

# CHINESE PHILOSOPHY FOR LOGICIANS: THE CASE OF JIN YUELIN AND SHEN YOUADING

SHINO YOSHINOBU 志野好伸, TRANS. BY TAKESHI MORISATO AND CODY STATON

## 1 World Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

The term “world philosophy” implies that philosophy does not belong to the western tradition alone. If that were the case, then when speaking of “Chinese philosophy” as a “world philosophy,” we would expect the term to refer to a type of philosophy that is different from the western counterpart. *Chinese* philosophy or any philosophy unique to China is an implicit expectation when we employ this terminology. In search of Chinese characteristics, we often refer to the tradition of Chinese thought, which includes Confucianism, Daoism, the Hundred Schools of Thought, Sinicized Buddhism, etc. Moreover, we probably need to pay attention to the fact that this tradition called *Chinese Thought* was itself constructed after the influx of western philosophy. If “philosophy” that is extracted from such a tradition is a response to questions that have significance only inside “China,” then we cannot say that it would contribute to “world philosophy.” Instead, it must provide answers to the questions that are universal to humanity or at least, to some degree, shared among us. Of course, depending on the ways in which the world exists, what counts as shared questions will vary. At any rate, Chinese philosophy must demonstrate the answer that is useful for people outside the bounds of the Chinese tradition. Only when demonstrating that kind of answer can “Chinese philosophy” be acknowledged to be a “world philosophy” and achieve value as a philosophy that is free of regional limitations.

Turning to the situation in Japan, when the term “Japanese Philosophy” is used, it often indicates academic movements in Japan after philosophy was imported from Europe, while the pre-Meiji philosophical works are frequently described as “Japanese Thought.” Fujita Masakatsu’s *A History of Japanese Philosophy* (2018) is a typical case in point: even though “an attempt to narrate the intellectual stream from Prince Shotoku’s *Seventeen-article Constitution* to contemporary thought as the history of Japanese philosophy is fully possible,” this book limits its narrative to the period in which Japanese intellectuals came in

contact with western philosophy.<sup>1</sup> In this case, “Japanese philosophy” presupposes that it has been baptized by “western philosophy.”

However, in the case of “Chinese philosophy,” so long as the term “philosophy” is used, there has certainly been some effort to discover ideas that correspond with the categories of “western philosophy” in the traditional thought of China, but after a considerable accumulation of studies, even if there were some parts that it shares with western philosophy, it had to be distinguished from western philosophy (and this does not mean, however, that the possibility of its dialogue with western philosophy is closed). Thus, the academic field of “Chinese philosophy” was established and tacitly assumed its originality.<sup>2</sup> We could say that, partly due to the historical development of the philosophical studies of Chinese classics since modernity, Chinese philosophy has been studied while maintaining its distinction from western philosophy much more than Japanese philosophy has.<sup>3</sup>

We must pause here and consider the following: “Chinese philosophy” as “world philosophy” comes with some biases such as those just mentioned and, because of that, there are certain types of Chinese philosophy that are difficult to discern. If we take a philosophy that has been emphasized as being Chinese and regard it as “Chinese philosophy A,” and if we take a philosophy that is related to China (without asking whether or not it is peculiar to China) and call it “Chinese philosophy B,” what is left out is “Chinese philosophy C,”<sup>4</sup> which

---

1 Fujita 2018, 13–14.

2 The “legitimacy” discussions concerning Chinese philosophy took place in the 2000s as a reflection of these distinctions, but I will not touch on this issue here. As an introduction to these discussions to the Japanese audience, I recommend articles included in the special issue of *Chūgoku: shakai to bunka* 中国-社会と文化 no. 19 (2004), entitled “Traditions and Modernity in East Asian Philosophy” (東アジア思想における伝統と近代).

3 With regard to a facet of these problems, consult Shino 2018.

4 Translator’s note: Note here that “Chinese Philosophy B” is inclusive of “Chinese philosophy C.” The author does not use the notion of A, B, C, but only differentiates them with two kinds of parentheses (「」 and < >) and indicate the third kind that is not recognized as being Chinese within the second category (i.e., B). The original construction is much better at showing the ambiguous status of the third

includes philosophical works that are written in Chinese, but their Chinese character will disappear once they are translated into other languages. Or, the ones written in English by Chinese authors with elements that have something to do with China will almost completely disappear when we hide the authors' names. For instance, logic or analytic philosophy by Chinese thinkers are typical cases. We could simply see their achievements as a contribution to "philosophy," but it is also possible to register them as "Chinese philosophy B," when they are written by Chinese authors (even though we would have to disregard the question of who the term *Chinese* applies to here) or when they are written in Chinese. This is the same as when we say that Kant is a philosopher or that he is a German philosopher, and when we say that Wittgenstein is a philosopher or include him in the Vienna School.

What I would like to examine here are the Chinese logicians Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (1895–1984) and Shen Youding 沈有鼎 (1908–89). Not many studies have been done on Jin Yuelin in Japanese, but there have been a number of works carried out in Chinese. As for Shen Youding, there are not been many scholarly works on his philosophy, even in Chinese, while nothing has been written on his work in Japanese.<sup>5</sup> Hashikawa Tokio 橋川時雄 (1894–1982) comments on the Chinese philosophical world in 1937 by saying that, after Hu Shi's (胡適, 1891–1962) pragmatism subsided in popularity, Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) went to Tsinghua University and Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973) to Yenching University, thus "giving a situation where a dragon is lying coiled up over there and a tiger is crouching over here" (Jp. Ryūbankyoko 龍蟠虎踞). He further articulates that, "at the same time as Feng Youlan, Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (1893–1986), and Jin Yuelin have advocated 'New Realism' and later Shen Youding joined the group, and now they are publishing texts on logic at their academies." Thus, we can see how Hashikawa considered Jin Yuelin and

---

kind and it should not be distinguished from others in the same way as the first and the second are differentiated. For the rest of this article, "Chinese philosophy A" is simply identified with quotation marks as "Chinese philosophy" unless it is placed in contrast with "Chinese Philosophy B."

- 5 If we search these names at CNKI (<http://www.cnki.net/>), 799 hits on "Jin Yuelin" and 66 on "Shen Youding" appear. Accessed on June 3, 2020.

Shen Youding to be important figures in the field of philosophy in China.<sup>6</sup> In other words, Japanese residents in China paid attention to their works in the late 1930s, though their publications have never been seriously studied in Japanese academia till today. Still, it is impossible for me to comprehensively examine their contribution to philosophy. In this article, I intend to propose a concrete example of “Chinese philosophy as a world philosophy” by examining how these philosophers, who seriously studied logic in Europe and North America and made a sufficient number of scholarly achievements, regarded “Chinese philosophy” and how they related it to their own philosophy.

## 2 Chinese Philosophy for Jin Yuelin

I would like to briefly cover the personal history and career of Jin Yuelin. He was born in Changsha 長沙 in 1895 and after studying at the Tsinghua School (清華學堂) in Beijing, he began studies in the United States in 1914, and while there entered graduate school for political science at Columbia University in 1917. He received his Ph.D. in 1920. It was exactly in 1917 when Hu Shi submitted his dissertation to Columbia University under the supervision of John Dewey. During this time, Jin Yuelin was awakened to philosophy and decided to take up his studies at Cambridge and London University after moving to the United Kingdom in 1921. According to him, he was most influenced by Russell's *Principia Mathematica* and Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*.<sup>7</sup> He finished his study abroad in Europe in 1925 and became a professor of philosophy at Tsinghua University in 1926. During the Sino-Japanese War, he moved to the south as a professor at National Southwestern Associated University 西南聯合大學. He published *Logic* (論理 / 邏輯) in 1935, began work on *Lun-dao* (論道) in 1937 (which was published in 1940) and completed his magnum opus, *Epistemology*, in 1948. He succeeded Feng Youlan in 1949 as the Chair of

6 Hashikawa Tokio 2016, 116. As we will see later, Shen Youding, who is the student of Jin Yuelin, became an instructor at Tsinghua University after his return from Germany in 1934 just like his teacher.

7 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 1994, 3.

Philosophy at Tsinghua University and embraced Marxism, though his earlier works received criticism. He died in 1984.

How did Jin Yuelin understand “Chinese philosophy”? Let us first examine his 1943 essay, “Chinese Philosophy,” which he prepared as a lecture to American soldiers staying in China.

At the beginning of this essay, Jin Yuelin divides philosophy in the world into three parts: India, Greece, and China. In opposition to Indian philosophy, which he characterizes as “otherworldly” (来世的), and Greek philosophy as “unworldly” (非现世的), he argues that Chinese philosophy is characterized as being “worldly” (现世的).<sup>8</sup> However, what is worldly through and through is not philosophical. Hence, he says that its being “worldly” is essentially its characteristics in comparison with philosophies of other regions.<sup>9</sup> Hence, we cannot say that there is no philosophy in China. Even then, Jin Yuelin does not actively discuss “Chinese philosophy.” Regarding pre-Qing dynasty Chinese philosophies, he argues as follows: “Since terms are inadequate, we shall refrain from any attempt at description.”<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, he states that, “[i]t is misleading enough to apply the familiar philosophical term to Western philosophy, it is much worse to apply them to the Chinese.” For instance, he refers to a theory that there was a logician in the pre-Qin Dynasty and that the School of Yin-yang is the pioneer of science. He criticizes how, even though these theories are not wrong, they are very likely to invite misunderstanding. He was probably thinking about Hu Shi’s *An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy*. In his “Feng Youlan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Review Report” (1930), Jin Yuelin de-

8 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 1980, 461: hereafter, CP, followed by the page number of *Jin Yuelin quanji* 金岳霖全集 vol. 5 (Jin Yuelin 2013) [The Complete Works of Jin Yuelin would be abbreviated as JYQ.]

9 It is widely known that the scheme of dividing world philosophy into the West, China, and India was adapted by Liang Shuming’s (梁漱溟, 1893–1988) *Eastern and Western Culture and Their Philosophy* (东西文化及其哲学) (1921). Liang argues in this text that the Buddha mostly lies outside the real world, while Confucius only talks about the real world, etc. See Liang Shuming 1989, 536. Jin Yuelin was probably thinking of this book when he introduced these distinctions. Also, at the beginning of *Lundao*, he introduces the same distinction (16).

10 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 1980, 462.

scribes Hu Shi's work "as if it were written by an American that studies Chinese thought" and criticizes the fact that we can detect "American prejudice" in it.<sup>11</sup>

He also sets forth the question of whether or not we can say that Buddhism, which flowed from India, is Chinese philosophy. British Hegelianism has a certain degree of British characteristics even though they are brought in from abroad, and it is clearly included in British philosophy. On the contrary, Buddhism was spread through the medium of Daoist thought and, even though it has become to some degree Chinese philosophy, there is a clear distinction between its fundamental character and philosophy that is peculiar to China.

What then are the characteristics of philosophy peculiar to China? Jin Yuelin tries to explain it without using "proper names, technicalities or details."<sup>12</sup> That is probably because this manuscript was prepared for an audience that did not know much about traditional Chinese thought, but also because "terms are inadequate" to do so. Under such conditions, Jin Yuelin dares to weave his words.

First of all, he points out the fact that Chinese philosophers did not develop logic and epistemology. As Hu Shi often pointed out, pre-Qing scholars, like ancient Greek thinkers, developed speculative (*shibenteki* 思弁的) philosophy—as mentioned above, while Jin Yuelin has argued that considering them to be logicians will invite misunderstanding. However, this way of thinking lived only for a short period of time in China and consciousness concerning logic and epistemology ends without seeing any substantial development. Chinese philosophy did not achieve clarity like the works of Aristotle, but argued always in a rather implicit way: hence, "centuries annotations and interpretations never stopped."<sup>13</sup> This does not mean that Chinese philosophy is poor in originality, but rather, according to Jin Yuelin, "Chinese philosophy [...] was particularly suited to being made use of original thinkers in that it could gather original thought into its mold or structure almost without any effort."<sup>14</sup>

Additionally, Jin refers to the differences between the Chinese concept of *tian* (天) and the western concept of "nature," explaining that nature is sepa-

11 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 2013, 2: 409.

12 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 1980, 463.

13 Ibid., 467.

14 Ibid., 468.

rated from humans in the west, thereby committed to anthropocentrism (人間中心主義), through which nature is the object of human conquest, while Chinese philosophers regarded the “unity of the universe and humans” (天人合一). Even though the interpretation of nature varies from one school to another, they coincide in that “man is not set apart from nature and in opposition to it.”<sup>15</sup> This universe/human unity also implies the “unity of ethics and politics, of the individual and the society”<sup>16</sup>; hence, the “unity of philosophy and politics lies partly at any rate in the philosopher.”<sup>17</sup> However, this is not peculiar to China alone. This way of approaching philosophy in the Chinese tradition is also inherit in the Socratic method, where “ethics, politics, reflective thinking and knowledge were unified in the philosopher.”<sup>18</sup> The specialization of knowledge has significantly advanced in Europe and North America, where there is no longer anyone like Socrates, whereas Chinese philosophers have instead succeeded the tradition of Socrates. According to Jin Yuelin, “philosophy was hardly ever merely a pattern of ideas exhibited for human understanding, but also at the same time a system of percepts internal to the conduct of the philosopher and in extreme cases it might even be said to be his biography.”<sup>19</sup> This essay ends with a lament: the separation of the philosopher and his philosophy, “deprived the world of one kind of colorfulness.”<sup>20</sup>

### 3 Jin Yuelin’s Philosophical View

Jin Yuelin certainly discusses the characteristics of Chinese philosophy in the essay “Chinese philosophy.” However, his attitude is not to discover the same characteristics as western philosophy in Chinese philosophy or to extract an originality of Chinese philosophy by discovering what is different about Chinese philosophy from western philosophy. For Jin Yuelin, to talk about Chinese philosophy is precisely to talk about how philosophy should be since Socrates. The

---

15 Ibid., 471.

16 Ibid., 475–476.

17 Ibid., 477, 360.

18 Ibid., 480.

19 Ibid., 480–481.

20 Ibid., 481.

way philosophy should be is not segmented fields of academic studies, but philosophy that is tied to philosophers' deeds and actions of their lives. Jin Yuelin's philosophy certainly reflected this ideal image of philosophy that he himself pursued.

In the English essay, "Prolegomena," published in 1927, Jin Yuelin tries to discuss the "relation of logic to philosophy, to life and to our knowledge of the world in which we live."<sup>21</sup> First, the problem of "whether the world is chaotic or orderly" is disqualified as a meaningless question.<sup>22</sup> The problem of whether or not life corresponds to logic can be answered in both ways, and he further argues that how we look at life is "a matter of belief."<sup>23</sup> Why then do we believe in logic in life? Logic provides convenience to life. Jin Yuelin states that the logic that is represented by the relation of "if - then" "facilitates life only in the satisfaction of our desires that are given, it does not have anything to do with the value, or quality or quantity of desires as desires, nor has it anything to do with psychology of their mutual relations."<sup>24</sup> In other words, "spiritual sufferings and strivings, ambitious beyond one's capacity, emotional excitement centering around one's ego, or imaginations that are unconditioned by time and space, or religious feelings, or Freudian complexes," stated simply the matters of feelings in life, are "aspects of life with which logic is not concerned."<sup>25</sup> In this manner, while acknowledging the significance of logic, Jin Yuelin clearly claims that it does not capture life itself.

Why then does he talk about logic? Why doesn't he take up a discussion of intuition as the method that captures life? There were those who emphasized intuition, which is suitable for grasping change (based on the fact that the world changes) "at the expense of intellect,"<sup>26</sup> but Jin Yuelin in fact criticized those approaches. For Jin Yuelin, "[t]he essential difference between intuition and intellect is probably one of speed,"<sup>27</sup> and intuition as a quick inference often suffers

21 "Prolegomena," 553. The page number is cited from *JYQ* vol. 5.

22 *Ibid.*, 566.

23 *Ibid.*, 573.

24 *Ibid.*, 578.

25 *Ibid.*

26 "Prolegomena," 586.

27 *Ibid.*



from uncertainties. Rather, knowledge “must be comparatively more static” vis-à-vis the changing world, thus claiming the necessity of intellect and logic for the sake of knowledge.<sup>28</sup> This criticism probably refers to those who claimed the superiority of intuition over the conceptualizing intellect, by borrowing lines from Bergson, during the philosophy of life debate which began in 1923, or more concretely, he was referring to Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887–1969) and Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988). He is not arguing that scientific, conceptual intellect is all-around perfect as scientific thinkers (following Hu Shi) do. What Jin Yuelin is doing is pointing out the limits of logic in relation to life and deciphering its limited usefulness. As we have seen previously, confidence in logic’s application to life is a matter of belief: hence, he once again states that, “if we believe in logic for the sake of convenience”, it is because “to believe in it is more convenient than otherwise” and expresses this choice as “metaphysical pragmatism”<sup>29</sup> and “a prejudice.”<sup>30</sup>

By saying that philosophy is “a form of play,” but also that “play is one of the most serious activities in life,”<sup>31</sup> he explains the relation of philosophy and life. In other words, philosophy and logic as the “the essence of philosophy”<sup>32</sup> are not clearly grounded. What acknowledges logic in life is nothing but belief and even though it is serious, it is merely an activity of play. In addition, the domain of the problem of feelings that logic cannot deal with spreads wide throughout the lifeworld. By adding this type of limit to logic, Jin Yuelin defends the significance of life or the significance of philosophy in life.

In his “The Principle of the Arrival of Inclination” (*Shizhi yuanze* 勢至原則, 1943), Jin Yuelin distinguishes two worlds—the world in which logic is established and the world in which logic is not necessarily established—with two expressions, “this kind of world” (這樣的世界) and “this world” (這個世界). “This kind of world” is that which is described by “reason” and “numbers” while “this world” is imbued by “inclination,” thus “we cannot seek the answer to the question of how the inclination is provided in the world of language. Propo-

---

28 Ibid., 588.

29 Ibid., 599.

30 Ibid., 600.

31 Ibid., 606.

32 Ibid., 596 f.

sitions cannot be a tool for answering this question.”<sup>33</sup> At *Lundao* 2: 30, he argues that the authentic world (original world), where logic is established, is also a real world, but in this case “reality” does not mean that it “exists” in the “present.” Rather it “comes to be” and “exists,” as this world is not limited to “this kind of world that exists in the present.” If we refer to the way that he argues in *Shizhi yuanze*, we should not think of it as “this kind of world,” but only “this world.”<sup>34</sup> We can say that “this world” is the world of life and that “this kind of world” is the world of philosophy. However, as we mentioned previously, philosophy is not cut off from the world of life. Concerning “reason” and “inclination,” he determines at *Lundao* 8:5 that the “interrelation of common appearance (*gongxiang* 共相) is reason and the generation/termination of particular appearance (*shuxiang* 殊相) is inclination.” We can rephrase *gongxiang* as universality (普遍性) and *shuxiang* as particularity (特殊性). At *Lundao* 8:8, he uses these terms of “common appearance” and “particular appearance” to determine the predicates, including *ti* (体), *yong* (用), *xing* (性), *qing* (情), which have been used often in traditional Chinese philosophy, in the following fashion:

*Xing* means that the common appearance of an individual lies in a certain individual; *ti* means that the common appearance stands in opposition to all the other individuals; *qing* means that the particular appearance of the individual lies in a certain individual; and *yong* means that this particular appearance stands in opposition to all the other individuals.

With regard to *xing* and *qing*, he argues accordingly: “I will not discuss whether there was such usage of them in the past, but it makes sense and I personally think that *xing* always tends to have more universal meaning while *qing* always takes on the meaning of the particular.” What he refers to here as *qing* has a much broader conceptual application than the expression “feelings” (感情), for he explains that feelings are included among “*qing* in the generation/termination of particular appearance,” thus not excluding the problem of feelings. Moreover, with regard to the concepts of *ti* and *yong*, he states that “Chinese philosophers have many different and conflicting arguments about them. However,

33 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 2013, 2: 373.

34 When I quote lines from Jin’s *Lundao*, I will indicate them with the proposition numbers.

according to the explication of this proposition [8:8], their differences depend on whether they emphasize the *gongxiang* or *shuxiang*” and then explains the difference between an ordinary life and philosophy in the following manner:

What we directly touch is all *qing* and *yong*, it is reasonable to stress them in ordinary life, but in philosophy we cannot emphasize either side of *xing-ti* or *qing-yong*.

Unlike ordinary life, philosophy takes up universal problems, but at the same time he says that it should be inclusive of the individual and particular feelings that we emphasize in ordinary life.

There are several articles that deal with the problem of feelings in the philosophy of Jin Yuelin and I would like to refer to Liu Yuebing’s (劉岳兵, b. 1968) “The Implication of Feelings in Jin Yuelin’s Philosophy” (金岳霖哲學思想的情感底蘊). Liu introduces two conflicting viewpoints concerning the relation between Jin Yuelin’s philosophy and traditional Chinese philosophy. The first is Feng Youlan’s evaluation that the system of *Lundao*, where modernization and nationalization (民族化) are dissolved into one, is certainly “Chinese philosophy” and not merely “philosophy in China.” The second is to say that “the problem of ‘Life Ethics’ or ‘humanity’ is diluted and there is undoubtedly a large distance and rupture from traditional philosophy in China.”<sup>35</sup> Liu Yuebing argues that both evaluations are one-sided and that “philosophical feelings” (哲意的情感) is the most basic and the most important foundation of Jin Yuelin’s thought. He then states: “‘philosophical feelings’ is represented by the *Lundao* and ‘Chinese Philosophy’ and embodies the unity of modernity and nationality, as its essence is Chinese.”<sup>36</sup> Liu Yuebing’s way of speaking here is extremely similar to the viewpoint of Feng Youlan, but he is probably assessing the rational side of Jin Yuelin’s philosophy as being cut off from the Chinese tradition, while the side of philosophical feelings that supports its theory is “Chinese.”

35 Liu 2007, 292 f.. “Someone” refers to Zhongjiang Wang 王中江 (b. 1957) and it’s a quotation from his Reason and Romance: cf. Wang 1993. By the way, Feng Youlan regards *Lundao* as “Chinese philosophy,” but states that Jin Yuelin’s *Logic* and *Epistemology* are “epistemology and logic in China and not Chinese epistemology or logic.” See Feng 1999, 198.

36 Liu Yuebing 2007, 290, 296.

Honma Tsugihiko also questions the distance between the *Lundao* and the traditional thought of China in “This World and This Kind of World: Discussing Jin Yuelin and His Notion of Dao,” but also indicates in conclusion that “there is no need to understand what he thinks of as *dao* in relation to traditional philosophy.”<sup>37</sup> Why then does Jin Yuelin purposefully take up the term *dao* in his *Lundao*? This choice has, to a greater extent, something to do with the problem of feelings in philosophy. In *Lundao* 1:1 and 1:2, Jin Yuelin states that, “if we are referring to the side of feelings, the notion of *zhenyi de qinggan* (哲意的情感)<sup>38</sup> in Indian philosophy is the most ‘authentic’, for it reveals the constant feeling that there is the least distinction between heaven and humans. We can say that, wherever it goes, all is ‘suchness’ (*ruru* 如如) and, moreover, it makes sense in reference to the side of feelings, but the notion of *dao* in Chinese philosophy is quite different from this.” With this in mind, he argues that he would employ the notion of *dao*, which has a certain coldness while being less serious and preserves more ambiguity than the Greek *logos*. We can understand coldness as the index by which we can measure whether it is logical or refers to feelings. *Dao* is thereby selected as that which takes the middle path between *ruru* 如如 and *logos*.<sup>39</sup> In the Preface to *Lundao*, he remarks that, “even though I have never studied Chinese thought, I was born and raised in China and without knowing it, I came to gain an understanding of the significance of Chinese thought and now I am reflecting on the feeling that this significance provides.” He continues: “the most sublime concept in Chinese thought is probably *dao*.”<sup>40</sup> Moreover, his attitude towards classical metaphysics (*Yuanxue* 元学) and epistemology differs from each other. With regard to epistemology, the “I” should forget itself as being human and take a “calm attitude” even in relation to the problems that have something to do with humans, while in *Yuanxue* he claims that the “I” can forget about itself being human, but it cannot forget that “the heaven-and-earth was born with the ego and all things are one with the ego.”<sup>41</sup> In the same Preface, he also discusses the use of the predicate *dao* in the following fashion (and this is what both Liu Yuebing and Honma have cited in their essays):

37 Honma 2008b, 79.

38 Jin is citing Zhang Shenfu’s term here.

39 He gives a similar explanation in *Lundao* 1:26.

40 Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 1994, 16.

41 *Ibid.*, 17.

With regard to the side of reason, what I call “*dao*” can be called by different names and even if we do this, the main idea of this book will not be affected. However, regarding the side of feelings, if we use different terms, the new name will neither move my heart nor rejoice my *qing* (情), nor even nourish my *xing* (性). The judge in epistemology is reason, but that of *Yuanxue* is the whole personality (Jp. *zenjinkaku* 全人格).<sup>42</sup>

We do not have to use “*dao*,” but “we can establish a different name.” So long as we take “this kind of world” as the object of our study, focus on examining the relation between it and “this world” and avoid touching on the concrete aspect of “this world,” whether or not we should use the traditional Chinese concept is not a problem.

However, when we think about Jin Yuelin’s philosophy, the problem of *qing* is indispensable. If we look from the side of *qing*, it is by all means necessary for Jin Yuelin, who was born and raised in China to use the notion of “*dao*.” Here rises (not philosophy but) “Chinese philosophy B.” The world of ordinary life that relates to the whole personality of a philosopher named Jin Yuelin, that is to say, “this world” finds its way into philosophy.

However, it has not been clearly shown what kind of relation the concept of *dao* that Jin Yuelin uses has to traditional Chinese thought.<sup>43</sup> Hence, like Liu Yuebing, we cannot quickly determine Jin Yuelin’s philosophy as being “Chinese.” However, we could at least say that by taking feelings as the problem, Jin

42 The original term translated here as “whole personality” is *zhengge de ren* 整個的人. This follows a previous translation in Azuma 2004, 235.

43 In *Lundao*, Jin Yuelin repeatedly refers to the relation of his concepts and traditional Chinese thought with qualifiers that “there has never been such usage of these concepts as you see in this book” or “I will not discuss whether or not there has been the same method as this book’s,” thereby severing the continuity between his concepts and traditional Chinese philosophy. For instance, proposition 7:1, which refers to *ji* (幾), and 8:8, which refers to *ti* and *yong*, says that his usage of these terms are different from the traditional one, and 7:11, which refers to *ming* (命), and 8:8, which refers to *xing* and *qing* shows that the author will not talk about the previous usages of these terms. As an exception, proposition 8:13, which refers to *taiji* (太極), affirms the connection between his understanding of it with the traditional interpretation by saying that we can use the “old terminology.”

Yuelin has defined the domain in which we should consider “Chinese philosophy B,” which is distinguished from philosophy. How that relates to “Chinese Philosophy A” remains an open question.

The essay “Chinese Philosophy” argues that philosophy is comparable to the biography of an individual and to grasp philosophy in that way is characteristic of Chinese philosophy itself. However, it is not particular only to Chinese philosophy, but Socratic philosophy was also originally something like that: hence, it is difficult to determine it as being peculiar to China. “This world” is the world with “colors” and just as there is the Chinese one, it also includes that which is Indian or western. If “this kind of world” is the domain of theoretical philosophy, “this world” is, so to speak, the domain of world philosophy. In later years, of the three books that Jin Yuelin wrote, *Lundao* had relatively satisfied what the author wanted to say. He states that “it is an extremely metaphysical book.” What he means by “metaphysical” here is synonymous with *yuanyue de* (元学的) and so, we could say that it is a book that has something to do with his whole personality. He further reflects that the main focus of *Lundao* aimed at the “current of times,” which allowed him to be “able to return to the great stream of the universe that is ultimate non-being (*wuji* 無極) and at the same time ultimate being (*taiji* 太極).”<sup>44</sup> Honma explains the step to move from *wuji* to *taiji* as a processual series in which the human being as the “individual that has will” comes to “completely realize its true nature” and as a process “that is chosen, established, and occasionally changed by human beings that live in history.”<sup>45</sup> Jin Yuelin did not often talk about “Chinese philosophy A,” but both self-consciously and actively talked about “Chinese philosophy B” as one of the world philosophies.

#### 4 Chinese Philosophy for Shen Youding

Next, I would like to consider Shen Youding’s theories. Shen Youding was born in Shanghai in 1908, entered Tsinghua University in 1925, and was under the tutelage of Jin Yuelin at the newly established department of philosophy. He

44 Liu Peiyu and Jin Yuelin *xueshu jijinhui xueshu weiyuanhui* 1995, 49–50.

45 Honma 2008a, 246.

graduated from the philosophy program in 1929 and went to the United States, where he studied logic from Whitehead and received a Master's degree in philosophy. In 1931, he moved to Germany and studied at Heidelberg and Freiburg. In Freiburg, he personally studied under Husserl (since he was ostracized from the university for being Jewish at that time).<sup>46</sup> He returned home in 1934 and taught at his alma mater, but during the Sino-Japanese war, just like Jin Yuelin, moved to National Southwestern Associated University as an instructor and took refuge in the south. He studied at Oxford University between 1945–47 and returned to China in 1948. After teaching again at Tsinghua University, he became the professor of philosophy at Beijing University and, in 1955, he moved to the Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院 (which is now Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 中国社会科学院) before passing away in 1989. He was not a very prolific scholar and most of his achievements are compiled in *The Collected Works of Shen Youding* (1992).

If we indicate his main achievements before the Liberation, he published two essays, “On Expressions” and “On the Finite System,” and two short essays on the order of 64 hexagrams of *Yi* (易) in 1935. Then, he published “The Future Development of Chinese Philosophy” in 1937, “The Field of Truth” in 1940, “Language, Thought, Significance: Analysis of Meaning Chapter I” in 1943, and in the following year “Classification of Significance: Analysis of Meaning Chapter 2.” With regard to the three articles that were published in the 1940s, Jin Xiping argues that “they depend on the fruit of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*.”<sup>47</sup> By the way, it is unthinkable that Shen Youding, who lived in Germany between 1931 and 1934, did not know the name of Heidegger. Xiong Wei 熊偉 (1911–1994), for instance, studied during the same period at Freiburg University under Heidegger, as did many other scholars who were influenced by this encounter; however, Shen Youding does not refer to Heidegger at all (as far as we look at the texts that he has left us). After the Liberation, he worked more on logic in Mozi and Gongsun Long.

46 As for the relation between Shen Youding and Husserl, see Jin Xiping 2004 and Ni Liangkang 2010.

47 Jin Xiping 2004, 18.

Most of Shen Youding's scholarly achievements are highly specialized in a specific field of philosophic study. However, his essay, "The Future Development of Chinese Philosophy" consists of relatively introductory content. In *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (当代中国哲学, 1947), after briefly touching on Shen Youding's personality, He Lin 贺麟 (1902–92) introduces this essay in detail. It is a short essay (which amounts to less than ten pages), but I would like to interpret this text from the viewpoint of Chinese philosophy as a world philosophy. This essay was originally delivered as a lecture at the *Third Conference of Philosophy in China*, held in Nanjing, January 1937, and it was later published in *Philosophical Review* (哲學評論) in vol. 7 in March of the same year. Jin Yuelin was also participating in the same conference and what he presented that year was "Individuation of Reality." This is compiled in *Lundao* chapter three of the same title.

At the beginning of "The Future Development of Chinese Philosophy," Shen Youding argues that the truth of philosophy is trans-historical and it neither increases its amount nor enjoys more development. On the contrary, "general truth—which also includes most of the philosophical knowledge—is gradual, historical, and developmental." To borrow Jin Yuelin's expression, we could say that what is involved with "this kind of world" is the truth of philosophy and what is involved in "this world" is general truth. In the first section of this essay, Shen Youding first introduces opposing views on the relation between Chinese people and philosophy. On the one hand, he presents a view that "Chinese people emphasize reality, they neither like contemplation nor have a spirit that seeks truth for the sake of truth: hence, they achieve little in terms of philosophy and fall far behind India or the West." On the other hand, he also argues that "there is a lucid, certain, and fine philosophy in China" and as Indian Buddhists say, "there are many foundational vessels of Mahayana in the Eastern soil." He holds to the view that "Chinese people have very powerful understanding and their intuitive ability and perseverance to achieve enlightenment are immediately far better than those in the west or India." He rather favors their tendency to rely on intuition and to disregard analysis because excessive analysis becomes a hindrance to the clear work of understanding. This, he claims, explains the reason why Chinese people do not take up an analytic attitude because they love peace and harmony. As for the first point, he values the flipside of it by saying that,



because Chinese people are concerned with practical life, they have a “particularly calm and objective attitude” and they “refrain from being carried away to extremes by seeking moderation and harmony”: hence, “in terms of academic studies, they are doing their best to absorb a number of different ideas and trying to refine them into one.” In sum, Shen Youding concludes that “Chinese people (中国民族) live up to their name as ‘philosophical people’ (哲学民族) based on the three aspects of innate character, past achievements, and future possibility.”

However, when he says, “philosophical people,” it is unclear what kind of trans-historical “truth of philosophy” this implies. He continues to discuss the history of Chinese culture, tie it to the way of philosophizing, and only talks about a so-called “knowledge of philosophy.”

If we follow Youding’s arrangement, Chinese culture in the first period takes the philosophy of “exploring reason of all things and fully developing nature” (*qiongli jinxing* 窮理尽性) in Confucianism as its primary axis, for Confucius is the one who theorizes the ideal in the Zhou Dynasty period. The second period turns to *Xuanxue* (玄学), which inherits a philosophy that returns to the genuine simplicity of Daoism as the primary axis, but regards Chan Buddhism as arriving as the highest point. He also makes an assessment about the first period being idealistic (唯心的) while the second is materialistic. As for the *Song xue* (宋学) that is placed in the second period, he sums it up by saying that, even though it has “proposed an idealistic philosophy of *qiongli jinxing*, it was poor and lacked a well-thought out and clear logic and, moreover, failed to escape from materialistic and nihilistic thought for several hundred years. They simply could not reach the creative intuition of ancient Confucians or fulfil a versatile intuition that produced social etiquette and music.” He then criticizes the culture of the Qing Dynasty period, in which students of classical Confucianism were carried away to science as the “culture without philosophy.”<sup>48</sup> The end of this culture in the second period is the present positioned as the culture

48 However, science and philosophy are not necessarily understood in their mutual opposition but he states that “science and philosophy are born from the spirit of firmness (刚) and motion (动) in the first period.”

in the third period.<sup>49</sup> “History has the rhythm of waves” and “the culture in the third period goes back again to the spirit of the first period.” What prevents this movement is the “influence of shallow pragmatism” and Shen Youding believes that, because of this, philosophy is generally disregarded. The question of “what kind of philosophy is needed in China?”—according to him, treats philosophy like a slave commodity (or slave that we can sell and buy) and this derives from the wrongheaded philosophical view owing to Pragmatism. Finally, he concludes this essay by saying that the culture of the fourth period could take place—which means the renaissance of the culture in the second period—and before the maturation of the culture in the third period, the revival of Daoism is needed for the revival of Confucianism because Daoism is rich in the power of liberation.

## 5 Shen Youding’s Chinese Philosophy and Logic

Let me ask again: is the philosophy that Shen Youding discusses in the history of Chinese culture trans-historical? Or does it belong to the “knowledge of philosophy” that is included in general truth? Various instances of Chinese philosophy, including Confucianism, Daoism, Xuanxue, Cheng–Zhu school, etc., are determined by the place called China and limited by different historical periods; even if they include trans-historical truth, it is very difficult to think that Chinese philosophy in its totality encompasses a trans-historical philoso-

49 He Lin makes some careless points with regard to the fact that “The Future Development of Chinese Philosophy” is advocating the renaissance of Idealistic culture and yet he positively evaluates this point by saying that “unless standing on an outstanding viewpoint, he cannot say such a thing.” See He 2002, 44. (This is a revised edition of the *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*.) However, He Lin also argues that *Logic in the Works of Mozi*, published after the Liberation, should be highly regarded as a “vivid materialist standpoint.” Thus, He Lin changes his standpoint when he comes to the works after the liberation. See Shen Youding 1992, 377; hereafter *SYW*. Zheng Jiewen (鄭傑文), while praising the accuracy and sophistication of analysis in Shen Youding’s *Logic in the Works of Mozi*, assesses its Preface and Conclusion as being materialistic, thus pointing out that this text clearly shows the characteristics of the historical era (Zheng 2002, 366–8).

phy. Can we then only say that Shen Youding was insinuating the existence of trans-historical philosophy in the beginning, but all the philosophies that he talked about in other parts of the essay were all historically determined? Does he conclude that trans-historical philosophy after all has no relation to Chinese culture? As we have already discussed, Shen Youding pointed out how Chinese philosophy is poor in analysis in comparison with Anglo-European and Indian philosophies, but praises a kind of “*Chinese philosophy*” that criticizes excessive analysis and emphasizes harmony against it. On the one hand, one of the characteristics of the first-period philosophy is its being logical: the third-period philosophy advocates the realization of “logical spirit.” We can also see a passage saying that “Chinese people are in the midst of revising their attitude under the influence of western culture and of doing their best to engage in analysis; hence, they are by no means inferior to westerners.” In other words, in both the first and third periods, we can observe an orientation towards trans-historical philosophy in China. Shen Youding probably took pride in the fact that he himself contributed to it. However, what he took as the objects of his study were Mohism and the School of Names and never dealt with Confucian or Daoist philosophies.

He states in the conclusion to the essay “Logic in Mohist Arguments” (published in *Guangming Daily* 光明日報 between 1954–55)<sup>50</sup> that “logical rule and form in human thinking have no ethno-nationality, race, or social class. However, the vocal language as the direct manifestation of thinking has ethno-nationality, though it has no social class” and because of that, the Chinese language “has made an ineluctable influence on the development of logic in China and the side of its expression comes to be equipped with a certain degree of ethno-national form.”<sup>51</sup> The problem of how to express trans-historical philosophy corresponds to Jin Yuelin’s problem of feelings that he dealt with in the process of selecting terms. We could say that the problem of the philosophy in China, namely, the problem of “Chinese Philosophy B” is taken up for discussion. However, there are some points that are quite different in their approaches. Jin Yuelin sees the possibility of the philosophy of the ordinary world in the do-

50 It was rephrased as *Mohist Logic* (墨經的邏輯學) in 1980 and published through Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe (中國社會科學出版社).

51 *SYW*, 377.

main of feelings with which the “whole personality” is involved, while, in the case of Shen Youding, his statement about philosophy in China is independent from his own philosophical system. His essay “The Future Development of Chinese Philosophy” occupies a peculiar place in relation to his oeuvre, thus remains poor in its relation to his other achievements. At the end, we have no choice but to say that Shen Youding could not clearly construct the relation between trans-historical philosophy and regional/historical philosophy. He later says the following to his disciple Wang Hao (王浩):

Chinese letters can easily draw out the problem of “interpretation without understanding” (望文生義) and there are some who try to read the principle of contemporary physics through *Mojing* (墨經). I think this kind of method is not very scientific. My interest in *Mojing* primarily lies on the side of the study of letters and grammar.<sup>52</sup>

After Liberation, Shen Youding did some investigations into the logic of ancient China, as well as logic itself, but what we could consider to be trans-historical philosophy is essentially the latter. As for the former, he intended to clarify the meaning of the ancient Chinese texts rather than to make any contribution to the field of logic (even though, of course, he demonstrated his great analytic power in this task). Zheng Jiewen highly values Shen Youding’s method by saying that “he proves the arguments of the texts in and through the texts and demonstrates logical themes in *Mohist Arguments* (墨辨) by using its terms.” He further remarks that “it implicitly goes along with the conclusion of his predecessors that two chapters entitled *Xiaoqu* (小取) and *Daqu* (大取) are the general outline of Mohist arguments (墨辨) and that *Mohist Texts* (墨經) provide each theory of the Mohist arguments (墨辨).”<sup>53</sup> This method in his investigation into Mohist arguments (墨辨) is the same as the way in which he examined the *I Ching* before the liberation, and Youding himself acknowledges in a few places that the result of analyzing the *I Ching* corresponded with the fruit of *Kaozheng* (考證) during the Qing Dynasty period.<sup>54</sup> In other words, Shen You-

52 “A Letter to Wang Hao on May 11, 1981” in *SYW*, 585.

53 Zheng 2002, 367–368.

54 See *SYW*, 98. Shen Youding argues in “Zhouyi xugua gugou dayi” 周易序卦骨構大意 [The Essential Summary on the Constructure of *Zhouyi Xugua*] (1936) that

ding's contribution to Ancient Chinese logic is based on the traditional study of them, at least since the Qing Dynasty period and it is, therefore, appropriate to separate it from his other contributions to trans-historical philosophy, namely, his achievements in logic.<sup>55</sup> For him, logic in ancient China was only "Chinese Philosophy A," but was never given the title of "Chinese philosophy B."

## 6 Concluding Remarks

What we can find from the abovementioned study is the difficulty of searching for China's philosophy, while maintaining it as a philosophy that is not bound by historical periods or geo-political regions. We could say that Jin Yuelin's philosophy that opened up the possibility of "Chinese philosophy B" is the trace of tenaciously walking along the narrow path. The preceding study has shown to a certain degree what kind of achievements it has made for philosophy. But it should be discussed as one of many considered to be a "world philosophy" in a much more open field.

---

"when I came up with this theory, I was thinking that it had never been developed by anyone. But recently, when I read 'Yigua citushou' 易卦次圖說 [The Visual Explanation of the Order of Hexagrams of Yi] in 'Cui Dongbi yishu' 崔東壁遺書 [Cui Dongbi's Existing Works], I realized that it has unexpectedly corresponded with my theory."

- 55 Of course, it is too early to judge philosophy of these thinkers only by paying attention to their published works as articles. According to He Lin, Shen Youding "preferred to absorb philosophical thought through his ears at lectures rather than through his eyes over books" and "never missed a single conference, lecture or workshop that involved philosophical association" (He 2002, 40). On the other hand, when a conference of *Philosophical Review* (哲學評論) was organized in Nanjing, he had others deal with the administrative and organizational work and recollected that "his duty was to sit next to Shen Youding and stop his talk." See, Liu and Ji Yuelin *Xueshu Jijinhui xueshu weiyuanhui* 1995, 47–48.

## References

- Azuma Jūji 吾妻重二 (2004). “Minkokuki chūgoku ni okeru ‘Tetsugaku’ to ‘Gengaku’ 民国期中国における‘哲学’と‘玄学’.” In: *Chūgoku: shakai to bunka* 19, pp. 232–238.
- Chūgoku shakai bunka gakkai 中国社会文化学会, ed. (2004). *Traditions and Modernity in East Asian Philosophy*. Chūgoku: shakai to bunka 中国：社会と文化 19.
- Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1999). *Zhongguo xiandai zhhexueshi* 中国現代哲学史. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.
- Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝 (2018). *Nihon tetsugaku shi* 日本哲学史. Kyoto: Shōwadō.
- Hashikawa Tokio 橋川時雄 (2016). “Shina gakkai no sūsei to peipin bunka no hōkai.” 支那学界の趨勢と北平文化の崩壊. In: *Minkokuki no gaku-jutukai* 民国期の学术界. Ed. by Takada Tokio 高田時雄. Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten.
- He Lin 賀麟 (2002). *Wushi nianlai de Zhongguo zhaxue* 五十年来的中国哲学. Shanghai: Shangwuyin shuguan.
- Honma Tsugihiko 本間次彦 (2008a). “Hajimari no nai hajime kara owari no nai owari eno michi o donoyōni arukuka: Kin Gakurin to shushigaku to nijū seiki no chūgoku tetsugaku.” 始まりのない始めから終わりのない終わりへの道をどのように歩くか：金岳霖と朱子学と20世紀の中国哲学. In: *Kokusai chiiki no shakaikagaku III: ajia gaku eno sasoi* 国際地域の社会科学 III：アジア学への誘い. Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō.
- (2008b). “Kono sekai to konoyōna sekai: Kin Gakurin, dō o ronzu” この世界とこのような世界：金岳霖、道を論ず. In: *Meiji daigaku kyōyōron shū* 429, pp. 61–83.
- Jin Xiping 靳希平 (2004). “Shen Youding yu Husaier de xianxiangxue” 沈有鼎与胡塞爾的現象学. In: *Yunnan daxue xuebao: shehui kexueban* 3.5, pp. 12–23.
- Jin Yuelin [Chin Yueh-lin] 金岳霖 (1980). “Chinese Philosophy.” In: *Social Sciences in China* 1.1.
- (1994). *Lun dao* 論道. Beijing: Shangwuyin shuguan.

- (2013). *Jin Yuelin quanji* 金岳霖全集. Ed. by Jin yuelin xueshu jijinhui 金岳霖學術基金會. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1989). *Liang Shuming quanji* 梁漱溟全集. Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe.
- Liu Peiyu 劉培育 and Jin Yuelin xueshu jijinhui xueshu weiyuanhui 金岳霖學術基金會學術委員會, eds. (1995). *Jin Yuelin de huiyi yu huiyi Jin Yuelin* 金岳霖的回憶與回憶金岳霖. Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe.
- Liu Yuebing 劉岳兵 (2007). “Jin Yuelin zhexue sixiang de qinggan diyun.” 金岳霖哲學思想的情感底蘊. In: *Zhong Ri jinxiandai sixiang yu ruxue* 中日近現代思想與儒學. Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian.
- Ni Liangkang 倪梁康 (2010). “Shen Youding yu Husaier zai zhiguan wenti-shang de sixiang yinyuan” 沈有鼎與胡塞爾在直觀問題上的思想因緣. In: *Jiangsu shehuikexue* 6.
- Shen Youding 沈有鼎 (1992). *Shen Youding wenji* 沈有鼎文集. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Shino Yoshinobu 志野好伸 (2018). “‘Nihontetsugaku’ eno iwakan o saguru.” “日本哲學”への違和感を探る. In: *Ima tetsugaku ga hajimaru: meidai bungakubu karano chosen* いま、哲学がはじまる：明大文学部からの挑戦. Ed. by Ikeda Takashi 池田喬 et al. Tokyo: Meiji University Press.
- Wang Zhongjiang 王中江 (1993). *Lixing yu langman: Jin Yuelin de shenghuo ji qi zhixue* 理性與浪漫：金岳霖的生活及其哲學. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe.
- Zheng Jiewen 鄭傑文 (2002). *Ersbi shiji moxue yanjiushi* 20世紀墨學研究史. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press.