that Elman did not propose this thesis with the intention to defend how the tide of the history of Chinese academia moved from philosophy to philology during the transition from the Ming to Qing Dynasty nor how the Qing academia was philosophically undeveloped. In the preface to the new 2001 edition of *From Philosophy to Philology*, whose first edition was published in 1984, Elman explains the “misunderstanding” that the title of this book gave birth to in the following manner:

A certain group of Chinese scholars, especially critics in Taiwan, claimed that the selection of this title indicated the fundamental misunderstanding with regard to the relation of philosophy and philology in *kaozheng* (考証學). They

17 Pollock, Benjamin A. Elman, and Chang 2015, 12.

saw the title of my book not as the historical transition (from Song to Qing Dynasty) but particularly as that which pertains to distinctions of academic disciplines (literally from philosophy to philology) and critiqued it. Then, they came to a conclusion that my book had to be entitled "from philology to philosophy." That is because, Kaozheng scholars were using philology as the method of evaluating philosophy in classical Confucian texts (經書). I talk about Dai Zhen 戴震 in this book from the viewpoint of the transition (轉換) from "philology to philosophy" and my other article that was published in Taiwan argues that Kaozheng represents "critical philosophy" that opposes Daoist metaphysics; but that did not have any impact on these critics. By translating "From Philosophy to Philosophy" into Chinese as "从理学到朴学," I believe I have counteracted these misunderstanding.¹⁸

In terms of language, in order to inform academics who have been traditionally using terms like "philosophy" and "philology" (in European terms) in reference to academic disciplines in regions where neither of these terms exist, namely, as an expedient means, Elman is using the expression "from philosophy to philology." Indeed, it is difficult to ask that European languages to correspond with the concepts of *lixue* 理学 and *puxue* 朴学 (or *kaozheng*).¹⁹ However, it rather seems to be natural to express the characteristics of Chinese academia during the Qing Dynasty by rephrasing "philosophy" (Ch., *zhexue*; Jp. *tetsugaku* 哲学) into moral study (*yilixue* 義理学), the study of Daoism as "daoxue" (道学), or *Songxue* (宋学) and "wenxianxue" into "*kaozheng* / *kaojuxue* (考据学)," *puxue*, or *Hanxue* (汉学). In fact, there is no disagreement on the fact that what Elman's book is vividly describing is an ecosystem of the rich philological community based on *kaozheng* in the Qing Dynasty. The placement of Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777), which became the ground for the critique of Elman as we have seen in the quote above, is not as important as critics have claimed, especially given the description of the characteristics of the academic ecosystem in Qing Dynasty. As Elman repeatedly argues in this book, because the segregation of *kaozheng* and *yilixue* was self-evident for scholars and scholar-officials (*shidafu* 士大夫) during this historical period, Dai Zhen trespassed their bound-

18 Benjamin A Elman 2014, xxxiii.

19 [Both *kaojuxue* and *puxue* also indicate "textual study."]

aries and was insulted (that is somewhat puzzling by today's eyes). Thus, we should say that philosophical works, such as *Mengzi ziyi shuzheng* (孟子字義疏証) and *Yuan shan* (原善), which made Dai Zhen's name famous in modernity, were hardly regarded as valuable texts at that time. In particular, if we pick up "critical philosophy," which Dai Zhen represented, as the characteristics of Chinese academia during the Qing Dynasty, it ends up distorting the picture of its ecosystem, as we should also recognize that these texts are different from most of the works that Dai Zhen contributed in his life-time. (Whether or not they had any important significance for Dai Zhen *himself* is an entirely different problem.) Besides, how many scholars during his time left intellectual works that we could call "philosophy" other than Dai Zhen? Even if we argue that Dai Zhen established "*kaozheng-de* philosophy"²⁰ as the philosophy of philological critique, we cannot possibly say that Chinese academia in the Qing Dynasty was free from the dualistic structure of philosophy and philology. That is to say, even if we could find an individual case of "critical philosophy" in the field of academia during the Qing Dynasty, there is still some difficulty in drawing the conclusion that the field as a whole had its intention to turn from "philology to philosophy." It is equivalent to the difficulty of drawing out the answer to the question of "Why Kant did not exist in China?"

In response to this question, Ori Sela, who finds "the philological turn" of China in the works of Qian Daxin 錢大昕 (1728–1804), gives the following round-about answer:

And eighteenth-century China had no category called "philosophy" (as opposed to philology or history). My aim in this book is not to answer the question "Why no Kant?" Neither is it to pull an eighteenth-century Chinese Kant out of a hat. Rather, it is to understand the preoccupations and priorities of the historical actors, for whom philosophy was a nonissue. However, not having the category of philosophy did not mean there was no interest in anything beyond philology; on the contrary, philology was understood as the cornerstone or gateway for both "attaining the truth of meanings and principles" (得義理之真) and "bringing order to all under heaven" (治天下).²¹

20 Benjamin A Elman 2014, 20.

21 Sela 2018, 3.

Sela's answer to the question of "Why there was no Kant?" argues that even though no philosopher like Kant was born in China, there was instead philology and the interest of philology that crossed over to "dao" leads to *yili* and *zhi tianxia* (治天下). According to Sela, the pursuit of *yili* and the ideal of *zhi tianxia* were carried out concretely through the confirmation of identity as *ru* (儒). He continues to describe how the anxiety toward the identity of *ru* was precisely the cause that set forth the "philological turn" in the Qing dynasty.

The term "*ru*" is often used by scholars as names in reference to self or other: e.g., "we *ru*" (吾儒), "genuine/true *ru*" (真儒), "comprehensive *ru*" (通儒), "sincere *ru*" (洵儒), and "previous *ru*" (先儒), "later *ru*" (後儒), "vulgar *ru*" (俗儒), and "pretending *ru*" (貌儒).²² Furthermore, Sela argues that the marginalization of "*ru*" as the by-product of the influx of *xixue* 西学, i.e., Western learning brought by the Jesuits, the governance of different peoples (Jp., *iminzoku tōchi* 異民族統治), and economic prosperity brought about the identity crisis of the Confucians. Since, in essence, they felt anxiety about the concept of "dao" which they had to investigate, the new notion of "dao" was sought in ancient sources. The new knowledge based on *xixue* was regarded merely as the "groundless and empty theory" that cannot be genuine or true on its own.²³ Sela, who acknowledges the difference between *qiushi* (求是) and *qiugu* (求古) as the difference between the study conducted by Dai Zhen and that by Hui Dong 惠棟 (1697–1758), by citing the words of Yu Xiaoke 余蕭容 (1732–1778), also recognizes the peculiarity of Dai Zhen that tended towards "*qiushi*."²⁴ At any rate, Sela exhaustively describes Qing academia with the key term, "philological turn," and philology, expressed therein, is an activity that tries to gain access to "knowledge of the known" through the circuit of obsession with the old and to reconfirm the identity of "*ru*" through it. This coincides with the so-called "Linguistic turn" in *ru*xue (儒学), which Hamaguchi Fujio has long since argued.²⁵

22 Ibid., 6.

23 Ibid., 97.

24 Ibid., 100. [求是 means pragmatist while 求古 means traditionalist or orthodox.]

25 Hamaguchi 1994, 32.

However, for those of us who try to think about “world philosophy as Chinese philosophy,” it is by no means sufficient or satisfactory to give up the question of why there was nothing philosophical in the academic works of the Qing Dynasty and to argue for the fact that there was the motivation to pursue *yili* in philological activities. As we have discussed earlier, it need scarcely be said that linguistics, astronomy, mathematics, *jinwenxue* (金文学), *lülüxue* (律呂学),²⁶ and land-surveying, which were widely conducted in Qing academia, were introduced by missionaries at the end of Ming Dynasty; and according to their European categories, almost all of these six disciplines were seen as that which is reducible to “*philosophia*” (*feilusuo feiya* 斐錄所費亞).²⁷ What is included in and outlined by philosophy is changeable according to different historical periods, and from the viewpoint of the 16th century, *kaozheng* in the Qing Dynasty served the name of philosophy. Of course, this does not answer the question of “why there was no Kant,” but at least we can realize that *yilixue* is philosophical and *kaozheng* is philological, in accordance with their distinction from each other, and that accordingly there is a different way of understanding the shift “from philosophy to philology” than the one in which the shift is understood as that which has historically taken place during the transitional period from the Ming to the Qing dynasty.

Therefore, I would like to go back to Böckh’s discussion. In other words, his argument that philology is the study that deals with the “knowledge of the known” and, at the same time, philosophy and philology limit one other. Here, *philologia* was an indispensable medium for the concrete expression of *philosophia*. In the Qing academia, the study of texts (Jp., *bunken kenkyū* 文献研究), especially those that expressed the study of antiquity (*guxue* 古学), was actively carried out; this is likely because, I gather, it was precisely based on the reflection of the mutual limitation between philology and philosophy. We should be reminded of Kinoshita Tetsuya’s 木下鉄矢 (1950–2013) words:

With regard to Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, even if we exempt Chen Di’s positivism, without knowing the “Rhyme Dictionary” (*yunshu* 韻書), especially the

26 *Jinwenxue* is the study of letters engraved on bronze plaques and statues. *Lülüxue* is the study of sound made by traditional Chinese instruments.

27 Ishii 2015, 243–265.

phonological system of *guangyun* (廣韻), I am not sure if the concrete insight of the "phonological part" (Jp. *on'in bubun* 音韻部分) was possible only through a careful study of and dwelling on Confucian texts (*jingshu* 經書). We should not underestimate the fact that, because he came across the text of *Guangyun*, that he arrived at this insight. With regard to Dai Zhen, it was clear that his knowledge of the "Rhyme table study" (*dengyunxue* 等韻學) played an important role. If we take this into consideration, whether regarding *guangyun* or "*dengyunxue*," the precise and systematic analysis of either phonological sound (音韻) or voice that they demonstrate was provided by importing the linguistic knowledge of Ancient India through the introduction of Buddhism. And this is an important point. ... In any case, concrete academic activity, and this is the same for activity of thinking, among others, takes place through "communication" (Jp. *kōtsū* 交通) and I wonder if that so-called purity, which "exhaustively dwells on [a tradition]," is really nothing but a scholarly "fiction."²⁸

Kinoshita's *Shinchō kōshōgaku to sono jidai* 「清朝考証学」とその時代 [*Kaozheng in the Qing Dynasty and the Historical Period*] discusses how phonology accomplished its position as it was launched by Chen Di 陳第 (1541–1617), passed from Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), through Dai Zhen, to Duan Yucai 段玉裁 (1736–1815). This text draws scholars' attention to the fact that the academic discipline, which is seen as a pre-established and particular tradition, realizes itself by presupposing "communication" (交通). All "activity of thinking," including "concrete academic activities," is established by taking an encounter with the other as a mediatory opportunity. By doing this, "change" (*henyō* 変容) becomes possible. This is probably connected to what Sela expresses as the crisis of *ru* identity. In other words, the new situation that pushed Confucians to their identity crisis is undoubtedly generated by the communication with the other; accordingly, it is fully possible to say that the fact of the sudden rise of *kaozheng* itself was the interaction between the practice of "philosophizing" (for those who created and carried out *kaozheng*) and the philology that mediates it. And in this sense, we should understand the turning point of history called the "philological turn."

The development of knowledge concerning an ancient language that focused on the study of ancient phonology made it possible to see through the written

28 Kinoshita 1996, 27–28.

letters of ancient texts (which centered around Confucian texts) into the living and trembling world of the “voice.” The deep, near, far, and resonating world of language, which can be lived as an individual was revealed, and those who acquired the intellectual ability to see this world through the letters were joyful over their new and exciting discovery. This achieved access to a world that breathed freedom of spirit.²⁹

Kinoshita’s description of the phonologists’ motive for their search of ancient sound is somewhat sensational; however, it could be of help to us to understand why there was an attempt to overcome what Sela has pointed out as an identity crisis through the study of texts. *Qing kaozheng* was probably not a “philosophical” study (in the ordinary sense of the term), thus we would have no choice but to say that an attempt to find such a “philosophy” therein itself is a non-historical attempt. This “philological turn” in the Qing Dynasty, as Elman describes, was inherited by succeeding scholars. In the 20th century, new types of philologists, such as Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936) and Liu Shiwei 劉師培 (1884–1919), fully observed the nutrients from *Qing kaozheng*.³⁰ We do not need to repeat that their academic works were quite philosophical, even in the general sense of the word. Since philology is the study that is mutually conditioned with philosophy, apart from the question of whether or not it is philosophy, it is often initiated by philosophy and also invites philosophy to it, so that each should rediscover thinking in the future. Philological philosophy that took place at the end of the Qing Dynasty is precisely this type of activity.

Böckh argues that, in the same way as *philosophia*, *philologia* has no choice but to be performative.³¹ That is because “love of wisdom” and “love of logos” are neither wisdom itself nor logos itself, but both cannot be anything but the continuous act of seeking them as that which should come to be in the future. Hence, if we accept the thesis of “philological turn” in the Qing dynasty, we should see it in the sense that the self-awareness of intellectual readers (Jp. *dokushojin* 読書人), who try to be philological through the “effort of achieving logos,”³² ex-

29 Kinoshita 1996, 21–22.

30 Benjamin A Elman 2014, 22.

31 Böckh 2014, 24.

32 Ibid., 24.

pressed itself as the question towards the identity of "ru." In this case, we should understand this "philology" as an indispensable medium for the act of "philosophizing" in the sense in which Jaspers talks about it. It is not about questioning "either philosophy or philology," but of philology being subsumed in "philosophizing" and, in turn, we can say that there is no "philosophizing" without "philologizing." Thus, philology, which is understood precisely as the pursuit of logos, can be rephrased as the performative practice of "philologizing."

Thinking in this way, I think that the method of Dai Zhen is much more important in the sense of "philologizing" rather than of being philosophical.

Where texts (經) arrive is dao. What clarifies dao is words (詞). What constitutes words cannot be anything but the letters in *xiaoxue* (小学). Through letters we arrive at language and through language, we communicate with the hearts-and-wills of the wise from antiquity.³³

We must recall the history in which dao was accepted as the translation of logos. It is not possible that they are of equal value, but it is also very difficult to definitively see what they ultimately mean. It is probably far more productive to think that the wealth of meanings is brought forth from the midst of such mutual-translationality (Jp., *goyakusei* 互訳性).³⁴ At any rate, Dai Zhen in this passage argues for the necessity of starting from *Xiaoxue* as the method of pursuing dao, and needless to say, this methodology directly shows Dai Zhen's position toward so-called *Kaoheng*/philology, which includes phonology (*yinyun-lun* 音韻論), astronomy (*tianwenlisuanxue* 天文曆算学), and commentaria of classical texts that made him famous in his time. Yasuda Jirō 安田二郎 (1911–1955) once pointed out that Dai Zhen's method "appears to be objective, but in fact feels like an overflow of subjectivity," as he sought its reason in the limits of language that one cannot avoid insofar as it is language.³⁵ In this sense, it was extremely appropriate for Pollock to point to tropology as the first level in the

33 "Gujingjie gouchen xu" 古经解钩沉序 [The Foreword to *Mining the Six Classics*] in Dai 1936, in the Anhui Congshu minguo ershiwu nian yingyinben 安徽丛书民国二十五年影印本 [A photo copy of Anhui Book Series 1936].

34 Regarding this point, Nakajima and Notomi particularly provide a very rich discussion. See Nakajima and Notomi 2020, 6–28.

35 Yasuda 1971, 6.

domain of philology. If I were to borrow the words of Notomi, logos is equipped with the “structure of inversion” (*gyakuten-no kōzō* 逆転の構造), where “what we are seeing is the image or more precisely falsehood, and in order to see the real, we use metaphors,”³⁶ and the “cause of the emergence of metaphor, irony, and symbol” expresses the “incompleteness of the function” of language;³⁷ hence, it rather shows the essence of “philologizing” as the “love of logos.” “To be scientific” has been widely accepted as the significance of Qing academia, as a kind of renaissance since Liang Qichao 梁啓超, but Yasuda expressed his skepticism towards it with the expression of an “overflow of subjectivity.” However, if we approve of Dai Zhen’s method, etymologically-speaking, as being philological, and also if we grasp the “philological turn” in the Qing Dynasty in this sense of the flourishing of philology, then we can acknowledge that philology in the Qing dynasty is the study that seeks logos (*dao*) within the bounds of language while being conscious of its limit. It is not necessary to repeat here that this is an activity that intermediates with “philosophizing,” which includes the contemplation of what transcends logos.

4 Ecology of Philologizing

The editor of *World Philology*, Sheldon Pollock, is by no means trying to recover the old glory days of philology from its continuous marginalization, since its peak happened during the 19th century. Instead, he argues that the present-day reconstruction of philology is necessary in response to the institutional diversification of knowledge and the decline of theories in the present, both of which are caused by the marginalization of the academic study that takes “reading” to be its main body (Jp., *shutai* 主体).³⁸ He then claims that this attempt should be promoted through “historical self-awareness,” “non-regionality,” and “methodological and conceptual pluralism.”³⁹ However, what is necessary in today’s technological society is not only “reading,” but also to return to the pursuit of logos

36 Nakajima and Notomi 2020, 13.

37 Yasuda 1971, 5.

38 *Shutai* could also mean “subject” or “subjectivity.”

39 Pollock, Benjamin A. Elman, and Chang 2015, 23.

as the origin of *philologia*. Philology as that which questions the ways of logos must be the method of intellectual exploration toward our being and the world as it becomes one with world philosophy.

In this case, I do think that we can still learn a lot from the ecosystem of the academic community in the Qing Dynasty that experienced the "philological turn." For instance, Elman argues that an academic practice in an organized association of intellectual readers, such as *Fushe* 復社, at the end of the Ming Dynasty, was helpful for the reconstruction of *jingshu* 經書 and arousing a self-awareness that leads to the methodology of *kaozheng* (which is necessary for the former) during the Qing dynasty.⁴⁰ The academies of classical learning (*shuyuan* 書院) that was actively carried out since the Song Dynasty began to be severely restricted during the Qing dynasty, but even then, it was impossible for the authority to suppress the needs for education, and after the Yongzheng Emperor 雍正帝, the public *shuyuan* (*guanli shuyuan* 官立書院) was established in every part of the country. The strict public-private (*guan* 官 / *si* 私) distinction did not bear any great significance then (just as it is the same today) and so, a number of new *shuyuans* were opened in Jiangnan, leading *kaozheng* scholars gathered there to form a large influential presence, as in such cases as the "Yangzhou School" (揚州學派). We could also say that Ruan Yuan's 阮元 (1764–1849) *Gujing jingshe* 詁經精舍 and *Xuehaitang* 學海堂 are the representatives of these places. These *shuyuans* were not only an educational facility, but also literally supported the prosperity of Qing academia as that which was in charge of textual studies (文獻研究). They served the role of a platform for collaboration and discussions among scholars, which came to be known as the "community of scholars."⁴¹ If we return to the primary meaning of philology, we should say that this kind of scholarly community was the outcome of "philologizing" carried out by the "lovers of discussions." Kondō Mitsuo claimed that we should add not only "*shishi qiushi*" (實事求是), but also "*haoxue shensi*" (好學深思) to the characteristics of *Qing kaozheng*. But as

40 Benjamin A Elman 2014, 166.

41 See *ibid.*, "Chapter 4" and "Chapter 6".

Böckh says, Qing academia, as we have described above, embodied philology as *philomatheia* (φιλομαθεία).⁴²

Thus, if we are to newly construct philology today, what is required on top of these elements that Pollock emphasizes is to reconstruct “reading” not as something that culminates in each individual, but as the communal activity among multiple individuals. Only through that does “knowledge of the known” become the interaction between the object of knowledge and the process of becoming. This is where philology appears as the study that loves logos as that which never becomes complete. If what is pursued in world philosophy is the transformation and creation of concepts through the cross-boundary movement of translation,⁴³ there is no doubt that what makes this possible is philology. If it is possible to establish a new *shuyuan*, it should be a community that is based on linguistic diversity. Only there do philology and philosophy hold each other hand in hand in the endless human pursuit of logos and that which lies beyond it yet to be fostered.

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42 Böckh 2014, 24.

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