

Nation and Nationalism in Modern Chinese History¹

One of the most complex concepts that has influenced modern Chinese political thought is the concept of nation.² Originally of European provenance, nation entered the mind of Chinese intellectuals as a concept in the late 19th century.³ It became part of major political campaigns in the 20th century, including anti-Manchurism in late imperial China, the nation building in the Republican period and the national liberation campaign under the Chinese Communist Party. China is thus no exception, an observation that is reinforced by Reinhart Koselleck, who has argued that people (*Volk*, in a social as well as an ethnical sense) and nation have been the most central concepts in world history since the 20th century. The nation concept found its way to China after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895. After being defeated by its former tributary state, the Empire could no longer claim moral or cultural superiority. Accordingly, the traditional world order – known as the all-under-heaven (*tianxia* 天下) – disintegrated, and in the following decades, the European model of the nation-state replaced *tianxia* as the new leading concept in political thought. After the war, tens of thousands of Chinese intellectuals and scholars – many of whom either fled to Japan due to the suppression of the Hundred Days' Reform in late 1898 or were sent by their provincial or the central government to study there – sought knowledge for building a prosperous country and a strong army (*fuguo qiangbing* 富國強兵)⁴ and making China successful in the struggle for survival as a nation state. Japan proved to be an influential role model⁵ as it had experienced rapid modernization success since the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji ishin* 明治維新) in 1868, which not only revived imperial rule, but also introduced enormous changes in the political and social structure leading to the creation of the first nation-state in East Asia.⁶

The influx of new knowledge that had already started slowly in the decades after the Opium Wars began to increase by leaps and bounds after 1895. It was then that nationalism and social Dar-

-
- 1 In writing this article, I based on the earlier research of Huang Xingtao and Wang Ke. I am grateful to Shen Sung-chiao and Murata Yūjirō for their stimulating discussion some years ago. I also thank Hon Tze-ki and Kai Vogelsang for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper, as well as the two anonymous reviewers.
 - 2 In the following, nation and the related terms should be understood with caution, for their conceptual use and understanding differs between Europe (the place of its origin) and the country analyzed here.
 - 3 On the transfer of the nation concept to China, see K.W. Chow 2001, Fitzgerald 1995, Liu Qingfeng 1994, Shen Songqiao 2002 and Wang Ke 2001.
 - 4 This slogan was widespread in the late imperial era as a reaction to the imperialist aggression that seemed to endanger the national survival of China. Liang Qichao, in his own account, wrote a short piece in 1901 entitled "Fuguo qiangbing" in his longer work *On Liberty* (*Ziyoushu* 自由書), which was published serially from March 1899 to March 1900 in the *Qingyi bao*. He reflected on the question of which nation would survive in the future and on the importance of material wealth and military strength. See *Yinbingshi wenji*, vol. 4, 2301.
 - 5 For more on this topic, see Harrell 1992, F.Q. Huang 1982, and Sanetō Keishū 1981.
 - 6 Current research holds that nation appeared in the Japanese language earlier than in the Chinese due to the fact that the successful Meiji Restoration managed to instill a national consciousness comparatively earlier (Huang Xingtao 2002, Fang Weigui 2002, Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2006). For a conceptual history of nation in Japan, see the impressive study of Doak 2007.

winism (both of European origin) began to put their world view into question, which plunged Chinese thinkers into a deep intellectual crisis.⁷ According to Joseph Levenson, this was the reason for the “intellectual alienation from traditional Chinese culture,”⁸ which both caused and provided the content for later Chinese nationalism and the quest for national identity.⁹ In the search for a sound and convincing self-understanding, intellectuals developed discourses of ethnicity that were designed to provide assurances to those reeling from the Western impact. When their own imperial government failed to respond to the fear that China might be “carved up” by the imperialist nations, their nationalism was soon directed against the ruling Manchu elite, who were ethnically distinct from the majority population, the Han. While the sense of alienation from the ruling elite ended in 1912 with the founding of the Republic of China, it persisted with regard to the Confucian tradition and efforts were made to cope with it in the Kuomintang’s (KMT) national modernization program. After the Northern Expedition (1926–1928), which ended the rule of warlords, the KMT pursued a variety of nation-building policies that included economic, educational, military and social reforms. These policies experienced a serious setback, however, not only due to the Japanese invasion in the 1930s,¹⁰ but also ethnocentric bias that favored Han Chinese over ethnic minority groups. This ethnocentrism changed when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered into the war for national liberation (*minzu jiefang* 民族解放). In contrast to the KMT, the communists were eager to solicit the support of ethnic minorities (*shaoshu minzu* 少数民族, itself a communist term) in their fight against “feudalism,” “imperialism,” and “capitalism.”¹¹ When the so-called national liberation was achieved in 1949,¹² nation was no longer defined ethnically, but in terms of class. Only those with the correct proletarian class background could be members of the nation, which in principle included the ethnic minorities. With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the introduction of market reforms in 1978, class disappeared as the primary category of nationhood and was replaced by a sense of ethnicity that emphasized nation over class (without, however, always clarifying its contents; more often than not, it equaled patriotism).¹³ For Chinese ethnic minorities today (the country currently claims to be home to a total of 56 ethnic groups), ethnicity is the primary marker of distinction (with culture being its most often

7 The ideas of Charles Darwin and his successors in the field of sociology were introduced to China by the efforts of Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), who published his translation of Thomas Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics* in 1898 and Herbert Spencer’s *The Study of Sociology* in 1902.

8 Levenson 1968, Vol. 1, 95. The sense of alienation caused a great feeling of insecurity among intellectuals in that period when they were compelled to reorient themselves in a rapidly changing world order. Compare here for instance the psychological tensions that Liang Qichao describes in his “Sanshi zizhuan” 三十自傳 (“Autobiography at Thirty”). See *Yingbingshi wenji*, vol. 4, 2222–2226.

9 For a similar interpretation, see Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding 2008, and the chapter on *tianxia* in Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2008.

10 For the nationalism of this period cf. Fitzgerald 1996.

11 The term “ethnic minorities” is a deliberate creation of the Chinese Communist Party. On the issue of communist ethnopolitics in general, see X.Y. Liu 2004. Instructive here is also the new study by Thomas Mullaney on the 1954 ethnic classification project.

12 Admittedly, “national liberation” is a communist slogan intended to legitimize the rule of the CCP. The extent to which the events of 1949 represented an actual liberation is questionable. A short yet critical assessment of the use of the ideological category “liberation” is provided in Esherick 1995. For an overview on the Sinicized Marxism and the national question in general, see Hoston 1994.

13 On the revival of ethnicity in 1970s and 1980s China see Litzinger 1998.

cited feature).¹⁴ This change has created severe problems resembling those that existed when nationalism was first introduced in the late imperial period, specifically concerning how far ethnicity can and should serve political ends. For maintaining national unity, the CCP obviously still does not favor construing ethnicity in a political sense among its minorities.¹⁵

Given the fact that the concept of nationalism figured continuously in Chinese political discourse throughout the 20th century (both the KMT and the CCP relied on nationalism as an important tool in political movement), this paper will certainly not be able to provide a complete picture of how "nation" and "nationalism" were used as terminology in political discourse. Its purpose is rather to focus on the formative period of the nation concept, when it traveled from Europe to China, and to highlight both the semantical and epistemological issues that Chinese intellectuals faced when ambitiously trying to appropriate a non-indigenous concept and use it for their own political purposes. I am going to show that the transfer of the nation concept faced severe problems due to the unique historical situation of late imperial China, where state and nation were conceptually interwoven, making the reception of a European concept especially difficult. Indeed, a great deal of creativity was necessary to make "nation" work in the Chinese context.

Research on the origin of Chinese nationalism¹⁶ (including national symbolism¹⁷) has shown that the nation concept in modern China was understood primarily in ethnic terms, albeit without a sufficiently clear distinction being made between ethnicity and nation. The two concepts were only rarely congruent, which made application of the concepts nation and nationalism to the political reality of China a challenge. To properly understand the role of nationalistic thinking in Chinese modern history, it is necessary to examine the intricate relationship in China between ethnic and national identity. In the following, nation will be understood as a normative political idea that is characterized by the congruence of people (*renmin* 人民), territory (*tudi* 土地) and national sovereignty (*zhuquan* 主權), whereby the state represents the interests of the nation.¹⁸ The history of modern political thought has shown that a nation can only be successful in securing its existence when it is able to establish and safeguard a collective identity based on the congruence of land and people.¹⁹ This congruence is achieved by homogenization to the inside and a clear delineation to the outside.²⁰ In this case, it is imperative to decide who belongs to the nation and who does not – in other words, to make sense of the slogan *Zhongguo zhe wu Zhongguoren zhi Zhongguo* 中國者吾中國人之中國 ("China is

14 On how the number of 56 gained widespread dissemination, see the concluding chapter in Mullaney 2011.

15 For this reason, differences between the ethnicities are largely perceived in cultural terms. Dru Gladney has shown how the perception of ethnic minorities by the majority Han ethnicities is actually an expression of a Han-Chinese exoticism (and even eroticism). See Gladney 1994.

16 Dabringhaus 2006, Duara 1995, Fitzgerald 1995, Karl 2002, Laitinen 1990, Liu Qingfeng 1994, Sakamoto Hiroko 2004, Schubert 2002, Townsend 1992, Wilbur 1983, Wong 1989, Zhao 2004.

17 Harrison 2000 and 2001, Onodera Shirō 2011.

18 The political significance of achieving this congruence has already been noticed by Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (1879-1936) in his serial article "Paiwai yu guojifa" 排外與國際法 (Antiforeign Sentiments and International Law) that appeared in the *Minbao* between 1906 and 1907 (*Minbao* no. 4, 6–10, 13).

19 This definition serves first and foremost a heuristic purpose. As shown elsewhere (Fitzgerald 1995, Callahan 2010) all three elements have been decisive elements, albeit to varying degrees in the course of 20th century.

20 This is a classical argument in nationalism theory. Cf. here Deutsch 1972, Anderson 1983, Smith 1971 and 1998. For the case of China, see Matten 2009.

the China of the Chinese”)²¹ – and to accordingly propagate this national consciousness.²² As the definition of nation tends to change over the course of time and directly influences political behavior, it is necessary to examine the impact of the concept of nation. Given that “nation” had to be translated into a completely different family of languages (translators had to find new terms for a new idea) to make the concept accessible, the rendering was inevitably influenced by the writer’s political views. In this paper, I will show how the conceptual use of nation reflected political views that, in turn, were a result of specific historical circumstances. This view corresponds to the findings of Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng (2006). By employing a quantitative statistical method, they propose a methodologically different reading of the transformation of the Chinese conception of *tianxia* and nation. Their database, which covers texts dating from 1860 to 1915 (totaling 70 million Chinese characters), has allowed them to implement a frequency count and meaning analysis of terms that tracks the fall of the concept of *tianxia* and the emergence of the concept of nation.²³ Highlighting the shifting frequency of the terms *tianxia*, *guojia* 國家 (“state”), *minzu* 民族 (“nation”), *wanguo* 萬國 (“ten-thousand countries”) and *shijie* 世界 (“world”), they conclude that until China’s defeat in 1894 Chinese intellectuals were deeply embedded in their traditional world order, characterized by the Sinocentric *wanguo guan* 萬國觀. They argue that it was not until 1895 that China replaced this view with the European nation-state concept that followed the logic of nationalism and social Darwinism.²⁴

Accordingly, a conceptual history in the case of China has to start with an examination of the intricate transfer of the nation concept from the European to the Chinese context. While Lydia Liu, Michael Lackner, Federico Masini and Fang Weigui have analyzed in detail the process of translating scientific terms from European languages into Chinese, the conceptual history of nation has generally received little attention. The problem is far more complex than imagined: Although earlier studies have concentrated on the historical semantics and lexical changes,²⁵ they have not adequately dealt with the *Begriffsgeschichte*, or “conceptual history,” of the nation concept. The latter invariably requires more than simple semantic or lexical analysis. For instance, whereas intellectual history focuses on intellectuals and their ideas, it also neglects the actual impact of the respective concepts on society. Likewise, the history of ideas deals mainly with the expression, preservation and change of human ideas over time, but it further disregards Reinhart Koselleck’s (1923–2006) insight that language is not simply an epiphenomenon of reality. Without it, there would be no knowledge of our world and society. Conceptual history sees the etymology and the change of meaning of concepts as a crucial basis for contemporary cultural, conceptual and linguistic understanding. It concentrates on the historic

21 See here the discussion in “Duli shuo” 獨立說 (*Qingyi bao* 58, 24 September 1900).

22 The means to do so are manifold, ranging from national education and mass media to army conscription.

23 For a list of the considered texts, see Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2008, 463–477.

24 The quantitative statistical method employed by Liu and Jin is very enlightening when analyzing conceptual change. However, the problem with this approach is twofold. First, their text corpus does not include all available texts, which might distort their findings. While considering more texts could certainly solve this problem, the second problem is more complex: due to the overall rise in publications after 1895 (owing to the growing degree of politicization and the better access to modern printing technology, esp. in Japan), the frequency of single terms inevitably rises. Accordingly, the findings of Jin and Liu should be viewed cautiously, unless one is able to provide a greater degree of reliability by focusing on a smaller text corpus that allows for better contextualization.

25 This accounts for Shen Songqiao 2002, Fang Weigui 2002 and Wang Ke 2003. A more conceptual approach to nation – yet with a rather weak theoretical apparatus – can be found in the works of Huang Xingtao 2002, Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2008, Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding 2008.

semantics of terms by analyzing the origin and change of the meaning of terms, while also not neglecting their political and social impact.²⁶ This study intends to fill a gap in the research by applying the conceptual history approach formulated by Koselleck to the Chinese context. This will be done by means of three analytical steps, namely: 1) examining the lexical change and the emergence of newly coined terms for nation, 2) looking closely at the history of semantics after the emergence of the new terms, and 3) the employment of certain terms as political concepts that influenced thinking and action (and vice versa) in the 20th century. These three steps are closely interrelated, because the introduction of the nation concept to China was not simply a matter of new semantics, but also an issue of conceptual transfer.²⁷

The threshold period in Chinese conceptual history

The historical events following the First Opium War (1840) had a profound impact on the intellectual history of late imperial China. They ended the century-long tribute system in which non-Chinese states were expected to pay tributes (*chaogong* 朝貢) to the Son of Heaven (*tianzi* 天子). No longer considered the sole legitimate emperors of the whole world, Chinese rulers had to sign unequal treaties with virtually every major European power, Russia and Japan and accept the humiliations of granting concessions and ceding colonies on Chinese territory. It was primarily the refusal of foreign powers to accept the cultural superiority of China that caused a deep crisis among scholars and intellectuals and resulted in a profound interest in foreign knowledge. It was believed that the new learning would create a strong and prosperous country able to survive global competition in a world characterized by imperialism and social Darwinism. To make this learning palatable, Chinese thinkers had to historicize their traditional values. This happened in a brief but highly influential threshold period (*Sattelzeit*)²⁸ that lasted from approximately 1895 – the year China was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War – until 1919, i.e. the May Fourth Movement. It was during these two decades that China successfully reimagined a China without a Confucian heritage (at least in principle) and replaced the imperial order of all-under-heaven with the particularism of the nation-state as the primary form of political order.²⁹ During these two decades, formerly unknown ideologies (ranging from xenophobic nationalism to international communism) that questioned the long cherished values were widely disseminated in the country. Due to the fact that they entered China simultaneously and did not experience the same genesis as in the European context, their appropriation by both intellectuals and politicians was highly complex. For instance, the emancipatory potential of nationalism, which played an important

26 For the relation of the basic concepts in history (*geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*) to the so-called Cambridge School in the history of political thought, see the exemplary writings of Melvin Richter (1990). On the Cambridge School in general, see the seminal text by Skinner (1969). A critical assessment can be found in Harlan 1989.

27 Koselleck (1985) holds that any investigation of a concept can and should never be limited to determining the semantics of words and their shifts in the historical process. The central concern of a conceptual historian is not to figure out the original, or unchanging, meaning of a word, but to discover exactly its political impact. To this extent, *Begriffsgeschichte* goes beyond simple etymologies and combines the history of semantics and lexicography with structural social history.

28 In his writings on the history of language, Koselleck (2010) defines the threshold period between 1750 to 1850 as a century during which language in Germany changed into the language of modernity, which was accompanied with the emergence of new concepts in the field of social, economic and political language.

29 Levenson (1968) has argued that Chinese intellectuals reacted to the Western impact by virtually abandoning Confucianism and moving it into a museum. For a contrary view on this matter, cf. Schneider 2011.

role in Europe from its inception in the Enlightenment, was only partially successful: Even the constitutional movement in the first decade of the 20th century was more interested in strengthening the state than in protecting citizen's rights against the autocratic government. The call for a constitution in 1906 was nourished by the wish to maintain the country's independence against the attacks of the imperialist countries.³⁰ To that extent, the nation concept did not gain acceptance vis-à-vis the state concept. On the contrary, the survival of the state was seen as an urgent precondition for the survival of the nation. The experience with nation and nationalism as concepts was thus less the result of the emancipation of an enlightened citizenry, but rather a reaction to the crisis triggered from outside.³¹ Koselleck's insight that the nation is defined in a field of tension between above-below and inside-outside is therefore only partly true for the Chinese context. In the former case, a population tries to emancipate itself from the ruling class and claims rights and duties which are constitutive for its national consciousness. In the latter case, an ethnic (or cultural or religious) collective fights for its interests against an outside threat.³² The question remains as to which aspect predominates and to what extent they rival each other (if at all). The nation concept caused the intellectuals of the late Qing Dynasty to develop an ethnical nationalism that concentrated first on homogenization to the inside and delineation to the outside, an experience that had been hitherto unknown. In fact, research has shown that these developments triggered a profound intellectual change,³³ even if discussions on alternative political imaginaries had emerged earlier.³⁴ Instead of presenting an image of a passive and receptive China, I argue that the impact during the threshold period was in the first instance a lexical one achieved by the introduction of "new terms for new ideas."³⁵ Much more influential, however, was the impact of these ideas which affected a radical conceptual change that, due to its lasting impact, can rightfully be called a threshold in the political modernization.

The following paper is thus concerned with how the introduction of new terms influenced the conceptualization of nation and nationalism in its non-indigenous context and with how Chinese intellectuals struggled to come to terms with the nation concept (which did not however prevent them from relying heavily on traditional conceptualizations, reintroduced in the process of the appropriation of foreign concepts). The conceptual transformation of political language in China can be grasped by highlighting four heuristic dimensions (developed by Koselleck for the European context) that help to elucidate the country's unique historical situation at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. However, as I will show, they are only able to explain the process of political thought's modernization (How is a nation created?), not its results (What is a nation?).³⁶ The heuristic dimensions are as follows: temporalization (*Verzeitlichung*), democratization (*Demokratisierung*),

30 See here the study by Li Xiaodong (2005).

31 Thus also the conclusion of Fitzgerald 1995 that the state defined the nation in the case of China, and not vice versa.

32 See the detailed article "Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse" by Koselleck (1984).

33 Teng and Fairbank 1979, Sakamoto Hiroko 2004, Schubert 2002, Wang Ke 2006.

34 Yet, even the Taiping Movement that directed itself against both Confucian orthodoxy and the Manchu rule can hardly be imagined without the exogenous impact. On the impact, see Reilly 2004 and Wagner 1982.

35 Mateer 1913. For this argument, see also Lackner, Amelung and Kurtz 2001.

36 This differentiation is crucial for not blindly applying European concepts to the Chinese context. The enormous literature on Chinese nationalism has already shown that both the motivation and process of nationalization follows the same logic as its European counterpart, yet without always producing the same results. On this issue, cf. Matten 2009, Wang Ke 2005 and Sakamoto Hiroko 2004.

susceptibility to ideology (*Ideologisierbarkeit*) and politicization (*Politisierung*).³⁷ Temporalization involves the observation that tensions arise during a threshold period between past, present and expectations for the future that cause politics to reflect on their future. A typical element of this threshold period is the eschatological promise of a better and more desirable future. In the Chinese context, this was the desire to found a nation-state, which was considered to be the most progressive and modern form of political order. In other words, *tianxia* was the past and the nation-state the immediate future.³⁸ Democratization means that both political and social vocabularies – once specialized and restricted to a small elite – becomes generally accessible. In China, with the rise of print, capitalism and the growing availability of publications in the latter half of the 19th century, coupled with the establishment of a new general school system (starting in 1904) and the abolishment of the imperial examination system (*keju* 科舉) in 1905, knowledge was made accessible for the general public. Further, with the Literary Revolution that replaced the traditional *wenyan* 文言 language with a vernacular version (*baihua* 白話, a core demand of the May Fourth Movement), lower strata of society were allowed to participate in the public sphere to a greater extent than ever before.³⁹ Susceptibility to ideology – the extent to which concepts could be integrated into ideologies – means that political and social concepts are no longer understood in the singular. Political values, in other words, are not specific, but abstract and universal. Traditional social differentiation disappears and the commitment to one ideology is demanded of every individual in society, thereby breaking down social and religious barriers. In the case of China, there was no longer an imaginable plurality of identities, but only one national identity that claimed primacy over alternative, competing identities.⁴⁰ Finally, politicization means that because of the weakening of traditional relationships (often personalized, face-to-face) and social, religious and constitutional groupings (clans, village communities, academic schools, monastic groups etc.), more and more individuals become involved in politics that try to convince the majority of the populace of certain ideas.⁴¹ In a time of greater social and political control in the course of modernization in China, individuals could no longer refrain from politics. Starting with the 1920s, both the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were highly interested in reaching each individual with their ideology and propaganda.⁴²

The application of Koselleck's four dimensions seems straight-forward at first. It would also be easy to refute them by pointing out the differences in Chinese modernization. However, given the fact that the nation concept was introduced to the decaying Qing Empire when it was in its last decade and more than eager to imitate the new model and that China struggled to create a national consciousness by propagating a new ideology that pursued homogenization to the inside and a clear delineation to

37 These four hypotheses are discussed by Koselleck (1972) in his introduction of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. On how to apply them to the concept of nation, see Koselleck 1984, 147–149.

38 Significant here is the introduction of teleology in the historical thinking of Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and most certainly since the inception of historical materialism. See here the works on Chinese historiography by Axel Schneider (1997) and Arif Dirlik (1978).

39 See Schwarz 1986, T.T. Chow 1960 and K.W. Chow 2008.

40 How the nation superseded all other forms of identity is described by Duara 1995. The replacement of national identity by class consciousness in post-1949 was merely a temporary aberration.

41 Famous here is the study by Eugen Weber (1979).

42 Every individual was supposed to emulate the correct political consciousness, which is how both KMT and CCP imagined their version of national community. The efforts of both parties to establish a national education system are symptomatic here. On the general necessity for an evolving nation-state to do so, see Gellner 1983.

the outside, it is safe to say that the country shared a conviction of an ideal political order defined by these four dimensions. These dimensions, again, are characteristic for the threshold period that signified the emergence of political modernity. As heuristic devices, they enable us to differentiate modern from traditional concepts more clearly. This is important because it makes a substantial difference whether a philosopher and classicist of the Late Ming Dynasty such as Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692) despises the Qing for being barbarian (while arguing in a very elitist fashion), or whether a scholar and noted anti-Manchu revolutionary such as Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868–1936) argues for an ethnically homogeneous collective.⁴³ The dimensions help to elucidate the nature of conceptual change and trace its impact back to the social structure (and vice versa). After all, at the core of conceptual history is a very practical concern of historians, namely, the issue of continuity and change, of contestation and consensus, with regard to the meaning of concepts in political language. Only then can we understand how political behavior is influenced and formed in the historical process.

The nation concept in new terms in late imperial China

In traditional Chinese texts – those compiled and published before the late Qing Dynasty (i.e. the threshold period) – there were ample expressions for social collectives, yet their meanings were unspecified and unrelated to the modern usage.⁴⁴ What was absent in these terms was a sense of collective consciousness that went beyond the face-to-face community or professional, social or religious sub-groups such as an association of like-minded people (*dang* 黨, an alternative term for collective in pre-modern China). Later dynasties – especially those under the attack from outside and those that felt the need to differentiate their own people from others (such as the Southern Song and the Late Ming) – began to use polysyllabic terms such as *minren* 民人,⁴⁵ *zhongzu* 種族,⁴⁶ *zubu* 族部⁴⁷ and *zulei* 族類.⁴⁸ The late 19th century then witnessed the emergence of binomials such as *minzu* 民族, *guojia* 國家 and *guomin* 國民, which are neologisms taken over from the Japanese and commonly used for the

43 Dikötter (1992) and Vierheller (1968) have interpreted Wang's attitude as an expression of early racism (which is actually misleading); Laitinen (1990) and Matten (2009) argue differently.

44 Single characters such as *ren* 人, *min* 民, *zu* 族, and *lei* 類 were used to denote collectives whose members were considered to belong to a community. Although describing social realities, these terms were largely used interchangeably without distinct definitions. In general, they referred to a group defined by a shared kinship (*zong* 宗). According to the *Hanyu daizidian*, these terms can be defined as follows: 1. *Ren* refers to a person of noble descent, or to an individual person, 2. *Min* refers to an unspecified collective, or people, 3. *Zu* emphasizes ancestry, meaning clan, tribe or family, 4. *Lei* describes a group whose members share certain characteristics, i.e. it is used in the sense of species or kind.

45 *Qingshi gao* 清史稿 (*Draft History of the Qing*, 24, 920) relates that in the year 1897 the ban on mining in Kebuduoza-haqinbaoji was lifted for both the Mongolian and the Han people: 癸未，弛科布多札哈沁寶爾吉礦禁，許蒙、漢民人開採。

46 *Qingshi gao* (439, 12406) relates that in a country such as Turkey there are a dozen races, with each having a different language and religion: 土耳其一國之中，分十數種族，語言宗教各不相同。

47 In *Songsbi* 宋史 (*History of the Song Dynasty*, 9, 189) the commentary on a tribute mission states that the term *du* 都 can no longer be used by an ethnic tribe in southeast China as a self-designation because *du* cannot denote a tribal name, or *buzuming*: 邛部川蠻的首領稱為「都蠻王」，但「都」非部族名，今刪。

48 *Songsbi* (266, 9178) advises letting the ethnic tribes exchange what they have and what they do not have, and thereby (by letting them sell salt for profit and exchange grain) sinicize them despite their barbarian background: 使其族類有無交易，售鹽以利之，通糧以濟之，彼雖遠夷，必然向化。 *Qingshi gao* (239, 9510) points out that it is better for the emperor to issue clear edicts regardless of ethnicity or social status: 上宜發明諭，不拘族類，不限貴賤。

term nation today.⁴⁹ By approaching the nation concept onomasiologically, I show in the following that the use of each alternative term had significant political consequences.⁵⁰ However, the emergence of new terms even in the 19th century did not necessarily mean that there was also accordingly a conceptual change. For instance, when the term *minzu* appeared for the first time in the Chinese language in the text “Yangwu zai yong qi suo chang” 洋務在用其所長 (“On Using the Advantages of Foreign Things”) written by Wang Tao 韜園 (1828–1897) in 1874, its usage was rather old-fashioned:

China is the largest country in the world, with a huge territory, numerous tribes [*minzu*], and rich resources. Once we can strive to self-strengthen, the country will be rich and strong, and no other countries can compete with us.⁵¹

In reference to the quotation, Peng Yingming claims that Wang Tao adopted the concept of *minzu* during his service as translator for the London Missionary Society Press in Shanghai (1849–1862). He did this, moreover, despite the fact that he had stayed in Japan for four months in 1879 and might have had access to Japanese translations of nation.⁵² In fact, Wang still used (besides *minzu*) rather traditional terms for denoting barbarian tribes – *yi* 夷 and *man* 蠻. Thus although he compared the family of nations to the Warring States Period (403–221 BC), it cannot be concluded that he was able to imagine a collective that clearly denoted who belonged to the Chinese nation, and who did not. What was missing at this point in time was the ideological and political use of the concept in Koselleck’s dimensions. He and his peers struggled to give *minzu* a clear definition in their writings and instead used the concept in a rather unspecified way. In contrast, the translation of nation as *nashen* 納慎 by Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾 (1818–1891) in his diary of his travels to London and Paris conveyed an exotic impression,⁵³ but did not provide a clear meaning of the term. Both examples show the considerable difficulty of rendering nation into Chinese.⁵⁴ Yet, this did not stop Chinese intellectuals from using the term to initiate political changes in the early 20th century.

49 Another, yet rather seldom used, translation of nation was *guozu* 國族. Introduced into political discourse by the late Qing constitutional movement, it referred to the congruence of the state China (*Zhongguo*) and its ethnicities (*minzu*). On *guozu*, see also Shen Songjiao 1997.

50 The semasiology of these three terms is important insofar as it relates to the definition of nation.

51 Wang Tao, *Taoyuan wenlu waipian*, 496: 夫我中國乃天下至大之國也，幅員遼闊，民族殷繁，物產饒富，苟能一旦奮發自雄，其坐致富強，天下當莫與頡頏。The translation follows Lackner 1998: 333. A similar argument is made by Fang Weigui (2002, 33–34), who found *minzu* in a Chinese translation of the Book Joshua of the Bible. Here it refers to the people of Israel, but not their nation. Though both are closely related to each other (as shown by Koselleck), the impact of this translation was virtually nil. The translation of the Book Joshua appeared in *Dongxi yangkao meiyue tongji zhuan* 東西洋考每月統紀傳 (*East-West Monthly Examiner*, September issue, 1837), published by the German missionary Karl Gützlaff (1803–1851) in Canton.

52 Peng Yingming (1985) claims further that Wang Tao did not understand Japanese. In fact, Wang relied mainly on Japanese works when writing his *Faguo zhiblie* 法國志略 (*History of France*, 1871). He was unable to make use of French sources because the French Sinologist Stanislas Julien did not want to participate in this project. For Wang’s stay in Japan, cf. his travel diary *Fusang youji* 扶桑遊記.

53 Guo Songtao, *Lundun yu Bali riji* 倫敦與巴黎日記 (1877).

54 Likewise, Guo Songtao used transliterations in his diary such as *lifaermu* 立法爾姆 or *lifuermen* 里弗爾門 for reform. Yan Fu translates revolution as *Lifolixian* 里佛留顯 in his 1904 translation of Edward Jenks’ (1861–1939) *A History of Politics* (1900).

Table I: Translations of nation into Chinese⁵⁵

Year of Publication	Translation of the term nation ⁵⁶	Source
1852	族類*, 國民*, 種類*, 族種*	Wei Yuan 魏源. <i>Zengguang Haiguo tuzhi</i> 增廣海國圖志.
1864	民種	Wheaton, Henry [Huidun 惠頓]. <i>Wanguo gongfa</i> 萬國公法, trans. by William A. P. Martin [Ding Weiliang 丁建良].
1868	種類*	Wang Tao 王韜. <i>Manyou sulu</i> 漫遊隨錄.
1869	氏, 邦, 國, 邦國	Lobscheid, Wilhelm [Luo Cunde 羅存德]. <i>English and Chinese Dictionary: with Puncti and Mandarin Pronunciation / Ying-Hua zidian</i> 英華字典. Hong Kong: Daily Press Office, 1866–1869.
1874	國*	Lemaire, Gabriel, and Prosper Giquel. <i>Dictionnaire de poche Français-Chinois: suivi d'un dictionnaire technique des mots usités à l'arsenal de Fou-tcheou / Han-Fa yuhui bianlan</i> 漢法語彙便覽. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Press.
1877	納慎*, 族類*	Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾. <i>Lundun yu Bali riji</i> 倫敦與巴黎日記.
1877	邦國	Theodore Dwight Woolsey [Wu'erxi 吳爾璽]. <i>Gongfa bianlan</i> 公法便覽, trans. by William A. P. Martin [Ding Weiliang 丁建良] [reprint in Han'guk kundaec pöpche saryo ch'ongsö 韓國近代法制史料叢書 (1981)].
1881	國, 國民	Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 and Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄. <i>Tetsugaku jii</i> 哲學字彙. Tōkyō.
1882	氏, 國, 邦	Kuang Qizhao 鄒其照. <i>Hua-Ying zidian jicheng</i> 華英字典集成. Hongkong, 1923; first issue 1882.
1884	一國的人*	Couvreur, F. Seraphim. <i>Dictionnaire Français-Chinois: contenant les expressions les plus usitées de la langue mandarine / Fa-Han changtan</i> 法漢常談. Ho Kien Fou: Imprimerie de la Mission Catholique.
1886	氏*, 百姓*, 國*, 邦*, 邦國*, 邦家*	Schlegel, Gustave. <i>Nederlandsch-Chineesch Woordenboek: met de Transcriptie der Chineesche Karakters in het Tsiang-Tsiu Dialekt / He-Hua wenyu leican</i> 荷華文語類參.
1909	族類*, 民族*	Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應. <i>Shengshi weiyang houbian</i> 盛世危言後編.
1912	邦國	Giles, Herbert A. <i>A Chinese English Dictionary</i> . Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai.
1913	國*, 國家*	Tanabe Keiya 田邊慶彌. <i>Hanyi Riben falü jingji cidian</i> 漢譯日本法律經濟辭典, trans. by Wang Wozang 王我臧. Shanghai: Commercial Press.
1913	國民	Richard, Timothy, and Donald MacGillivray (eds.). <i>A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms: Chiefly from the Japanese</i> . Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China.
1916	國民	Hemeling, Karl Ernst Georg. <i>English-Chinese Dictionary of the Standard Chinese Spoken Language [kuan hua 官話]: and Handbook for Translators, including Scientific, Technical, Modern and Documentary Terms</i> . Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs.
1921	民族*, 國民*, 國*	Lu Bohong 陸伯鴻 and Song Shanliang 宋善良 (eds.). <i>Fa-Hua xin zidian</i> 法華新字典. Shanghai: Commercial Press.

The examples above show that the transfer of nation to China was a long and arduous process in which a clear understanding of the concept was not always possible and there were sometimes also misunderstandings and deviating renderings (this transfer was in any event still meaningful, and “failures” – in terms of making a new term unambiguous – should not be understood as deficits here). In order to understand how the concept of nation moved from one cultural context to another, it is

55 This list has been produced with the help of the WSC Database: “An Electronic Repository of Chinese Scientific, Philosophical and Political Terms Coined in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century,” edited by Joachim Kurtz, Michael Lackner and Iwo Amelung (2001–present). Online at mst.uni-hd.de (last access 14 September 2012).

56 The asterisk shows that the corresponding English term nation is not mentioned in the sources consulted here.

necessary to first analyze the historical semantics of the different translations of nation and consider changes in meaning and usage.⁵⁷ As most renderings were neologisms, the popularity of the nation as a political concept in China cannot be explained by the simple act of translation, understood as a necessary way to modernize by imitating the European model.⁵⁸ A better appreciation of how nationalism was received in China requires taking a closer look at hermeneutical issues inherent to the process of transferring the concept of nation, including the question of how it was applied in politics. Given that China had a range of epistemological traditions, its understanding of the European concept of nation was highly diversified. When advocating his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, the American logician and philosopher Willard van Orman Quine (1908–2000) argued in his book *Word and Object* that the problem of making insensible things sensible is first of all an epistemological problem. According to Quine, there can be different epistemologies that are compatible with the same metaphysics. As no single epistemology is equal or adequate to a given metaphysics, it is clear that the latter is founded on many possible epistemologies and is thus underdetermined by any one epistemology. As a result, the transfer of the nation concept necessitated creative thinking, which caused – more often than not – confusion on both the terminological and the conceptual level. Therefore, a holistic understanding of a concept regarding its relevance to reality, life, and practice may only be achieved when taking account of several, differing epistemologies or epistemological principles, and not just one in particular. This broader comprehension will be made possible in the following by taking a closer look at the different renderings of nation and its usage in various textual sources of late imperial and Republican China. Here, it will be imperative to take into consideration both historical semantics and the hermeneutics related to the act of translation.

Generally speaking, the translation of European terms formerly unknown in China into Chinese is achieved by either borrowing terms from traditional sources and bestowing them with a new meaning (*zulei, guojia*), or by devising new terms (*minzu, guomin, renmin*). In both cases, an undistorted reception of terms is not certain: When choosing traditional terms for new ideas, the translator risks unwanted connotations, and when choosing new terms for new ideas (Ada Haven Mateer), it is unsure whether they will be completely understandable to an audience. These uncertainties often result in misunderstandings and misconceptions, which again are a source of conflict.⁵⁹ They also caused those writing on

57 Table I shows how translations can vary, and that this is not simply a lexical problem.

58 In her groundbreaking study *Translingual Practice* (1995), Lydia Liu points out that the transfer of Western terms is a transfer that is deeply permeated by power structures. She proposes the idea of translingual practice in order to raise the possibility of rethinking the forms of – what she calls – linguistic mediation between the East and the West (Liu 1995 and 2004). Influenced by postcolonial theories, she strives to understand the nature of translation, while focusing on the question of what kinds of knowledge or intellectual authority the agent of cultural translation draws on in the act of cross-cultural translation. She warns against taking the notion of commensurability for granted that is created by the conceptual model derived from the bilingual dictionary. On epistemological problems of translation in this context, cf. Matten 2004.

59 Lydia Liu argues that the translation of European knowledge into Chinese came with a high price. She argues (Liu 1999, 148) “translations often employed neologisms at the expense of intelligibility. Some of the vocabulary seems obscure at the time but has since grown self-evident. This is because the words have been gradually assimilated in the language as modern China itself underwent massive changes through increased exposure to translations of European texts in the past century”. Though Liu is correct in stating that the modern Chinese language is the product of an import of European terms and concepts conveyed by translators, who were at the same time missionaries, imperialists or colonizers, this is not necessarily something negative: for whatever political or religious motives these translators may have had, his translation was an act of border-crossing communication which tried to impart certain knowledge to a new audience. It would be misleading to reduce this transfer to a one-sided “act of aggression”.

nation in China to reflect on conceptual differences in the varying translations themselves and to avoid an overly casual use of nation in political discourse. When a writer discussed nationalism in late 19th and early 20th century, he had to consciously decide which term to use, as each had different connotations. This resulted in the common practice of discussing nationalism with a definition that guided the reader, as in the case of the article “Minzuzhuyi lun” 民族主義論 (“On Nationalism”) in the journal *Zhejiangchao* 浙江潮 (published by Chinese foreign students in Japan in 1903).⁶⁰ This became necessary not so much because nation was still an unfamiliar concept at that time, but because the number of available publications dealing with political ideologies became so vast that knowledge correspondingly became more heterogeneous and definitions of nation began to vary considerably. Despite this proliferation of the translations of the nation concept, there was no explicit need for a higher degree of conceptual clarity or consensus. While definitions put down in dictionaries and encyclopedias help to define what a certain term signifies, this does not mean that those who use a term for distinct political purposes also have a clear understanding of it. As Christian Meier has shown, classical Greek had different political concepts that are normally distinguished in modern political language (power, force, violence, rule, domination), but were also used synonymously in ancient Greece.⁶¹ While this is certainly an expression of the conceptual resources available to a social collective, it also shows that an individual can have a concept without having a proper word for it (in times of linguistic change, this also might not even result in neologisms). The following section takes a closer look at what terms for nation were available in late imperial China and how they were used in political language.

The ethnicized nation in the late imperial period

The most popular translation for nation in late imperial China – *minzu* – was an ethnic, and among the more radical nationalists, a racialized one.⁶² *Minzu* proved to be a fairly popular rendering because it combined the notion of *min* (referring to a group of subordinated people without political power) with the notion of ethnic lineage, or *zu*.⁶³ Nation was thus first understood in the sense of ethnicity or race, and *minzu* remained the most predominant term for the ensuing century. In the late Qing period, ardent nationalists such as Zhang Taiyan and Liu Shipei quoted from the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 and referred to *zu* to prove that racial thinking had existed in China.⁶⁴ One statement they quoted was “If he is not of our kin,

60 This monthly journal is characterized by its explicit anti-Manchurian stance. Accordingly, the definition of nation and nationalism introduced here (*Zhejiangchao* 1, “Minzuzhuyi lun”, 3) is a racial one: “To found a nation-state means to unify the people of the same race and to differentiate them from people of other racial origin, that is nationalism” 合同種異異種，以建一民族的國家，是曰民族主義。

61 See Melvin Richter 1995, Chapter 3.

62 In the following, I am going to present some quotations that shed a light on the understanding of ethnicity and race. While ethnicity accepts the possible existence of different ethnic groups in one polity, a racialized understanding of nation is going one step further by denying this, as most forcefully argued social Darwinist nationalism. Suffice it to say that this understanding was very common in the majority of periodical publications at that time, such as in the *Ershi shiji zhi Zhina* 貳拾世紀之支那 (1905), *Guomin riri bao* 國民日日報 (1903), *Huangdihun* 黃帝魂 (1903), *Hubei xueshengjie* 湖北學生界 (1903), *Guocui xuebao* 國粹學報 (1905–1911).

63 Liu Qingfeng 1994, Huang Xingtao 2002.

64 Zhang Taiyan uses the expression *fei wo zulei* in his “Yuzhong da xinwen bao” 獄中答新聞報 (“Letter from the Prison to the *Xinwen bao*”), published in July in 1903 in the paper *Subao* 蘇報, where he holds the Manchu foreign rule responsible for the weak standing of China. See Tang Zhijun 1977, vol. 1, 233. For the nationalism of Zhang Taiyan see Laitinen 1990, Shimada 1990 and Wong 1989.

he is sure to have a different mind.⁶⁵ It is important to point out – noting that James Legge translated *zulei* here as kin – that the racial connotation is not present in the original text because both pre-imperial and imperial China⁶⁶ could still envision incorporating non-ethnic Chinese into their *tianxia*,⁶⁷ as the Manchurian Qing Dynasty, which was able to ensure the general acceptance of its rule for nearly three centuries (1644–1911), had done. As I will show later, the acceptance of foreign rule weakened in late 19th century and caused Zhang Taiyan and Liu Shiwei to interpret the *Zuozhuan* quote quite differently by introducing the idea of race into it, fully in the spirit of the then prevailing social Darwinist thinking.⁶⁸ The reference to ethnicity or race was imported from Europe. For instance, the journal *Jiangsu* 江蘇 – published by Chinese students residing in Japan in 1903 – carried an article entitled “Minzuzhuyi” 民族主義 (“Nationalism”) that traced the nation concept back to 19th-century Italy, where it referred to the unification of several ethnicities into one state.⁶⁹ Liang Qichao presented a similar view in his influential text “Xinmin shuo” 新民說 (“On the New Citizen,” 1902–1906). He writes:

What is nationalism? It means to view those of the same race, same language, same religion and same social customs as compatriots, who will strive for independence and self-government, create a perfect government, and pursue collective interest and protect the nation against others.⁷⁰

According to this definition, each *minzu* is a grouping of people who enjoy certain rights, but have the responsibility to preserve national sovereignty and independence.

Liang was one of the first Chinese intellectuals to provide a clear definition of nation and he included it in a political program. Before 1895, he referred sporadically to the nation concept in his writings, and only after his exile in Japan did he focus on nationalism explicitly, as in his 1902 review article “Dongji yuedan” 東籍月旦 (“A critical examination of Japanese book lists”) in the *Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報 (*New Citizen Journal*)⁷¹ and in articles for the journal *Qingyi bao* 清議報 (*The pure opinion*).⁷² While in exile, he found the Japanese model of a modern monarchy highly attractive. In 1899, he writes that there

65 Legge 1860–1872, vol. 1, 354–355: 非我族類，其心必異。Couvreur (1914, vol. 2, 45) translates: “Les princes qui ne sont pas issus des mêmes ancêtres que nous ont des sentiments différents des nôtres.”

66 In the case of the Qing Dynasty, the ruling Manchu imagined their empire as a multi-ethnic one. See the discussion in Matten 2009 and 2012.

67 Dikötter (1992, 2–6) chooses “race” as translation, a translation that he wrongly ascribes to Legge.

68 In fact, the term *zulei* – although playing a prominent role in the writings of Zhang Taiyan and Liu Shiwei – appears only 29 times in the dynastic histories. For the impact of social Darwinism in late imperial China, see Pusey 1983 and Dikötter 1992.

69 *Jiangsu* 7, 25: The passage reads: 民族一語見於歐洲學者之著書。始於羅馬西舍倫之共和篇中多混國家人民民族為一。This view might have been influenced by W.B. Lawrence who defined in his annotation of Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law* the nation as a unity of race. He concluded (Wheaton 1863, iii–iv and 33, note 13) that Italy was the first nation-state because it had been the first state to successfully gain full autonomy and self-governance.

70 *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 2, 656: 民族主義者何? 各地同種族，同言語，同宗教，同習俗之人，相視如同胞，務獨立自治，組織完備之政府，以謀公益而禦他族是也。

71 In the review of the book *History of Modern Europe*, written by the English historian Thomas Henry Dyer (1804–1888) and others (translated into Japanese in 1883 by Shimada Saburō 島田三郎, 1852–1923). Cf. here issue 9 and 11 of *Xinmin congbao* (June and July 1902), reproduced in *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 1, 325–335, esp. 332–334.

72 For example, in the article “Guojia sixiang bianqian yitonglun” 國家思想變遷異同論 (“On the Differences in the Changes of State Thought”), dating from 1901. A further proof that the rather ethnically understood term *minzu* enjoyed some popularity at the turn of the century are translations of Yan Fu (1854–1921), who did not use *minzu* in his 1898 translation of Thomas Huxley’s (1825–1895) *Evolution and Ethics* [*Tiyan lun* 天演論], but increasingly from 1904 when he published the translation of Edward Jenks’ (1861–1939) *A History of Politics*. Compare here the findings of Han Jinchun and Li Yifu 1984.

are three different forms of government (*zhengti* 政體) ruling the world, namely, autocratic monarchism, constitutional monarchism and constitutional democracy. For Liang, democracies tend to be unstable and autocracies oppressive. He thus concludes that a constitutional monarchy is the best system one could imagine.⁷³ A few years later – after intensive reading of Rousseau and Hobbes – Liang defined his concept of nation in a statist fashion, contrasting his civic nationalism to the ethno-racial nationalism of the anti-Manchu movement. In his 1903 article on “Zhengzhixue Dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo” 政治學大家伯倫智理之學說 (“The teachings of the great political scientist Bluntschli”), he completes his turn to statism and describes the eight characteristics of a nation (*minzu*) as follows:

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| 1. common area of settlement from the beginning | 其始也同居一地 |
| 2. common bloodline from the beginning | 其始也同一血統 |
| 3. common phenotypical appearance | 同其肢體形狀 |
| 4. common language | 同其語言 |
| 5. common writing system | 同其文字 |
| 6. common religion | 同其宗教 |
| 7. common customs and traditions | 同其風俗 |
| 8. common economic life | 同其生計 ⁷⁴ |

This organic definition of the nation was taken directly from Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881), a 19th-century Swiss-German political scientist and law professor.⁷⁵ The reason Liang idealizes an ethnical-cultural nationalism here was not because he shared the views of the anti-Manchu movement. He was convinced rather that China’s primary problem was its lack of (national) unity. Having only a very weak sense of the meaning of citizenship, lacking a proper name for the country and being estranged to the virtue of patriotism,⁷⁶ he bases the need for unity on an organic, or essentialist, given. As shown by Machetzki,⁷⁷ China – in contrast to the Western European notion of state-nation (*Staatsnation*) – shared the intellectual tradition of Central Europe, which favored a cultural nation (*Kulturnation*).⁷⁸ The political ideal was not a liberal nation with a weak state (as in the case of Great Britain), but safeguarding a powerful state that was able to guarantee the defense and the self-assertion

73 See Liang Qichao, “Lun Zhongguo yu Ouzhou guoti yitong” 論中國與歐洲國體異同 (1899).

74 *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 2, 1067–1068. Wang Jingwei has put forward similar criteria in his piece “Minzu de guomin” 民族的國民 (“On a racially defined Nation”), published serially in *Minbao* 1905.

75 The state organism theory holds that the state equals a person with a spirit and body that is able to express its own free will. Bluntschli’s views became popular in Japan due to his 1869 book *Die Lehre vom modernen Staat* (*The Theory of the Modern State*) translated into Japanese by Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 (1836–1916) in 1872, and in China due to Liang’s reading of Katō’s translation. Liang Qichao read Bluntschli’s two essays “New Theories of the State” and “Introduction to Constitutional Government” during his exile in Japan, which were to become the primary source for his later writings on Bluntschli. Liang Qichao became familiar with his writings after his return from America. For a detailed analysis on Bluntschli’s influence on Liang Qichao, see Tang Xiaobing 1996, 123–124.

76 These issues are discussed most forcefully in his serial article “Xinmin shuo” and in his highly critical article “Lun Zhina ren guojia sixiang zhi ruodian” 論支那人國家思想之弱點 (“On the weakness of state thinking of the Chinese people” published 1901).

77 Machetzki 1973.

78 Machetzki (1973) argues that this view has strong ties to Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954) who described the opposing models of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*. The historical parallel is quite obvious considering that the German nationalism was a reaction to the Napoleonic hegemony and that China developed its own nationalism as a reaction to the European and Japanese imperialism. A direct impact of Meinecke on the political thinking of Liang Qichao is unlikely, however. Bluntschli played a far greater role.

of the Chinese nation. For achieving these aims it was necessary to organize a state in a hierarchical fashion where individual interests were subordinated to the greater good. It thus comes as no surprise that there is a tendency in Liang's political thought to prefer an "enlightened autocracy" (*kaiming zhuanzhi* 開明專制), which resulted a few years later in his call for a constitutional monarchy. He wanted to keep the Manchu in power in order to ensure the success of the reform movement.

Liang's "new people" (*xinmin* 新民) was first and foremost a national people defined by an organic unity (*youji zhi tongyi* 有機之統一) and an effective order (*youli zhi zhixu* 有利之秩序). This shows that, for him, the progressive elements of national movements in China were less important than in the case of French nationalism.⁷⁹ In his text on Bluntschli, he reasons:

If one analyzes the great despair of our country, there is no larger pain than the fact that it possesses a quality of regional groupings, but no national equivalent... Therefore, the greatest shortcoming of our country today and its greatest need is an organic unity and a powerful order. Liberty and equality are of secondary relevance. What does that mean? We first have to forge a state-people (*guomin*) by amalgamating the regional groups (*bumin*), only then can we talk of the happiness of our people.⁸⁰

Liang distinguishes between people (*guomin*, in the sense of the German term *Volk* here), and the nation, pointing out that a nation (*minzu*) can only be referred to as a people (*guomin*) when it has achieved the status of a nation-state (*guojia*). State and people are inseparable and form a living organism; one cannot exist without the other. The nation *minzu* is merely a preliminary stage in the development of a nation-state:

The nations have the same language, the same customs, the same spirit and character, yet their sense of community develops gradually. This is one step in the process of state-building. But in a time where one (nation) has not yet become a united state, it can under no circumstance be called a personality or a legal collective. This can only be called a nation (*minzu*), but not a state (*guojia*).⁸¹

Thus, instead of relying on an enlightened citizenry, Liang favored state institutions and organizations as a promising means of transforming the collective, which included the propagation of a patriotic spirit from above (he shared Bluntschli's antipathy towards Rousseau's contractual theory, cf. here Machetzki 1973). The eight criteria of a nation were constitutive elements that were taken from the historical tradition. As a consequence, Bluntschli's view of the nation as an organism became the most prominent conceptualization in China during the 19th and early 20th century. The objective definition was linked to the then-prevailing preference for race as the primary marker of identity. The ambition to reach a high degree of cultural, ethnic, religious and/or political homogeneity is typically a great concern of young nation-states, for it is believed that nationalism creates nations. Yet, this goal is only rarely achieved, especially when considering that China considers itself today to be a multiethnic nation. In the 1900s, Liang Qichao realized early on that if the concept of an ethnic nation were strictly applied, then sub-groups

79 And this despite the fact that both the French and the American Revolution were an important part of political thought in late Qing China. See here Pan Guangzhe 2008 and Gotō Sueo 1969.

80 *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 2, 1066: 深察祖國之大患，莫痛乎有部民資格，而無國民資格。[...]。故我中國今日所最缺點而最急需者，在有機之統一與有力之秩序，而自由平等直其次耳。何也？必先鑄部民使成國民，然後國民之幸福乃可得言也。

81 *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 2, 1068: 故夫民族者，有同一之言語風俗，有同一之精神性質，其共同心漸因以發達，是固建國之階梯也。但當其未聯合以創一國之時，則終不能為人格，為法團，故只能謂之民族，不能謂之國民。

would inevitably be excluded. This was unacceptable because transforming the empire into a nation would have led to a considerable loss of territory.⁸² Therefore, Liang differentiated at the same time between a narrow nationalism (*xiao minzuzhuyi* 小民族主義), where only the Han were considered legitimate Chinese, and a broad nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi* 大民族主義), where different ethnic groups were united in their fight against foreign imperialist aggressors.⁸³ In the latter case, the nation is more tolerant and includes subgroups that, for instance, differ in ethnicity. For Liang, it is not exclusively primordialism that determines whether a nation will emerge as a form of political order. He also noted, significantly, that constructivism, or instrumentalism, play an important role in forming a nation. He was convinced that the fate of a nation depended on the quality of its people:

Bluntschli presented two explanations for defining a nation (*guomin*): “First, a *guomin* is defined by the character of its individuals. According to the organic state theory *guomin* is a collective body that can express its thinking and determine its rights. Second, a *guomin* is a legal collective (*Rechtsgemeinschaft*). It is a legal entity that exists in a state.” For a state to be complete, united and an enduring collective, it must rely on the spirit of national movement to achieve its full existence. Therefore, having a nation (*guomin*) means that there must be a state (*guojia*), and not having a state means that the nation does not exist. The two are the same, but with different names.⁸⁴

Here, national consciousness and statehood are closely related, and the state – with the help of a strong centralist government – is obliged to protect the interests of its citizens with a constitution. Liang expressed this in 1906 in a rebuttal of the call for racial homogeneity and the expulsion of the Manchu, when the *Xinmin congbao* fiercely debated the radical *Minbao* 民報 (*People’s Journal*) over the need for a racial revolution.⁸⁵ The *Xinmin congbao* – then under the editorship of Liang Qichao – harshly criticized the revolutionary organ of the *Tongmenghui*, warning of a dangerous militant clash with the Manchu government. Liang Qichao openly rejects ethnic revolution, arguing instead that state-nationalism should be the basis of political revolution.⁸⁶ His preference for a nation that viewed race and tradition as only secondary means for creating a sound political consciousness among the citizens was also influenced by his teacher Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927). Kang Youwei had warned his student in an open letter dating from 1902 that he should not join Sun Yat-sen’s movement because he was convinced that the Manchu had the legitimacy to rule China.⁸⁷ He proved this by construing a

82 Except for those who even considered genocide as a viable means to achieve the ideal of a racially homogenous nation, such as Liu Shipai, Zou Rong and Zhang Taiyan. Their vision of nationalism is discussed below.

83 The two alternatives *da minzuzhuyi* and *xiao minzuzhuyi* appear already in his text on Bluntschli. In 1906, when the conflict with the revolutionary camp became severe, Liang replaced in his political program his call for *minzuzhuyi* with concepts such as *guojiazhuyi* and *guominzhuyi*. Accordingly, the citizen becomes more important than race or ethnicity. For the conflict between the two camps, cf. Tang Zhijun 1994.

84 *Liang Qichao quanji*: 1068: 伯氏乃更下國民之界說為二：一曰：“國民者，人格也。據有有機之國家以為其體，而能發表其意思，制定其權利者也。”二曰：“國民者，法團也。生存于國家中之一法律體也。”國家為完全、統一、永生之公團體，而此體也，必賴有國民活動之精神以充之，而全體乃成。故有國民即有國家，無國家亦無國民，二者實同物而異名耳。For further details on Liang Qichao’s understanding of nation, see Chang Hao 1971, 248, 252–257, 260.

85 The *Minbao* was the major publication organ (1905–1910) of the *Tongmenghui*.

86 Liang Qichao (1906): “Zada moubao” 雜答某報 (“A miscellaneous reply to *Minbao*”, in *Xinmin congbao* 85 and 86), here quoted after Shen and Chien 1999, 15.

87 On the nationalism of Kang Youwei and especially his attitude towards the Qing regime compared to the revolutionary camp, see Tang Zhijun 1990.

genealogical lineage according to which the ancient legendary ruler Yu 禹 of Xia 夏 Dynasty – himself a descendant of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝) – was the first ancestor of the Manchu.⁸⁸ Liang preferred a constitutional government that allowed the Manchus to be part of China, instead one that excluded them, as the more racially oriented *Minbao* demanded under its head editor Zhang Taiyan. For the more conservative *Xinmin congbao*, a racial revolution against the Manchu would mean the government's downfall, leading to China's demise and foreign intervention.⁸⁹ This ideological struggle resulted in the deep radicalization of Chinese students residing in Japan, causing the majority to join Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Taiyan instead of Kang and his disciple Liang Qichao, because, for the former group, efforts that aimed at integrating the non-Han ethnicities into the nation were unbearable. Conceptually speaking, *guomin* gave way to *minzu*.

The racialized nation in the anti-Manchurian movement

In 1905, when those in favor of excluding the Manchu from the Chinese nation organized themselves in the *Tongmenghui* 同盟會 ("Revolutionary Alliance")⁹⁰ led by Sun Yat-sen, the nationalist and later leader of the Kuomintang Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883–1944) defined nation as follows:

Nation is a term used in the field of racial studies. Its definitions are manifold. Today, it is defined as a human collective who share the same *qilei* (similar nature). Its meaning includes the following. First, it is a collective of humans of the same *qilei*. There are six criteria for *qilei*, namely, 1) same blood (the most important factor [...]), 2) same language and script, 3) same living territory (a natural habitat), 4) same social customs, 5) same religion (in the modern era, this factor is less important due to freedom of religious belief), and 6) same spiritual essence. These six criteria are the essential factors of the nation. Second, it is a collective of humans that continues (to exist). The association of a nation is certainly not random, but (its members) have a historical relationship. It is for this reason that such a collective group cannot be destroyed after it came into existence. It is therefore an eternal association because a random meeting and parting (of people) cannot be called a nation. People (*guomin*) is a legal term. [...] People constitute a state (*guojia*). A state is a collective, and the people are part of the collective. Thus we can say that people are the constituent elements of the state from a legal perspective, and they have rights with regard to national law.⁹¹

-
- 88 See Kang Youwei, "Bian geming shu" 辨革命書 (1902). Zhang Taiyan refuted this view in an answer to this letter entitled 1903 in "Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu" 駁康有為論革命書 ("A letter refuting Kang Youwei's discussion on revolution"), published in May 1903 in the journal *Subao*.
- 89 Liang Qichao had already differentiated between *guojia* 國家 ("state") and *guomin* 國民 ("nation") as opposing principles in 1899. Cf. his article "Lun jinshi guomin jingzheng zhi dashi ji Zhongguo qiantu" 論今世國民競爭之大勢及中國前途 "On the current trend of worldwide national competition and the prospects for China".
- 90 Judging from the Chinese characters, this translation seems to be misleading (Sun had also once refused to add the two characters *geming* 革命, "revolution", to the name of his organization), but it has remained the most common translation in English language research. For the problem of how to translate *Tongmenghui* properly, cf. Liew 1971, 82.
- 91 Wang Jingwei, "Minzu de guomin" 民族的國民 (1905), 1–2: 民族云者。人種學上之用語也。其定義甚繁。今舉所信者曰民族者同氣類之繼續的人類團體也。茲析其義於左，(一) 同氣類之人類團體也。茲所云氣類其條件有六一同血系(此最要件，[...])，二同語言文字，三同住所(自然之地域)，四同習慣，五同宗教(近世宗教信仰自由畧減其例)，六同精神體質。此六者民族之要素也。(二) 繼續的人類團體也。民族之結合，必非偶然，其歷史上有相沿之共同關係。因而成不可破之共同團體，故能為永久的結合，偶然之聚散非民族也。國民云者法學上之用語也。[...]。國民者構成國家之分子也。國家者團體也。而國民為其團體之單位。故曰國家之構成分子自法理論言則國民者有國法上之人格者也。

This quote shows that a nation is a political collective defined by racial, linguistic, social and religious commonalities, similar to Liang's reading of Bluntschli. At the same time, it is obvious that Wang was well aware of the terminological subtleties, stressing as he did the differences between *guomin*, *guojia* and *minzu*. Though convinced that the latter played an important role, he did not forget that the primary aim was to prevent China's fate of being carved up like a melon by establishing a strong nation-as-state (*guojia* 國家). The nation-as-state concept emphasizes the sovereignty and autonomy of a nation against the interests of a rival nation. It refers to a nation in both an ethnic and geographic sense, opposes foreign intervention and asserts national sovereignty in foreign politics.⁹² For instance, in the journal *Jiangsu* published in Tōkyō in 1903, national sovereignty was discussed in the following way:

The Japanese scholar Tokutomi Sohō⁹³ said that Japan was a state (*guojia*), but without individuals, and that China had individuals, but did not have the concept of the state. It hurts me to hear such words [...]. A state is made of one ethnic people that help and support one another. The Japanese people are the Great Yamato race that holds sovereignty, and all members of the Great Yamato race are, without a doubt, part of the state. But how about China? If one asks the Chinese people, one will hear that China has been a sovereign state for 260 years. If one asks the Chinese people in whose hands the sovereignty resides, one will hear that it is the treacherous race of those who live north of the Great Wall and have queues and button the lappets of their coats on the left side [...]. Our four hundred million people of the same origin are not able to form a large collective, with their hearts and power united, to restore the national sovereignty by driving away from the white mountains and black waters⁹⁴ the treacherous race that has queues and button the lappets of their coats on the left side.⁹⁵

Nation is defined here as a collective that enjoys national self-determination. The emphasis on statehood notwithstanding, nation is defined by race. For the Han, it was obvious that they should enjoy national self-determination and sovereignty, unlike the other ethnic groups on their territory. This allowed for the possibility of genocide. In fact, the rising antipathy towards the Manchu following the debate of the *Mimbao* and *Xinmin congbao* led to the prominence of *minzu* as a term in nationalist discourse. It was often understood in reference to ethnicity or race (種族, 族類), and these differences were non-negotiable (in contrast to the imperial period where differences in ethnicity, race, culture or religion did not play any political role). In one of the most racist publications of the late Qing period, *Gemingjun* 革命軍 (*The Revolutionary Army*), the young Zou Rong 鄒容 (1885–1905) defined the Chinese nation in terms of seven characteristics that – in contrast to Liang's reading of Bluntschli – clearly emphasized delineation from the outside by excluding the Manchu from the nation-to-be:

92 On the relation between state and *guojia* see Liang Qichao, "Xianzheng qianshuo" 憲政淺說 ("Preliminary Discussion on Constitutional Government").

93 Tokutomi Sohō 德富蘇峰 (1863–1957) was a Japanese journalist and intellectual. He stemmed from a samurai-ranked family and studied English at the Kumamoto Yōgakkō. He started a local newspaper before moving to Tōkyō, where he established in 1887 the Min'yūsha Publishing Company, which produced Japan's first general news magazine, the *Kokumin no tomo* 國民之友 (*The People's Friend*, 1887–1898), which also appeared in an English-language version (1896–1898). For more details on the political life of Tokutomi, cf. Pierson 1980.

94 This geographical description refers to the region between the Changbai Mountain 長白山 and the Amur River 黑龍江.

95 Anonymous (1903): "Sanlelu zizhushu: renzu, wu guojia" 三樂盧自助書: 人祖, 無國家: 日本學者德富蘇峰曰「日本有國家而無個人中國有個人而無國家」吾痛其言[...]。國家者一族人民相維相繫而成者也。日本人民同是大和民族為人民之代表而握主權者亦皆大和民族之分子故其有國家機軸也不俟論中國何如乎問其人民則二百六十年根深蒂固之隸屬也問其握主權者何人則長城以北辮髮左衽之賊族[...]。我四百兆同種國民竟不能結成一絕大團夥同心同力驅逐此辮髮左衽之賊族醜類於白山黑水間以光復我固有之國權。

- China is the China of the Chinese. Fellow countrymen, you must all recognize the China of the Chinese of the Han race.
- To not allow any alien race to lay its hands on the least of the rights of our China.
- To annul once and for all any obligations to subordinate the people to the Manchus.
- To first overthrow the barbaric government set up by the Manchus in Peking.
- To expel the Manchus settled in China or kill them in order to avenge ourselves.
- To kill the emperor set up by the Manchus as a warning to the myriad future generations that the despotic government will not to be revived.
- To oppose any intervention directed either by Chinese nationals or from foreign soil against Chinese revolutionary independence.⁹⁶

Zou understood the fight against the Manchus as a social Darwinist fight that was unavoidable if the Han were to survive:

Sweep away millennia of despotism in all its forms, throw off millennia of slavishness, annihilate the five million and more of the furry and horned Manchus, cleanse ourselves of 260 years of harsh and unremitting pain, so that the soil of the Chinese subcontinent is made immaculate, and the descendants of the Yellow Emperor will all become [George] Washingtons.⁹⁷

His contemporary Liu Shipai 劉師培 (1884–1919), a classical scholar and later anarchist, shared this definition of the Chinese nation when pointing out the following in his *Zhongguo minzu zhi* 中國民族志 (*Annals of the Chinese Nation*):

Nations of lower and higher ranks annihilate each other. While the Han developed a daily progressing civilization, the barbarian races⁹⁸ were unable to preserve their independence. This is the reason why the power of the Han was stronger.⁹⁹

Liu Shipai was convinced that the Han had a very distinct character, which was why they drove away foreign people that had occupied Chinese territories.¹⁰⁰ In the most radical writings that were directed against the Manchu rule, Han Chinese nationalists considered racial differences to be a given fact. This is expressed for example in the 1903 *Jingshizhong* 警世鐘 (*Alarm Bell*), written by Chen Tianhua 陳天華 (1875–1905):

96 Tsou Jung 1968, 42; 123 (translation by John Lust):

- 一、中國為中國人之中國，我同胞皆須自認為自己的漢種中國人[之]中國。
- 一、不許異種人沾染我中國絲毫權力。
- 一、所有服從滿洲人之義務，一律銷[消]滅。
- 一、先推倒滿洲人所立北京之野蠻政府。
- 一、驅逐居住中國中之滿洲人，或殺以報仇。
- 一、謀殺滿洲人所立之皇帝，以徵萬世不復有專制之君主。
- 一、對敵干預我中國革命獨立之外國及本國人。

97 Tsou Jung 1968, 58; 1 (translation by John Lust): 掃除數千年種種之專制政體。脫去數千來種種之奴隸性質。誅絕五百萬有奇披毛戴角之滿洲族，洗盡二百六十年殘慘虐酷之大恥辱，使中國大陸成乾淨土，黃帝子孫皆華盛頓。

98 By referring to the barbarians as races and not nations, Liu emphasizes that these races have not reached the status of a nation yet, i.e. they are obviously less civilized than the Han.

99 *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, 606: 劣等民族與高等民族相值滅亡。隨至漢族日進於文明，則野蠻種族，自不能常保其獨立。此誠漢族增勢第一原因矣。

100 *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, 622: 漢族者，有特立之精神者也。故無論何種何族入據中國，入據卒為漢族所排。

Only China does not know racial (*zhongzu*) distinctions. [...]. When the Mongols and the Manchus came, they [the Chinese] provided them with military service and paid taxes. When the Westerners (*xiyang ren*) came, they served in their army and paid taxes...Even animals know how to protect their own species; the Chinese are not even animals (*qinshou*)! As the old saying goes: No one loves people of other surnames (*waixing*).¹⁰¹ In the case of a feud between two lineages, one always fights on the side of his kinsmen. But [throughout Chinese history] all the ordinary *xing* (family names, or lineage) originated in one *xing*. The Han race (*Hanzhong*) is a large *xing*; Huangdi is the grand first ancestor (*da shizu*). All those who are not *Hanzhong* are not the descendants of Huangdi.¹⁰² They belonged to other surnames (*waixing*). One must not help them. If you do, you abandon your ancestors (*zuzong*) and you are brutes (*chusheng*).¹⁰³

Chen emphasizes ancestral lineage as a criterion for defining the nation. This approach had been most forcefully propagated by Zhang Taiyan, who in his *Qiusbu* 墟書 (*Book of Urgency*, 1900) had denied the possibility that both Han and Manchus could be part of China (*Zhongguo* 中國, *Zhongxia* 中夏).¹⁰⁴ In an open letter published in August 1900 in the journal *Zhongguo xunbao* 中國旬報, he rejected the possibility of Manchus and Mongols being represented in a future parliament. In his eyes, it would be better for the five million Manchus currently residing in Chinese territory south of the Great Wall to return to their homeland and leave China to the Chinese.¹⁰⁵

This is also the reason why a nationalist journal such as the *Minbao* – while using a variety of self-designations – tended to privilege *hanzu* 漢族 and *hanren* 漢人 as the two most frequent terms.¹⁰⁶ Both terms suggest that the Han are the primary political agents in the current quest for national unity and identity. Chen Tianhua emphasized in his serial novel *Shizi hou* 獅子吼 (*The Roaring Lion*) that the charter of a fictive nationalist association required that its members not forget that China is the China of the Han.¹⁰⁷ Similar usages can also be attributed to the term *hanzu*.¹⁰⁸ While *hanzu* is a neologism coined in late Qing China, *hanren* is a term used frequently in the dynastic histories, yet

101 Chen defines the Chinese nation by means of lineage, i.e. a people with a different surname clearly does not belong to the own group.

102 On the creation of Huangdi as the Chinese national ancestor, see Matten 2009 and 2012.

103 *Jingshizhong*, 86–87: 只有中國從來不知有種族的分別，蒙古、滿洲來了，照例當兵納糧，西洋人來了，也照例當兵納糧。[...]。禽獸也知各顧自己的同種，中國人真是連禽獸都不如了。俗語說得好，人不親外姓，兩姓相爭，一定是幫同姓，斷沒有幫外姓的。但是平常的姓，都是從一姓分出來的。漢種是一個大姓，黃帝是一個大始祖，凡不同漢種，不是黃帝的子孫的，統統都是外姓，斷不可幫他的，若幫了他，是不要祖宗了你不要祖宗的人，就是畜生。 This translation is for the sake of precision slightly adapted from the one provided by Chow Kai-wing (2001, 56–57). Chen wrote the *Alarm Bell* in autumn 1903 as a reaction to Russia's continuous advance into Manchuria.

104 The racist thinking of Zhang Taiyan was influenced by Sir Edward Burnett Tylors' (1832–1917) book *Primitive Culture* (1871). In his *Qiusbu* (chapter *Zuzhi* 族制, 194), Zhang points out that stupidity and intelligence depended on the inheritance of superiority and inferiority, and strength and weakness depended on the purity of blood: 遺傳之優劣，愈智繁焉。血液之純雜，強弱繫焉。

105 Ma Yong 2003, 56–57. See also Zhang Taiyan's piece "Zhengchou Man lun" 正仇滿論 ("On the correct hating of the Manchu"). This piece appeared originally in *Guomin bao* 國民報 4 (10 August 1901).

106 Cf. Table II compiled on the basis of Onogawa Hidemi's concordance to the *Minbao*.

107 *Minbao* 8, 112: 本會之人，須知中國者，漢人之中國也。

108 Wang Jingwei ("Xiwang Manzhou lixianzhe he tingzhu" 希望滿洲立憲者盡聽諸, 1906) argues: 滿族壓制漢族，而此兩族利害相反，不能並存。"The Manchu suppress the Han, and as the interests of both races oppose each other, they cannot coexist." This article attacks Liang Qichao's journal *Xinmin congbao*, which in an earlier issue had called for a constitutional government of both Han and Manchu.

with a different meaning. Generally speaking, the term *hanren* at first appears to denote the Han people,¹⁰⁹ but in 13th century it meant rather the Northern Chinese.¹¹⁰

Table II: Designations for China and the Chinese in the *People's Journal* (*Minbao* 民報), 1905–1910

Term	Frequency of use	Term	Frequency of use
中華民族	2	中華共和國	1
漢族	96	中國民族	5
中華民國	4	中國臣民	5
中國人	37	漢民	14
中國人民	5	中國人種	1
中國之人民	5	中國之民	1
中國之臣民	12	漢人	216

Given that *hanren* encompassed the people living in Northern China (including the Khitan, Jurchen and Koreans) during the Yuan Dynasty, and that the first emperor of Ming Dynasty considered himself the ruler of all people, this term can hardly be understood in its modern, ethnicized sense.¹¹¹ It rather described the social reality of the Chinese empire that was consciously construed as a heterogeneous, multi-faceted territory. This circumstance helped to promote the image of a multiethnic empire in later centuries, when ethnicity emerged as a decisive factor in the process of democratization, ideologization and politicization during the threshold period. Only then did ethnicity replace the traditional, mostly kin-

109 In imperial times, it was used especially in dynasties with foreign rulers, such as the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty. The *Yuanshi* 元史 (*History of the Yuan*; 7, 141) mentions in the annals of Emperor Kublai Khan (1215–1294) the prohibition of the Han to assemble and fight against the Mongols: 禁漢人聚眾與蒙古人鬪毆。And in the *Jinshi* 金史 (*History of the Jin*; 2, 32) *hanren* is used to classify the imperial subjects according to judicial or administrative categories, yet not as an identity marker: 乙未，威州都統司言，漢人李孝功、渤海二哥率眾來降。

110 For instance, the conflict between the Han and the Jurchens 女真 in 12th century caused by the advancement of the Tungusic tribe in northeast China to the south in their ambition to gain control over Han-populated Southern China was surely an issue of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) in terms of war and peace. Yet, it did not pose a political problem for the ensuing Mongolian Yuan Dynasty which considered itself to be multiethnic. Their rulers divided the population into four classes, the Mongols 蒙古人, the Semuren 色目人 (people from central Asia that had different eyes colors than the Han), the Northern Chinese (*hanren* 漢人, including the Khitan, Jurchens and Koreans), and the Southerners 南人, i. e. the subjects of the former Southern Song Dynasty. Though this division was often viewed as hierarchical (with the Mongols enjoying most of the social and economic privileges), the dynasty ensured that these differences were not interpreted in clearly ethnic or racial terms. After the downfall of the Yuan, many Semu intellectuals were quickly assimilated and became prominent mandarins and officials under the Ming, with some even no longer retaining a separate ethnic identity. Accordingly, the criminal code of the Yuan stated that in case of theft the Han and the Jurchens were sentenced equally. See *Yuanshi* 104, 2660: 諸女直人為盜，刺斷同漢人。This is however only a judicial norm that does not say anything about the actual treatment of the Han under Mongolian rule.

111 This conclusion is also valid for the first ruler of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328–1398) who originally had declared his intention to drive away the Mongols and restore Chinese rule (驅逐胡虜，恢復中華), but, according to *Ming Taizu shilu* 明太祖實錄 26, soon became conciliatory after his takeover of power. In April 1370, in the fourth year of his regency, he interdicted the practice of the Mongols and Semu to change their surname into a Chinese one (to avoid sinicization), because each name had its own origin and could not easily be abandoned (in addition, the name had been inherited from the ancestors). At the same time though, he declared himself emperor of all peoples residing on Ming imperial territory (蒙古諸色人等皆我赤子). For the corresponding “Edict on the Prohibition of Mongols and Semu people to change their Family Name” (禁蒙古色目人更易姓氏詔) see *Ming Taizu shilu* 51, 999–1000. The refusal to demand sinicization from non-Han ethnicities in imperial China is discussed in Matten 2009, 150–154.

ship-based organization of the nation concept, which occurred when homogenization to the inside and a clear delineation from the outside became an urgent need to the early nationalist thinkers.

The sense of ethnicity as a non-negotiable and unquestionable identity marker in this context emerged when *hanren* gained a new meaning, turning into a more radical term that no longer implied the inclusion of various subgroups into the empire (an imperial concept backed up by the Confucian tradition), but was sometimes also used to support the exclusion of those ethnicities that were not deemed part of the nation (as implied by the term *hanzu*). This shift in meaning was mainly achieved by introducing the notion of blood-based ancestry or the concept of race. The corresponding term *hanzu* was a neologism coined by Liang Qichao in 1901 when he wrote his piece “Wanguo pian” 亡國篇 (“On our country’s decay”). He complained about the social segregation of the Manchus, who were residing in their garrisons, receiving monthly stipends and rice rations without being obliged to work. Their function was solely to defend the Manchu court against the Han.¹¹² Besides *hanzu*, this article still uses *hanren* 漢人, *hanmin* 漢民, *hanzhong* 漢種, and *hanzhong zhi ren* 漢種之人 as terms for the Han race/ethnicity. This is due to the fact that these terms were not clearly differentiated from each other, and also accounts for the fact that many publications of that period used *hanzu* and *hanren* – more often than not – interchangeably,¹¹³ such as the *Minbao* (see Table II).

However, the prevailing racial-essentialist definition of China at the end of the Qing period raised a perplexing question: If the Han were allowed to have a nation of their own, why shouldn’t the Manchus, Mongols and Tibetans? Already a few years before the Xinhai Revolution broke out in late 1911 some radical nationalist thinkers in the *Tongmenghui* camp – Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1868–1936), Liu Shipai et al. – acknowledged the problem of defining the Chinese nation as a Han nation. The more reformist scholars Liang Qichao and Yang Du 楊度 (1874–1932)¹¹⁴ had warned against the consequences of having an exclusive nationalism that would force the new Republic to give up a greater part of its territory. In 1907, Zhang Taiyan had expressed the view in his influential piece “Zhonghua Minguo jie” 中華民國解 (“Explanations of the Chinese Republic”) that a future China would include territories inhabited by the Han race, which extended to Vietnam and Korea. Regions such as Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang (but not Manchuria) were considered far away from the civilizational center and beyond the dominion of the Chinese people and thus to be excluded from the future nation-state.¹¹⁵ For him, even if this meant territorial losses, China was a monoethnic entity characterized by a well-defined territory, a shared history and the common primordial characteristics of all its inhabitants.

The question of whether the non-Han ethnicity could be included into the Chinese nation (which is still a highly sensitive political issue today) has already been answered in different ways. For

112 Liang Qichao, “Wanguo pian”, 2: 皇皇種族，乃使之永遠沉淪，其非人心哉！夫駐防云者，則豈不以防我漢族哉！ See also Wang Ke 2001, 188. Liang wrote this text before becoming acquainted with the statism of Bluntschli in 1903.

113 To mention a few, there are Wang Jingwei, “Minzu de guomin” (1905); Zhu Zhixin 朱執信, “Lun Manzhou sui yu lixian er bu neng” 論滿洲雖怨立憲而不能 (1905); Si Ji 嗣輯, “Xinmin congbao fei zhongzu geming lun zhi boyi” 「新民叢報」非種族革命論之駁議 (1906).

114 See here his most important publication on the fate of China, the “Theory of Gold-Ironism” (*Jintie zhuyi shuo* 金鉄主義說), discussed below.

115 “Zhonghua Minguo jie,” 2420. In Zhang’s eyes, it was not likely to include these regions into the future Chinese Republic (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國) because the people in these regions differed in ethnic lineage and language so much from the Han that their inclusion would create problems, unless they were assimilated by means of sinicization. However, even if Sinicized this would not mean that these ethnic groups would be able to enjoy the same social status or political rights as the Han. A fine introduction to the relationship between Han and Manchu is Rhoads 2000.

instance, the contemporary historian Li Guoqi sees no contradiction between China as a state and as a nation. According to Li, Chinese nationalism since 1912 has undergone an evolution from narrow to tolerant nationalism. Anti-Manchu nationalism appears here as a merely temporary phenomenon that is later replaced by a more inclusive nationalism, i.e. one that promotes the ideology of a multiethnic nation-state.¹¹⁶ As a result, Liang and Yang argued for replacing ethnically or racially defined nationalism (*xiao minzuzhuyi*) with a more civic nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*) that would allow non-Han ethnicities – Manchus, Mongols and Tibetans – to remain part of the republic. The question remains as to how this paradigmatic change was achieved on the conceptual level. In fact, it was the obscurity, or polysemy, of the term nation in the Chinese language that made it possible to diminish substantial differences between the ethnic and the statist term for nation.¹¹⁷ In the remaining part of this paper, I will elaborate on the origins of this paradigmatic shift by showing that this complexity was both terminological and conceptual.

The inclusive nation in the Republican period

Immediately after the revolution of 1911, the exclusion of ethnic minorities from the Chinese nation was abolished due to the growing pressure the country faced during the breakdown of the imperial order. It was widely feared that if Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia or Manchuria were not included, the imperialist forces of England (from the south), Russia (from the north) and Japan (via Korea) would seize the opportunity to occupy Chinese territory. As a consequence, all ethnic groups were allowed to enjoy equal rights and form an integral part of the Republic.¹¹⁸ When Sun Yat-sen was appointed as temporary president in January 1912, he thus declared:

The foundation of our country (*guojia*) lies with the people (*renmin*). We need to combine all areas of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetans into one unified state, just as we, the different ethnic groups of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetans, are to be united to form one people. This means that the nation (*minzu*) is unified.¹¹⁹

The inclusion of these territories located on the edge of the empire into the new Republic needed to avoid any suspicions that an internal colonization was taking place. One way to do this was to strengthen the common history and culture of the ethnicities and to point to their common struggle against the Japanese and European imperialism. In other words, it was understood that the extreme

116 This view is in line with the current official interpretation of the Xinhai revolution (see Zhang Haipeng and Gong Yun 2005). Li Guoqi's view corresponds roughly to Liang Qichao's differentiation between *da minzuzhuyi* and *xiao minzuzhuyi*. Cf. Li Guoqi 1985, chapter "Zhongguo jindai minzu sixiang" 中國近代民族思想 ("Modern National Thinking in China"), 42.

117 This was already the case with Liang Qichao who in his 1901 "Zhongguo shi xulun" 中國史敘論 ("Introductory Essay to a History of China") used *Zhongguo minzu* 中國民族, a term that sometimes referred to the Han solely, but sometimes also to the ethnicities that since the recording of history had lived on Chinese territory. See the discussion below.

118 The need to grant equal rights to all ethnic groups in the empire had already been acknowledged by the Manchus in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, yet they had difficulties in calling for an abandonment of their privileges. It was only after the overthrow of the Qing that an equality of all *minzu* had a chance to be implemented. One of the early supporters among the Manchus was Hengjun 恆鈞, a member of the imperial family. He had studied pedagogy and historical geography in Japan. In 1907, he asked in a petition submitted to the court that a national parliament should be convened that included ethnic minorities. For the role of Hengjun see Rhoads 2000, 127–128.

119 "Linshi da zongtong xuanyanshu" 臨時大總統宣言書, 2: 國家之本, 在於人民。合漢、滿、蒙、回、藏諸地為一國, 即合漢、滿、蒙、回、藏諸族為一人。是曰民族之統一。

racial enmity towards the Manchu had to be replaced by a seemingly more tolerant nationalistic thinking that effectively transformed the irreconcilable enemy of the Han into a compatriot.

In order to convincingly initiate such a paradigmatic shift, the demands for the expulsion of the Manchus pronounced in the political program of the *Tongmenghui* in 1905 were dropped in the Republic's first provisional constitution, *Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa* 中華民國臨時約法, in 1912. Article 5 simply reads:

The people of the Chinese Republic are without exception equal, there is no discrimination in race, class or religion.¹²⁰

Article 1 further states that the Chinese people (not an ethnic group) represent the Republic.¹²¹ This change was not simply a response to the successful revolution, but had been discussed since the emergence of the constitutional movement in 1907. For instance, the journal *Datong bao* 大同報 (published in 1907 in Beijing, Shanghai and Tōkyō) – which was far less radical than the anti-Manchurian publications – pointed out that

[...] the people (*renmin*) of China were a nation whose members were of the same ethnicity (*minzu*), yet stemming of different races (*zhongzu*).¹²²

It is worth noting here that *minzu* is no longer understood in an exclusionary, but rather in an inclusionary sense. Likewise, the Tōkyō edition of this journal emphasized several times in an opinion piece on constitutional government that Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui and Tibetans were part of the 400 million compatriots.¹²³

Sun Yat-sen inherited this legacy after becoming president. When the new Republic was founded, local officials in Shanghai banned the use of the term “the Great Han” (*Da Han* 大漢) in commercials and newspapers, as well as in private and official letters,¹²⁴ and Sun replaced his jingoistic Han-Chinese nationalism with the vision of a republic of five ethnic groups (*wuzu gonghe*).¹²⁵ He propagated this vision intensively in the years after 1912, largely in his speeches to multiethnic audiences, in order to make non-Han ethnicities part of the political community.¹²⁶ As a term, *wuzu gonghe* was used for the first time officially in the resignation note of the last emperor Puyi 溥儀 (1906–1967).¹²⁷ As an ideological principle defining the boundaries of Chineseness (i.e. determining who belongs to the collective and who does not), however, the idea had a history predating the nationalist era. It was due to the increasing general openness to an ideological understanding of nationalism that it could emerge in a new conceptual

120 *Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa*, § 5. 中華民國人民一律平等，無種族、階級、宗教之區別。

121 None of constitutions of 1912, 1923 and 1931 use the term *minzu*. For the different constitutions see Zhang Jinfan 2005.

122 Mu Duli 穆都哩, “Meng Hui Zangyu guohui wenti” 蒙回藏與國會問題, 15: 中國之人民，皆同民族異種族之國民也。

123 “Zhongguo xianzheng jiangxi yijianshu” 中國憲政講習會意見書, 19: 我漢、滿、蒙、回、藏四萬萬同胞。

124 See the corresponding reports in the *Shenbao*, 13 April, 26 and 27 May 1912.

125 For more details on the origin of this principle and its function in the 1910s, see Kataoka Kazutada 1984 and Murata Yūjirō 2005, and Matten 2009. For a 1920s Japanese view on the *wuzu gonghe*, see Nakamura Kujirō 中村久四郎 *Shina no gozoku kyōwa* 支那の五族共和 (1925).

126 Kataoka Kazutada (1984, 300-301) has shown that Sun Yat-sen used the term especially in speeches and public lectures after 1912 when a multiethnic audience was present (and not just Han-Chinese). A list of speeches where Sun uses the terms *wuzu gonghe*, *wuzu pingdeng* and *wuzu yijia* is provided by Murata Yūjirō (2005, 86).

127 Cf. “Qingdi xuanbu tuiwei zhi” 清帝宣佈退位旨, 72.

framework.¹²⁸ Under the rule of the Qing, China was conceived as a unified state whose government "represented" or acted in the name of different ethnic groups and where the emperor claimed both the simultaneity and universality of his rule in every part of China. The claim for a multiethnic empire was also apparent in the *Da Qing yitong zhi* 大清一統志 (*Gazetteers of the Unified Great Qing*, ca. 1746) and the *Huangqing zhi gongtu* 皇清職貢圖 (*Illustrations of Tributes to the Qing Empire*, ca. 1769). These texts defined the 18th century dynasty as a geographical and ethnically heterogeneous, but unified empire. Sun's call for *wuzu gonghe* thus shared the same political logic when he tried to integrate the Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans and Hui into the new Republic. Yet, Sun broke from the Qing vision of China in one important respect when it came to the treatment of the ethnic minorities under the government of the new nation: While the emperor denied the sinicization of the Manchu, Sun and his successor Chiang Kai-shek explicitly demanded the assimilation of the four major ethnic groups (see below).¹²⁹

The call for *wuzu gonghe* was more than just a rhetorical strategy of Sun, however. Two months after the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911, it was the north-Chinese faction that tried to implement preferential treatment of Manchu, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans in the new Republic. For example, the reformer and supporter of Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916), Zhang Jian 張謇 (1853–1926), proposed the idea of a unified state during the peace negotiations between North and South China in Shanghai in December 1911. In various letters and telegrams addressed to Yuan Shikai, Zhang Jian argues for the establishment of a multiethnic republic: Only a republic could ensure the survival of such a vast and heterogeneous country like China.¹³⁰ Intellectuals who had earlier insisted on an anti-Manchurian stance shared this view. For instance, the manifesto of the *Guoshi gongjihui* 國事共濟會 (*Association for Support of National Concerns*), founded in November 1911 by Wang Jingwei and Yang Du, reads:

Since the beginning of developing a constitution in China, two factions have appeared: the supporters of constitutional monarchy and the supporters of constitutional democracy. The former argue that the Chinese state is a community of the five races, the Manchu, Han, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans. The argument that the Mongols, Hui and Tibetans can be governed together with the Han fully depends on the control imposed by the Manchurian monarch...As concerns the so-called territory, one can say that it thus includes the 22 provinces, the vassal states of Mongolia, Tibet, and Hui. If the Han form a state out of their 22 provinces and transform the country into a democratic state, their military strength will not be sufficient to control Mongolia and Tibet. At the same time, Mongolia and Tibet

128 In April 1912, early supporters of the Xinhai revolution in the Ili region in Xinjiang founded the *Han, Man, Meng, Hui, Zang wuzu gongjinhui* 漢、滿、蒙、回、藏五族共進會 (*Society for the Advancement of the [Affairs of the] Five Ethnicities Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans*) in Beijing. It was headed by Zhao Bingjun 趙秉鈞 (1859–1914), the later third premier of the Republic of China (Sept. 1912–May 1913). The aim of the association was to remove differences between the five ethnicities in order to establish a strong state. See Yang Xiaonong 1934. With very similar aims, the *Wuzu guomin hejinhui* 五族國民合進會 (*Society for a Common Advancement of the Nation of Five Ethnicities*) was founded in May 1912 in Beijing. Among its founders and supporters were illustrious persons of the early Republic, such as Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, Huang Xing 黃興, Li Yuanhong 黎元洪, and Duan Qirui 段祺瑞. Its leader was Zhao Bingjun, his deputies the Manchu Zhijun 志鈞, the Mongol Xilinga 熙凌阿, the Hui Wang Kuan 王寬 and the Tibetan Salun 薩倫. Murata Yūjirō 2005, Wang Ke 2005 and Fujii Shōzō and Yokoyama Hiroaki 1992 question whether Sun Yat-sen was the creator of the term *wuzu gonghe*.

129 Evelyn Rawski (1996) has argued that sinicization is a Han-nationalist interpretation of the past that dates from the 20th century.

130 Telegram to Yuan Shikai, "Zhi Yuan Shikai dian" 致袁世凱電, 276–277. Cf. also the discussion in Kataoka Kazutada 1984, 292–293, and the summary in Murata 2005, 87.

are not able to form a state on their own. If the Manchurian emperor is removed from his throne, the Han territory, Mongolia, the Hui territory, and Tibet will fall apart.¹³¹

For Yang Du, a member of the constitutional movement, all five ethnic groups were part of China. He also believed that jingoistic Han nationalism would mean the loss of large parts of Chinese territory. In his central text, the “Jintie zhuyi shuo” 金鐵主義說 (“Theory of Gold-Ironism”, 1907), he argued:

In regard to China’s role in today’s world, no part of the territories of the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans can be forsaken. In a similar way, no part of the population of the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans can be forsaken. Land, people and sovereign power must remain the same as before. If one of these factors is lost or changed, then the country itself is lost. [...] This means that the form of the country cannot be changed, as well as its territory and its people. That the people (*renmin*) remain unchanged means that the five ethnicities of Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans are members of one nation (*guomin*). We must unite the five parts to one nation; we must not divide one nation into five parts.¹³²

Even if Yang Du did not use the slogan *wuzu gonghe* here, his intention was clear: The post-imperial territory of China should remain the same as in the imperial times. Such a definition corresponds to the principle of *uti possidetis* in international law, which says that imperial boundaries can be inherited, as stated in the draft constitution, *Zhonghua minguo xianfa caoan* 中華民國憲法草案, of October 1913. In other words, imperial frontiers were simply transformed into national boundaries that defined a national space of a national government.

A similar, straight-forward equation of imperial and national order occurred when Yuan Shikai restored imperial political rituals in 1914. Though he creatively combined modern and traditional forms of ritual, their purpose was to serve the new Republic. When he restored state religion, assumed the role of the High Priest in the Temple of Heaven (*Tiantan* 天壇), and finally conducted sacrifices to Heaven in December 1914, as the dynastic emperors had done before, he aimed to revive the traditional cosmology and in some way receive a proper mandate from heaven.¹³³ The imperial rituals were conducted in the name of the people,¹³⁴ and here again the concept of the citizen (*guomin*) replaced the more problematic term for race (*minzu*). The enmity towards ethnicities such as the Manchus and Mongols was supposed to disappear, and the attempt was made to create a unified nation.¹³⁵ Similarly, Sun Yat-sen continued to

131 Wang Jingwei and Yang Du, “Guoshi gongjihui xuanyanshu fu jianzhang” 國事共濟會宣言書附簡章 (“Manifesto and Statute of the Association for Support of National Concerns”), 538: 中國自有立憲問題發生，國中遂分為君主立憲、民主立憲兩黨。君主立憲黨之言曰：中國之立國以滿漢蒙回藏五種人集合而成，而蒙回藏人之能與漢人同處一國政府之下者，全恃滿洲君主主義羈縻之耳。[...]。而其所謂領土者，乃合二十二行省、蒙古、西藏、回部等藩屬而言；若漢人以二十二行省自立一國，變為民主政體，一時兵力必不能兼定蒙藏，而蒙藏又無獨立一國之力，則滿洲君主去位之時，即漢蒙回藏分離之時。The aim of the *Guoshi gongjihui* was to negotiate between the radical revolutionaries and the members of the constitutional movement.

132 Yang Du, “Jintie zhuyi shuo,” 304: 故中國之在今日世界，漢滿蒙回藏之土地不可失其一部，漢滿蒙回藏之人民不可失其一部，必使土地如故，人民如故，統治權如故。三者之中，不可失其一焉有所變動，則國亡矣。[...]。茲所論者，則國形不可變，即領土不可變，人民不可變也。人民即不可變，則國民之漢滿蒙回藏五族，但可合五為一，而不可分一為五。Yang Du’s views were criticized by Zhang Taiyan in his “Zhonghua Minguo jie” and by Wang Dong 汪東 (1890–1963) in his “Geming jinshi lun” 革命今勢論 (“On the current status of Revolution”, 1907). China was supposed to be the China of the Han, thus an exclusion of the Manchus was deemed necessary.

133 For some details on the characteristics of this ritual, cf. Zarrow 2001.

134 As reported in the newspaper *Shibao*, 21 December 1914, see here the discussion in Zarrow 2001, 169.

135 Despite this, racial discrimination of the Manchus continued to persist after the successful revolution in 1911 and even after the founding of the Republic on 1 January 1912. See here Rhoads 2000.

discuss the issue of nationality and ethnicity long after 1912. Nine years after the founding of the Republic, he still emphasized in a speech at a meeting of the KMT in Canton the urgent need for the "Republic of the five ethnic groups," which would now be achieved by means of assimilation (*tonghua* 同化):

Our party must realize the ideal of nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*), its task is to assimilate the Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans to our Han and create a state characterized by a great nationalism. Look at the United States, which is the strongest and richest nation-state (*minzu guojia*) in the world. America's national unity is the unity of the whites and the blacks, which consist of thousands of ethnic groups. It is the most complex amalgamation of a multitude of ethnic groups. Since the founding of the United States, people from England, Holland, Germany and France have participated in this newly organized state. [...]. Why is America not called England, Holland, France, Germany or *Mei*, but the United States of America? The new nation in America is created by the assimilation (*tonghua*) of the British, Dutch, French and German, and the country is known as the United States of America. By combining various peoples, USA is shining and blooming today. [...]. [Thus,] the United States of America should be a model for our party. [...]. Brothers, an appropriate method [for China] would be to center on the Han, and to assimilate the other ethnicities into the nation by providing them with opportunities to be part of the new country. Just as in the example of USA, the Han ethnic group shall become the Chinese nation and create a perfect nation-state, and therefore – similar to USA in the western hemisphere – become a nationalist state on the eastern hemisphere of the earth.¹³⁶

What Sun intended to achieve with his 1921 speech has long been debated. Despite its racial rhetoric, including the non-Han ethnic groups in the young Chinese Republic in the speech was a skillful political move. Whether or not the non-Han Chinese accepted Sun's plan was a completely different matter, however. To integrate non-Han ethnic groups into the Republic, Sun argued that language acquisition was of primary significance:

If foreign ethnicities¹³⁷ learn our language, they will be more easily assimilated by us, and after a long while they will become one ethnic group with us.¹³⁸

In his *Sanminzhuyi* 三民主義 (*Three Principles of the People*, 1924), Sun uses *zhong*, *zhongzu* or *renzong* for race (in a biological sense), and cultural or ethnic differences within this biologicistic category

136 Sun Yat-sen, Speech on 6 March 1921, "Zai Zhongguo Guomindang benbu teshe zhu Yue banshichu de yanshuo" 在中國國民黨本部特設駐粵辦事處的演說, 473–474: 本黨尚須在民族主義上做功夫, 務使滿、蒙、回、藏同化於我漢族, 成一大民族主義的國家。試看彼美國, 在今日號稱世界最強、最富庶民族國家。他底民族結合, 有黑種, 有白種, 幾不下數十百種, 為世界各民族最多底集合體。自美國國家成立, 有英國人、荷蘭人、德國人、法國人, 參加入他底組織中。[...]。何以美國不稱英、荷、法、德、美, 而稱美利堅呢? 要知美利堅底新民族, 乃合英、荷、法、德種人同化於美而成底名詞, 亦適成其為美利堅民族, 為美利堅民族, 乃有今日光華燦爛底美國。[...]。本黨應以美國為榜樣。[...]。兄弟現在想得一個調和的方法, 即拿漢族來做中心, 使之同化於我, 並且為其他民族加入我們組織建國底機會。仿美利堅民族底規模, 將漢族改為中華民族, 組成一個完全底民族國家, 與美國同為東西半球二大民族主義的國家。

137 *Minzu* should rather read ethnic group than race as proposed by d'Elia, which is much closer to the understanding of Sun Yat-sen as argued above. There are various translations of *Sanminzhuyi*, each with a differing degree of reliability. In the following, I use the least problematic one by Pascale d'Elia, which appeared first in French (1930) and then in an English version (1931). Though generally considered to be most precise translation, it is not sufficiently consistent with regard to some political concepts, such as nation. For this reason, I will modify it slightly if necessary.

138 Sun Yat-sen (*Sanminzhuyi*, [1] 620; d'Elia 1974, 68–69) continues this argument by pointing out that if the Chinese learned a foreign language the foreigners would also more easily assimilate them: 如果外來民族得了我們的語言, 便容易被我們感化, 久而久之, 遂同化成一個民族。

are defined by using *zu* or *minzu*. Of all the factors that define a nation, blood kinship is the most significant one. Yet this does not render the assimilation of non-Han impossible (assimilation refers here to their acceptance of the language, customs and religion of the ethnic majority). Though he is convinced of the national cohesion force of the 400 million Han who quite naturally share mode of living, language and religion, customs and habits, Sun marginalizes the ten million non-Han Chinese.¹³⁹ It is thus safe to say that while he observed a national consciousness in the Han (enforced by national education and propaganda), he also realized that including Mongols, Manchus and Tibetans would be more difficult to achieve – possibly due to rise in each of these ethnicities of an ethno-national consciousness in the cause of future democratization and politicization. Despite his intuition, Sun was still largely convinced of the viability of assimilation, as shown by his reference to historical experiences in his *Three Principles of the People*:

When the Yuan Dynasty conquered China, the Mongol race was not able to destroy the Chinese, but was, on the contrary, assimilated by them. The Chinese not only did not perish, but they absorbed the Mongols. The Manchu conquered China and governed it for 260 years, and still the Manchu race not only did not destroy the Chinese, but was assimilated by them. As a result, the Manchus became Chinese (*Hanzu*), as is shown by the fact that many Manchus added to their name a Chinese surname (*Hanxing*). For this reason, some scholars think that we can let the Japanese or the white people conquer China, for only if the Chinese absorbed the Japanese or the white people, the Chinese people can be at ease.¹⁴⁰

Sun's reasoning is clearly an example of Han chauvinism. In his speeches and writings, China (*Zhongguo*) is largely equated with the Han, and not defined by categories of language, customs, or religion. Even ethnic differences do not play a role when it comes to a shared sense of nationality. Sun presents this ideal of a homogenous nation as a form of the American "melting pot":

The American nation has been built by merging various European races. After the liberation of the black slaves and the inclusion of millions of blacks from Africa, the USA became the most advanced, largest and richest nation in the world that has founded the first democracy and republican state in today's world.¹⁴¹

In commenting on Sun Yat-sen's seeming idealization of the American model, Andō Kumiko has argued against an unduly negative assessment of Sun's statements. In her opinion, they are to be evaluated in a broader context and are primarily a critique of the European and Japanese imperialism, which also did not shy away from economic exploitation.¹⁴² Andō's view is supported by Sun's second speech on nationalism in February 1924. Here, his call for national unity aims less at the assimilation of ethnic minorities (knowing that *tonghua* would be a manifestation of an outspoken Han chauvinism).¹⁴³ Instead, he fo-

139 Sun Yat-sen, *Sanminzhuyi*, [2] 187–188.

140 *Sanminzhuyi*, [1] 627; d'Elia 1974, 80–81.: 在元朝入主中國以後，蒙古民族不但不能消滅中國，反被中國人同化。中國不但亡，並且吸收蒙古人。滿洲人征服中國，統治二百六十多年，滿洲民族也沒有消滅中國人，反為漢族所同化，變成漢人，像現在許多滿人都加漢姓。因為這個原故，許多學者便以為縱讓日本人或白人來征服中國，中國人只有吸收日本人或白種人的，中國人可以安心罷。Liang Qichao shared this view in his opposition against the anti-Manchurian nationalism. Cf. here the discussion of his preference for *Zhonghua minguo*.

141 Sun Yat-sen, *Sanminzhuyi*, [2] 187: 又美利堅之民族，乃合歐洲之各種族而熔冶為一爐者也。自放黑奴之後，則收吸數百萬非洲之黑種而同化之，成為世界一最進步、最偉大、最富強之民族，為今世民權共和之元祖。

142 Andō Kumiko 2005.

143 This was the case for the 1920s. In the Xinhai period, the call for *tonghua* aimed at achieving a true equality of the ethnicities. In 1912, the historian and linguist Wu Guanyin 吳貫因 (1879–1936) published a serial article in the journal *Yongyan* 庸言 (co-edited by Liang Qichao) entitled "Wuzu tonghua lun" 五族同化論 ("On achieving equal status of

cused his attention on turning “the heap of loose sand” of former imperial China into the true national unity of the New Chinese Republic. He had recognized the need of his country to develop a strong national consciousness, and thus presented a more tolerant, yet no less ideological, nationalism.

This is even the case in Sun’s third speech on Nationalism, where he attributes the origin of modern nationalism to the opposition to the Manchus. Yet, when he laments that the Mongols and Manchus had conquered China (Sun speaks here of *zhengfu* 征服 in his first and third speech on nationalism), he does not mean – despite his own expressed animosity towards the Manchus in the third speech – that the eras of Yuan and Qing Dynasty were not part of Chinese history. Indeed, he conceptually equates *minzuzhuyi* with *guozuzhuyi*, pointing out this equation can only be applied to China:

When I say that the racial Demism [*minzuzhuyi*] is the racial nationalism [*guozuzhuyi*], that holds true for China but not for foreign nations. Foreigners make a difference between race and nation. In English, the word “nation” [*naxun*] is used to designate the race. But the word “nation” has two meanings: it signifies race [*minzu*] and it signifies nation [*guojia*]. Although that word has two different meanings, still they are very distinct and should not be confused. In Chinese, there are many characters which have two meanings. Thus the two characters 社會 [*she-hui*] are used to designate a group of men and an organized society. “Race” [*minzu*] and “nation” [*guojia*] have, of course, many mutual relations which cannot easily be separated. But still, they have some sharply defined limits which make it necessary to distinguish carefully between the nation and the race. Why do I say that the statement, “the race [*minzu*] is the nation [*guozu*]” holds true for China only but not for foreign nations? Because in China, since the time of the Chin 秦 (255–206 B. C.) and of the Han 漢 (206 B.C.–221 A. D.) dynasties, one sole race has developed into one single nation.¹⁴⁴

In foreign countries, there are cases where one race has founded several nations, and other cases where there are several races within one certain nation. Take, for instance, England, the strongest nation of the world at the present time. It is the white race which is the fundamental race of that nation; (that white race) united to the black and to the brown races forms the “Empire of Great Britain”. Hence, to say that “the race is the nation” is an incorrect statement in regard to England. Here is another example. Hong Kong is a British possession. Among its races there are hundreds of thousands of Chinese. Hence, if we were to say that the English nation of Hong Kong is a race, that statement would be incorrect. Another example. India is also an English possession. In speaking of the English

the five ethnicities”). He argues that a new collective had to be created that took into account the shared history of the five ethnicities, including their shared descent, which had now evolved into a Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*): instead of restoring racial boundaries, universal citizenship should be pursued. Wu had studied politics at Waseda University, where he published in 1909 together with Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1886–1969) the journal *Xianzeng xinzi* 憲政新志. Though being a member, Wu did not share the radical stance of the *Tongmenghui*.

- 144 Sun Yat-sen, *Sanzhuyi*, [2] 185–186; d’Elia 1974, 65–66: 我說民族主義就是國族主義，在中國是適當的，在外國便不適當。外國人說民族和國家便有分別，英文中民族的名詞是“哪遜”；“哪遜”這一個字有兩種解釋：一是民族，一是國家。這一個字雖然有兩個意思，但是他的解釋非常清楚，不容易混亂。在中國文中，一個字有兩種解釋的很多，即如社會兩個字，就有兩種用法，一個是指一般人群而言，一個是指一種有組織的團體而言。本來民族與國家之間相互關係很多，不容易分開；但是當中實在有一定界限，我們必須分開什麼是國家，什麼是民族。我說民族就是國族，何以在中國是適當，在外國便不適當呢？因為中國自秦漢而後，都是一個民族造成一個國家；外國有一個民族造成幾個國家的，有在一個國家之內有幾個民族的。像英國是現在世界上頂強的國家，他們國內的民族是用白人為本位，結合棕人黑人等民族，才成“大不列顛帝國”；所以在英國說民族就是國族，這一句話便不適當。再像香港，是英國的領土，其中的民族，有幾十萬人是中國的漢人參加在內；如果說香港的英國國族就是民族，便不適當。又像印度，現在也是英國的領土，說到英國國族起來，當中便有三萬萬五千萬印度人；如果說印度的英國國族，就是民族，也是不適當。大家都知道英國的基本民族是“盎格魯撒克遜”人；但是“盎格魯撒克遜”人，不祇英國有這種民族，就是美國也有很多“盎格魯撒克遜”人，所以在外國便不能說民族就是國族。

nation, (it is necessary to know) that it comprises 350,000,000 Hindus. Thus it would be incorrect to say that the English nation of India is a race. Everyone knows that the original population of England belonged to the Anglo-Saxon race. But England is not the only representative of the Anglo-Saxon race; the population of the United States is also in great part Anglo-Saxon. Therefore we cannot say of a foreign nation that “the race is the nation”.¹⁴⁵

In 1942, the anthropologist Rui Yifu 芮逸夫 (1898–1990) adopted this definition of Chinese nation, pointing out in his “*Zhonghua guozu jie*” 中華國族解 (“Explanation of the Chinese Nation”) that Sun Yat-sen’s notion of *guozu* and *minzu* were alike, as were *minzu* and *guojia*.¹⁴⁶ It is important to point out that Rui – while strongly believing in the trinity of *Zhonghua guozu*, *Zhonghua minzu* and *Zhonghua guojia* – actually prefers *Zhonghua guozu* to the more wide-spread term *Zhonghua minzu*. While *guozu* – the state-nation – denotes the primacy of the state by emphasizing the unity of China (*Zhongguo*) and its ethnicities (*minzu*), the latter term is believed to have been coined by Liang Qichao in his 1905 text “*Lishishang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan*” 歷史上中國民族之觀察 (“Observations on the Chinese minzu in History”) and used interchangeably with *Zhongguo minzu*.¹⁴⁷ According to Liang, *Zhongguo minzu* was a broader concept than *Zhonghua minzu*. The latter denotes the Han ethnicity (thus being a collective singular – *Kollektivsingular* – in the sense of Koselleck), whereas *Zhongguo minzu* is a term that integrates non-Han ethnicities (as propagated with Liang’s greater nationalism, *da minzuzhuyi*).¹⁴⁸ Despite this insight, *Zhonghua minzu* became more prevalent. This was not simply due to the fact that ethnicity was a greater concern (exemplary here is Zhang Taiyan’s use of *Zhonghua* in his 1907 “*Zhonghua Minguo jie*” 中華民國解 (“Explanations of the Chinese Republic”), or because the term emphasized the need for assimilation (*tonghua*) for the nation-to-be. Instead, it reflected better the historical fact that the Chinese nation was from its beginning a hybrid, as Liang put it 1905 in his “*Observations on Chinese minzu*”:

The Chinese nation of today has from its beginning never been mono-ethnic, but was actually created by a blending of several ethnicities.¹⁴⁹

To conclude, even the less radical nationalists in the conservative camp tended to use an ethnicized term for nation. *Zhonghua* combined the two words *Zhongguo* 中國 and *huaxia* 華夏, i.e. territory with ethnicity, yet without excluding particular ethnic groups from being an inalienable part of China (similar to Yang Du in his “*Theory of Gold-Ironism*”). Although Liang now preferred *Zhonghua minzu* to *Zhongguo minzu*, it was not simply due to a lexical difference, but also a conceptual one that accorded with the perceived historical situation.¹⁵⁰

145 Sun Yat-sen, *Sanminzhuyi*, [2] 185–186; d’Elia 1974, 65–66.

146 Rui Yifu, “*Zhonghua guozu jie*,” 4: 由中山先生之說, 『國族』和『民族』是相同的: 而『民族』和『國家』也可說是相同的。這三個名詞在西文本同作一詞: 拉丁文作 *Nationem*, 英、德、法文並作 *Nation*。所以我嘗以為中華國族、中華民族和中華國家三個稱謂, 可以說是『三位一體』。

147 Huang Xingtao 2002.

148 *Zhongguo minzu* is used here in the sense of *Zhongguo zhi minzu* 中國之民族, i.e. ethnicities of China (and not Chinese ethnicities).

149 Liang Qichao, “*Lishishang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan*,” no. 65, 47: 現今之中華民族自始本非一族, 實由多數民族混合而成。

150 For Huang Xingtao 2002, *Zhonghua minzu* already implied that China was defined by the triad of state, territory and ethnicity (國家、地域、族類), a consciousness that had developed since the Ming-Qing period.

If Sun Yat-sen claims in his speeches on “racial demism” (*minzuzhuyi*) that many words in the Chinese language are polysemantic and that race (*minzu*) equals nation (*guozu*), he still recognizes the need to distinguish the latter terms from the state (*guojia*):

The race was formed by natural forces; the nation¹⁵¹ was formed by military forces. The political history of China will furnish proof. The Chinese say: “The royal way consists in following nature”;¹⁵² in other words, “Nature is the royal way”. The group formed by the royal way is the race. An armed force is the “way of might”. A group molded by the way of might is a nation.¹⁵³

While European governments appear to enlarge their territory with imperialist measures and base their rule on violence (*badao* 霸道) when establishing their nation-state, China is presented here as a civilized nation that was created by means of the royal way (*wangdao* 王道). By conceiving the nation as a natural phenomenon, Sun is able to convey a sense of inescapability. To define nation differently than he does would go against nature. In other words, even if China consisted of various ethnic groups (*minzu*), it is still only one nation (*minzu*). Even if the term *minzu* appears ambivalent, when combined with the term *Zhonghua* it creates the perfect collective singular (Kollektivsingular) for forming a convincing collective consciousness.

The political reality, however, looked different. During the 1930s and 1940s, a similar use of force and political pressure may be observed with regard to the national policy of the KMT, as the assimilation of ethnic minorities was considered an appropriate means for maintaining stability. As seen above, the integration of ethnic minorities into the community of *Zhonghua minzu* 中華民族 followed the American model of the melting pot. Chiang Kai-shek propagated this strategy on a nation-wide scale in his 1943 work *Zhongguo zhi mingyun* 中國之命運 (*China's Destiny*).¹⁵⁴ The KMT tried to establish a nation-state by continuing the policy of *Hanhua* (turning ethnic minorities into Han Chinese), but had only limited success.¹⁵⁵ While the melting pot could easily be unmasked as an ideological endeavor, the historical rationale for the claim that all ethnicities (*minzu*) were part of China was more complex, especially since new disciplines such as anthropology and ethnology had gained ground.

A relatively successful rationale – at least on a rhetorical level – was formed by means of an awkward combination of national genealogy with the findings of modern paleoanthropology. Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), a Buddhist scholar and well-versed expert in classical studies, managed to combine the 1929 discovery of the Peking Man (*Sinanthropus pekinensis*, *Zhoukoudian yuanren*) by Pei

151 The translation by d’Elia is not quite precise as it renders *guojia* as nation. His translation makes only sense if *guojia* is understood here as a state-nation, and not in an ethnic sense (as this would rather be termed *minzu*). In addition, the translation of the quote beforehand is also somewhat misleading when d’Elia renders both *guojia* and *guozu* as nation, and understands *minzu* as either population or race.

152 The origin of this saying is unknown and most probably a colloquial saying.

153 Sun Yat-sen, *Sanminzhuyi*, [1] 618; d’Elia 1974, 66: 民族是由於天然力造成的，國家是用武力造成的。用中國的政治歷史來證明，中國人說王道是順乎自然，換一句話說，自然力便是王道。用王道造成的團體，便是民族。武力就是霸道，用霸道造成的團體，便是國家。

154 See Chiang Kai-shek 1947, 6, especially 3–24, where Chiang argues that only a unity of Han and Manchu could ensure the survival of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua Nation*). This book was written by the party historian Tao Xisheng 陶希聖 (1899–1988) and enjoyed a great circulation as it was declared required reading for students, soldiers and party members.

155 Leibold 2007 has shown how the KMT struggled to create a sense of racial unity in the Republican era by promoting the myth of consanguinity.

Wenzhong 裴文中 (1904–1982) with the figure of the national ancestor Yellow Emperor in such a way that the non-Han ethnicities residing on Chinese territory could similarly be declared his descendants. Xiong argued in his influential piece “Zhonghua minzu tuiyuan” 中國種族推原 (“Tracing the origin of the Zhonghua race”) that the five ethnic groups which had been considered separately for so long actually have a common ancestor, namely, the Peking Man, with the four ethnic minorities descending from the Han.¹⁵⁶ His ethnogenealogy oriented itself to earlier ones, which originate in the *Shiji* 史記 by Sima Qian 司馬遷. Xiong, however, was able to provide what he considered scientific evidence:

Looking at the division of the Hua ethnic group (into different sub-groups), the Peking Man can be called our prehistoric ancestor...Among the descendants of the Peking Man, one lineage has stayed in the Holy Land,¹⁵⁷ today known as the Han. One lineage has spread into the northeast, formerly known as the Eastern Tartars, and today as the Manchus. Another lineage has spread to the north into Outer and Inner Mongolia. These are the Mongols, formerly called the Huns. Another lineage has spread in the northwest, into the provinces Gansu and Xinjiang, and even continued to Central Asia. This is the ethnic group of the Hui, formerly called the Di. Another lineage has spread into Tibet and Qinghai, today’s Tibetans, who were formerly the western Qiang. Since archaeology has discovered the Peking Man, we know that all five ethnic groups are of the same origin. In other words, the five ethnic groups (*wuzu*) all descended from the Peking Man. The proof is clear and indisputable.¹⁵⁸

Although Xiong refers here to historical sources such as the *Shiji* and the *Shangshu* 尚書 that had long been declared questionable by Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980) in his *Gushibian* 古史辨, the link to the modern science of paleoanthropology lent him the necessary credibility to finally silence his critics.¹⁵⁹ In the following decades, China and the Chinese represented a nation with a monolithic (*yiyu-ande* 一元的) and homophyletic (*tonggende* 同根的) character: The common origin of all the ethnic groups was made irrefutable, a view that was shared and propagated successfully after 1949 by the anthropologist Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (1910–2005) in his 1989 volume *Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju* 中華民族多元一體格局 (“The Plurality and Organic Unity of the Zhonghua minzu”).¹⁶⁰ Post-1949 thinkers and politicians simply reproduced the conceptual obscurity of *minzu* when the ethnic classification project (*minzu shibie*) of the CCP in the 1950s had to create plausible communities that mainly – though not necessarily – relied on language, clothing style and social customs to define an ethnic group (*minzu*). This project relied primarily on Stalin’s 1913 definition of nation that read:

156 Xiong Shili, “Zhonghua minzu tuiyuan,” 33. See also Sautman 2001 and Leibold 2006.

157 *Shenzhou*, or divine continent, is a traditional name for China that has been in use since the Warring States era (475–221 BC).

158 Xiong Shili, “Zhonghua minzu tuiyuan,” 18–19: 故就吾華族分派之情形推測。在鴻古時代之祖先，不妨即名為北京人（意即依此北京人，而用為中國遠古種類之通稱）。此北京人之子孫，一支留於神州本部者，即今所謂漢族是也。一支蕃衍於東北者，即今所謂滿族，古之東胡等是也。一支蕃衍於朔北，內外蒙古等地域，即今所謂蒙古之匈奴等是也。一支蕃衍於西北甘新諸省，並蔓延於中亞細亞等地域，即今所謂回族，古之氐族是也。一支蕃衍於西藏青海等地域，即今所謂藏族，古之西羌是也。自考古學家發見北京人，而後知吾五族本自同源。易言之，即五族血統，同出於北京人。此其證據堅強無可搖奪者。

159 Among them Gu Jiegang who had argued in his *Gushibian* that the Yellow Emperor was merely a mythical figure that could hardly be called a national ancestor. See here Matten 2009, 141–143.

160 For a discussion of this book, see Sakamoto Hiroko 2004, 207–228.

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.¹⁶¹

In order to retain the image of the plural singularity of the *Zhonghua minzu*, both anthropologists and ethnologists in the PR China, then and now, have clung equally to the unity and diversity of the People's Republic, and have also occasionally not shied away from creating ethnic groups when it served a political purpose,¹⁶² or from even making them disappear from the national census.¹⁶³

The objection of Sun Yat-sen and Rui Yifu that the Western concept of nation could not be directly applied to China thus made perfect sense here. The analysis above has shown that *minzu* – being the most predominant translation of nation – could only be sustained if the European concept of the nation could be reconciled with the political and ethnic reality of the Chinese empire. This is still visible today, as evidenced, for instance, by the efforts of the current PRC government to prove that regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Tibet belong inseparably to China. The central problem surrounding the territorial continuity of China during its transformation from an empire to a nation-state had very much to do with the fact that the new form of political order – the nation-state – had made its way from Europe to an East Asian civilization. In the history of the European nation-states, nationalist movements aspired to establish a political order that was characterized by a congruence of an ethnically (racially, culturally) defined nation and state. If one nation was represented by a state and formed a nation-state, freedom and authenticity were guaranteed: Only if a nation had a state would it be able to participate equally in the international community. The Chinese Republic pursued this aim explicitly in their modernization project, but was soon confronted by political reality when non-Han ethnic groups gained an ethnical consciousness that claimed their own national representation (the independence of movements in Tibet and Mongolia all emerged in the decade after the demise of the Qing Empire).

Similar to the situation in the Qing period – when the Yongzheng Emperor encountered resistance by those who favored a restoration of Ming rule¹⁶⁴ – the young Republic had to prove that Han rule was legitimate for the whole of China that included the regions inhabited by non-Han Chinese, as well as the People's Republic a few decades later. While the reasoning differed according to the political view (the Republic favored assimilation by creating a narrative of consanguinity, which became an important idea reinforced in the war against Japan; the People's Republic preferred the idea of a multiracial origin of the *Zhonghua minzu*), the final argument was that, by allowing the state to define the nation exclusively,¹⁶⁵ Han rule was legitimate if the right system prevailed, ethnic and cultural differences notwithstanding. The same logic has been reproduced in the People's Republic of China, which has been able to promote a greater degree of *minzu* plurality than Chiang Kai-shek could before 1949. Today, the ideal national consciousness of *Zhonghua minzu* is one without reference to ethnic, racial or religious differences among the *minzus* that are part of it. Only *Zhonghua*

161 Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question." Originally published 1913. Here quoted after Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 20. On the *minzu shibie* project cf. Mullaney 2011.

162 On the invention of the Zhuang as an ethnic minority see Kaup 2000.

163 Shown by Mullaney 2011 with the case of the Nong ethnicity. Those ethnic groups that are left out of the ethnotaxonomic system nowadays tend to use the Taiwanese term *zuqun* 族群 as a more appropriate and less sensitive denomination.

164 Famous here is the Zeng Jing inquisition case, see Matten 2009.

165 Fitzgerald 1995.

minzu as a multiethnic collective can claim political representation, not the ethnicities (*minzu*) themselves. James Leibold (2007) has shown in this context how the CCP was successful in “domestizing” the *minzu*, unifying the Chinese multiracial nation under the party’s leadership for the fight against Western imperialism. For this reason, the preference to use *Zhonghua minzu* results from the declared need to formulate a collective singular that is highly inclusive and able to incorporate different ethnic groups into one nation. Those in political control are both responsible and morally obliged to represent the people (*guomin*, *renmin*) and protect their interests. Political rule is thus universal and can be exercised over a heterogeneous polity. In terms of territoriality, the extent of rule is – in contrast to the imperial age – limited by the boundaries of the national territory, a territory though that was inherited from the Qing. While territorial continuity was easily accepted by Han Chinese, continuity with regard to identity – which was due to the idea of defining the nation in racial/ethnic or civic terms – was not. These definitions were either exclusive (as with *minzu*) or inclusive (as with *guomin*, *guojia*, *guozu*); they either emphasized or downplayed differences in ethnicity, culture or religion among national subgroups. Making both congruent, that is, creating a polity where nation and state are in harmony, was an arduous task as late imperial nationalists had discovered early on. Even before the official founding of the first republic in Asia – which from its beginning aspired to become a nation-state – they realized that it was difficult to apply the Western concept of nation to the Chinese context. Sun Yat-sen, for instance, pointed out that equating *minzu* and *guozu* only made sense in the Chinese context. The scholar Wang Ke explains that the success of nationalism in China was nevertheless due to a conceptual misunderstanding (*wuhui* 誤會) that occurred in the process of appropriating the nation concept.¹⁶⁶ He points out that while the Western notion of nation made perfect sense for an ethnically homogeneous nation such as Japan,¹⁶⁷ its transfer from Japan to China did not, because the latter was an entity that kept its multiethnic character when transforming from an empire to a nation.¹⁶⁸ Contrary to his findings, I would argue that the impressive history of the nation concept as a principle of political order is the result of the conceptual creativity in the minds of Chinese national thinkers. They maintained *minzu*’s obscurity in their efforts to propagate their ideal of plurality for the sake of a kind of national unity that involved both territory and identity, even if it meant that slogans such as “Zhongguozhe wu Zhongguoren zhi Zhongguo” 中國者吾中國人之中國 (“China is the China of the Chinese”)¹⁶⁹ – popular since the end of the Qing period – would avoid the term *minzu* and be used rather in an ideological fashion. In the end, expressions like “We Chinese” (*women Zhongguoren*) and *Zhonghua minzu* are conceptually understood in a highly de-ethnicized sense, even if the term might tell a different story.

166 Wang Ke 2003 and 2006.

167 The assumption of ethnic homogeneity in Japan has already been refuted by John Lie (2001).

168 Wang Ke 2001.

169 See here the discussion in *Duli shuo* 獨立說, in: *Qingyi bao* no. 58 (24 September 1900).

References

1. Sources Cited According to Titles

- "Bian geming shu" 辦革命書, by Kang Youwei 康有為, *Xinmin congbao* 16 (16 Sept. 1902), 76–86.
- "Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu" 駁康有為論革命書, by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, *Subao*. (29 June 1903). Edition: *Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji*, vol. 4, 194–209.
- Datong bao* 大同報. Beijing, Shanghai, 1907.
- Dongxi yangkao meiyue tongji zhuan* 東西洋考每月統紀傳, journal published 1833–1838 by Karl Gützlaff in Canton.
- Ersbi shiji zhi Zhina* 貳拾世紀之支那, ed. by Huang Xing 黃興 and Song Jiaoren 宋教仁, sole issue Tōkyō, 1905.
- Fusang youji* 扶桑遊記, by Wang Tao 韜園. Zou xiang shijie congshu. Changsha: Yuelu, 1985.
- "Geming jinshi lun" 革命今勢論, by Wang Dong 汪東, *Minbao* 17 (1907). Edition: *Xinbai geming qian shinian shilun xuanji*, vol. 2B, 791–806.
- Guocui xuebao* 國粹學報. Shanghai, 1905–1911.
- Guofeng bao* 國風報, ed. by He Guozhen 何國楨. Shanghai, 1910–1911.
- Guominbao* 國民報, ed. by Qin Lishan 秦力山 *et al.* Tōkyō, 1901.
- Guomin riri bao* 國民日日報, successor of *Subao* 蘇報, ed. by Zhang Shizhao 章士釗, Zhang Ji 張繼 and Su Manshu 蘇曼殊, 4 issues, Shanghai, 1903.
- "Guoshi gongjihui xuanyanshu fu jianzhang" 國事共濟會宣言書附簡章 ("Manifesto and Statute of the Association for Support of National Concerns"), by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 and Yang Du 楊度, published in *Jingwei bao* 經緯報 (Nov. 18, 1911). Edition: *Yang Du ji*, 538–540.
- Hanshu* 漢書, ed. by Ban Gu 班固 *et al.* Beijing: Zhonghua, 1970.
- Hanyu dacidian* 漢語大詞典. 12 vols. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu, 1986–1994.
- Hanyu dazidian* 漢語大字典. 8 vols. Wuhan: Hubei cishu, 1986–1990.
- Hubei xueshengjie* 湖北學生界, published by Chinese students from Hubei residing in Japan. Tōkyō, 1903.
- Huangdibun* 黃帝魂, ed. by Huang Zao 黃藻, 1903.
- Jiangsu* 江蘇, published by Chinese students from Jiangsu residing in Japan. Tōkyō, 1903.
- Jingshizhong* 警世鐘, by Chen Tianhua 陳天華, first published 1903. Edition: Luo Bingliang 2002.
- Jinshi* 金史, ed. by Tuotuo 脫脫 *et al.* Beijing: Zhonghua, 1975.
- "Jintie zhuyi shuo" 金鐵主義說 ("Theory of Gold-Ironism"), by Yang Du 楊度, originally published in *Zhongguo xinbao* 中國新報 1–5 (1907). Edition: *Yang Du ji*, 213–397.
- "Lishishang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan cha" 歷史上中國民族之觀察 ("Observations on the Chinese minzu in History"), by Liang Qichao, first published in *Xinmin congbao* 65–66 (1905).
- Liang Qichao quanji* 梁啟超全集. 1999. Ed. by Yang Gang 楊鋼 and Wang Xiangyi 王相宜. 10 Vol. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe.
- "Linshi da zongtong xuanyanshu" 臨時大總統宣言書, by Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, announced in *Linshi zhengfu gongbao* 臨時政府公報 (1 Jan. 1912). Edition in *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol. 2, 1–3.
- Lundun yu Bali riji* 倫敦與巴黎日記, by Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾. Zou xiang shijie congshu. Changsha: Yuelu, 1985.
- "Lun jinshi guomin jingzheng zhi dashi ji Zhongguo qiantu" 論今世國民競爭之大勢及中國前途, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Qingyi bao* (15 Oct. 1899). Edition: *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 1, 309–311.
- "Lun Manzhou sui yu lixian er bu neng" 論滿洲雖慾立憲而不能, by Zhu Zhixin 朱執信, *Minbao* 1 (1905), 31–41.
- "Lun Zhinaren guojia sixiang zhi ruodian" 論支那人國家思想之弱點, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, published in *Qingyi bao* 73 and 74 (1901) [reprint: 4611–4614 and 4667–4673].

- “Lun Zhongguo yu Ouzhou guoti yitong” 論中國與歐洲國體異同, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Qingyi bao* 26 (1899), 1–5.
- “Marxism and the National Question,” by Joseph V. Stalin, originally published in *Prosveshcheniye*, 3–5 (March–May 1913). Edition in Stalin 1954, 300–381; excerpt titled “The Nation” in Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 18–21.
- “Meng Hui Zang yu guohui wenti” 蒙回藏與國會問題, by Mu Duli 穆都哩, *Datong bao* 5 (1907), 1–16.
- Menghui tou* 猛回頭, by Chen Tianhua 陳天華, first published 1903. Edition: Luo Bingliang 2002.
- Minbao* 民報, ed. by Zhang Ji 張繼, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 et al. Tōkyō, 1905–1910.
- “Minzu de guomin” 民族的國民, by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, *Minbao* 1 (1905), 1–31, *Minbao* 2 (1905), 1–24.
- Ming Taizu shilu* 明太祖實錄. Reprint: Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1964.
- Minli bao* 民立報, successor of *Minyu ribao* 民吁日報, ed. by Song Jiaoren 宋教仁, Ma Junwu 馬君武 and Zhang Shizhao 章士釗, Shanghai, 1910–1913.
- “Qingdi xuanbu tuiwei zhi” 清帝宣佈退位旨, published 12 Feb. 1912. Edition: *Zhonghua mingguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian*, vol. 2, 72.
- Qingshigao* 清史稿, ed. by Zhao Ersun 趙爾巽, et al. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1976–1977.
- Qingyi bao* 清議報, ed. by Liang Qichao 梁啟超. Yokohama: Xinmin she 新民社, 1898–1901 [reprint in: *Zhongguo jindai qikan huikan* 中國近代期刊彙刊. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991]
- Qiusbu* 旭書, by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, first published 1900. Edition in *Zhang Taiyan quanji*, vol. 3.
- “Sanlelu zizhushu: renzu, wu guojia” 三樂盧自助書: 人祖, 無國家, anon., *Jiangsu* 3 (1903), 143.
- Sanminzhuyi* 三民主義, by Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, first published 1924. Editions in: [1] *Sun Zhongshan xuanji*, 588–838; [2] *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol. 9, 183–426.
- Shina no gozoku kyōwa* 支那の五族共和, by Nakamura Kujirō 中村久四郎. Tōkyō: Tō-A kenkyūkai, 1925.
- Songsbi* 宋史, ed. by Tuotuo 脫脫 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977.
- Sun Zhongshan quanji* 孫中山全集, ed. by Zhongshan daxue lishixi Sun Zhongshan yanjiushi 中山大學歷史系孫中山研究室. 11 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981–1986.
- Sun Zhongshan xuanji* 孫中山選集. Beijing: Renmin, 1981.
- Tao Chengzhang ji* 陶成章集, ed. by Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1986.
- Taoyuan wenlu waipian* 韜園文錄外篇, by Wang Tao 韜園. Edition: *Yangwu yundong wenxian huibian* 洋務運動文獻彙編 (Taipei: Shijie, 1963), vol. 1, 480–503.
- “Wanguo pian” 亡國篇, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Guomin bao* 4 (August 1901), 1–7.
- “Wuzu tonghua lun” 五族同化論, by Wu Guanyin 吳貫因, first published in *Yongyan* 庸言 (1912).
- “Xiwang Manzhou lixianzhe he tingzhu” 希望滿洲立憲者盍聽諸, by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, *Minbao* 5 (1906), 28.
- “Xianzheng qianshuo” 憲政淺說, ed. by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Guofeng bao* 1, 2, 4, 6 (1910). Edition: *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 4, 2053–2062.
- Xinbai geming shiliao* 辛亥革命史料, ed. by Zhang Guogan 張國淦. Shanghai: Longmen lianhe, 1958.
- Xinbai geming qian shinian shilun xuanji* 辛亥革命前十年間時論選集, ed. by Zhang Nan 張枬 and Wang Renzhi 王忍之. Vol. 1a-b (1960); 2a-b (1963); 3 (1977). Beijing: Sanlian.
- Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報, ed. by Liang Qichao 梁啟超. 96 issues. Yokohama, 1902–1907.
- “Xinmin congbao fei zhongzu geming lun zhi boyi” 「新民叢報」非種族革命論之駁議, by Si Ji 嗣輯, *Fubao* 3 (May 1906), 3–5.

- “Xinmin shuo” 新民說, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, first published 1902–1906 in *Xinmin congbao*.
Edition: *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 2, 655–735.
- Yang Du ji* 楊度集, ed. by Liu Qingbo 劉晴波. Changsha: Hunan renmin, 1986.
- Yinbingshi wenji* 飲冰室文集. Collection of texts by Liang Qichao 梁啟超. 6 vols. Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu, 2001.
- Yuanshi* 元史, ed. by Song Lian 宋濂 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1976.
- “Zai Zhongguo Guomindang benbu teshe zhu Yue banshichu de yanshuo” 在中國國民黨本部特設駐粵辦事處的演說, by Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, speech held at March 6, 1921. Edition in: *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol. 5, 472–481.
- Zhang Taiyan quanji* 章太炎全集. 8 vols. Shanghai: Renmin, 1982–1884.
- Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji* 章太炎政論選集, ed. by Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. 2 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977.
- Zhejiangchao* 浙江潮, published by Chinese students from Zhejiang residing in Japan in 1903.
- “Zhengchou Man lun” 正仇滿論, by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, originally published in *Guomin bao* 4 (10 August 1901). Edition in *Xinhai geming qian shinian shilun xuanji*, vol. 1a, 94–99.
- “Zhi Yuan Shikai dian” 致袁世凱電, by Zhang Jian 張謇, sent Dec. 1911. Edition in *Xinhai geming shiliao*, 276–277.
- Zhongguo minzu zhi* 中國民族志 (*Annals of the Chinese Nation*), by Liu Shipai 劉師培. Edition in *Liu Shipai quanji* 劉師培全集, vol. 1. Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1997.
- “Zhongguo shi xulun” 中國史敘論, by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, first published 1901 in *Qingyi bao* 90, 1–5, 91, 1–4.
- “Zhongguo xianzheng jiangxi yijianshu” 中國憲政講習會意見書, *Datong bao* (Shanghai) 4 (1907), 17–19.
- Zhongguo xunbao* 中國旬報. Hong Kong, 1900.
- Zhongguo zhi mingyun* 中國之命運, by Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石], first published 1943 in Chengdu. Title of the English translation published 1947: *China's Destiny*.
- “Zhonghua guozu jie” 中華國族解, by Rui Yifu 芮逸夫, first published 1942. Edition in Rui Yifu 1972, vol. 1, 1–11.
- “Zhonghua Minguo jie” 中華民國解, by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, *Minbao* 15 (5 July 1907), 1–18.
- Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa* 中華民國臨時約法. Nanjing linshi canyi yuan 南京臨時參議院, 1912.
- “Zhonghua minzu tuiyuan” 中國種族推原, by Xiong Shili 熊十力, first published 1929. Edition in Xiong shili 1994, 1–35.
- Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian* 中華民國史檔案資料匯編, ed. by Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan 中國第二歷史檔案館. 90 vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji, 1991.

2. Sources Cited According to Names

- Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Andō Kumiko 安藤久美子. 2005. “Son Bun no ‘gozoku kyōwa’ hihan to Tai Kitō no renpō kyōwasei ron” 孫文の「五族共和」批判と戴季陶の連邦共和制論, *Shisō* 思艸 46, 13–41.
- Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. 1868a. *Allgemeines Statsrecht*. 2 vols. München: Cotta.
- . 1868b. *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt*. Nördlingen: Beck.
- . 1875. *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. Stuttgart: Cotta.
- Callahan, William A. 2010. *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University.

- Chang, Hao [Zhang Hao 張灝]. 1971. *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Chen Tingxiang 陈廷湘 and Zhou Ding 周鼎. 2008. *Tianxia, shijie, guojia: jindai Zhongguo dui wai guannian yanbian shilun* 天下, 世界, 国家: 近代中国对外观念演变史论. Shanghai: Sanlian.
- Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石]. 1947. *China's Destiny* [*Zhongguo zhi mingyun* 中國之命運, first published 1943], translated by Wang Chung-hui [Wang Chonghui 王寵惠]. New York: Macmillan.
- Chow, Kai-Wing [Zhou Jiarong 周佳榮]. 2001. "Narrating Nation, Race and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China," in Chow, Doak, and Fu 2001, 47–84.
- , Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu (eds.). 2001. *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- (ed.) (2008): *Beyond the May Fourth Paradigm: In Search of Chinese Modernity*. Lanham: Lexington Books/Rowman&Littlefield.
- Chow Tse-tsung [Zhou Cezong 周策縱]. 1960. *The May Fourth Movement*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Couvreur, Séraphin. 1914. *Tch'ouen Ts'iou et Tso Tchouan*. 2 vols. Ho Kien Fou: Mission Catholique.
- d'Elia, Pasquale. 1974. *The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-Sen*. New York: AMS.
- Dabringhaus, Sabine. 2006. *Territorialer Nationalismus in China: Historisch-geographisches Denken 1900–1949*. Köln: Böhlau.
- Deutsch, Karl W. 1972. *Nationenbildung, Nationalstaat, Integration*. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann.
- Dikötter, Frank. 1992. *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. London: Hurst.
- Dirlik, Arif. 1978. *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Dittmer, Lowell, and Samuel Kim. 1993. *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University.
- Doak, Kevin M. 2007. *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*. Handbuch der Orientalistik. Leiden: Brill.
- Duara, Prasenjit. 1993. "De-Constructing the Chinese Nation," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30, 1–26.
- . 1995. *Rescuing History from the Nation*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago.
- Esherick, Joseph. 1995. "Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution," *Modern China* 21.1, 45–76.
- Fairbank, John K. (ed.). 1968. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Fang, Weigui. 2000. "Yi' 夷, Yang' 洋, Xi' 西 and Wai' 外. Zum wort- und begriffsgeschichtlichen Wandel des Chinesischen im 19. Jahrhundert," *Orientierungen* 2000.1, 15–46.
- Fang Weigui 方維規. 2002. "Lun jindai sixiangshi shang de 'minzu', 'Nation' yu Zhongguo" 論近代思想史上的「民族」, 「Nation」與中國, *Ersbiyi shiji* 70 (April 2002), 33–43.
- Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (ed.). 1989. *Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju* 中華民族多元一体格局. Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan.
- Fitzgerald, John. 1995. "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 33, 75–104.
- . 1996. *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- Fujii Shōzō 藤井昇三 and Yokoyama Hiroaki 横山宏章. 1992. *Son Bun to Mō Takutō no isan* 孫文と毛沢東の遺産. Tōkyō: Kenbun.
- Gellner, Ernst. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–1997.
- Gladney, Dru. 1994. "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53.1, 92–123.
- Gotō Suco 後藤末雄. 1969. *Chūgoku shisō no Furansu seizen* 中国思想のフランス西漸. Tōkyō: Heibonsha.
- Han Jinchun 韩锦春 and Li Yifu 李毅夫. 1984. "Hanwen 'minzu' yici de chuxian jiqi chuqi shiyong qingkuang" 汉文“民族”一词的出现及其初期使用情况, *Minzu yanjiu* 1984.2, 36–43.
- Harlan, David. 1989. "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," *The American Historical Review* 94.3, 581–609.
- Harrell, Paula. 1992. *Sowing the Seeds of Change: Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895–1905*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University.
- Harrison, Henrietta. 2000. *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911–1929*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- . 2001. *Inventing the Nation: China*. London: Arnold.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- , and Terence Ranger, (eds.). 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Hoston, Germaine A. 1994. *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Howland, Douglas R. 2002. *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i.
- Hsü, Immanuel. 1960. *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858–1880*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Huang, Fuqing [黄福庆]. 1982. *Chinese Students in Japan in the Late Ch'ing Period*, translated by Katherine P.K. Whitaker. Tōkyō: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies.
- Huang Xingtao 黄兴涛. 2002. "Xiandai Zhonghua minzu guannian xingcheng de lishi kaocha: jianlun xinhai geming yu Zhonghua minzu rentong zhi guanxi" [现代中华民族观念形成的历史考察: 兼论辛亥革命与中华民族认同之关系, *Zhejiang shehui kexue* 2002.1, 128–141.
- Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith (eds.). 1994. *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Jansen, Marius B. 1954. *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Jin Guantao 金觀濤, and Liu Qingfeng 劉青峰. 2006. "Cong 'tianxia', 'wanguo' dao 'shijie': wan Qing minzuzhuyi xingcheng de zhongjian huanjie" 從「天下」、「萬國」到「世界」: 晚清民族主義形成的中間環節, *Ersbiyi shiji* 94, 40–53.
- and ———. 2008. *Guannianshi yanjiu: Zhongguo xiandai zhongyao zhengzhi shuyi de xingcheng* 觀念史研究中國現代重要政治術語的形成. Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue.
- Karl, Rebecca E. 2002. *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. Durham and London: Duke University.
- Kataoka Kazutada 片岡一忠. 1984. "Shingai kakumeiki no gozoku kyōwaron wo megutte" 辛亥革命期の五族共和論をめぐって], in: Tanaka Masayoshi sensei taikan kinen ronshū kankōkai 1984, 279–306.
- Kaup, Katherine Palmer. 2000. *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Kohn, Hans. 1945. *The Idea of Nationalism*. New York: Macmillan.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1972. "Einleitung," in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 1, XIII–XXVII.
- . 1984. "Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse," in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 7, 141–431.

- . 1985. “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History,” in his *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Trans. by Keith Tribe. Cambridge/Mass.: MIT), 75–93.
- . 2002. *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- . 2010. *Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Lackner, Michael. 1998. “Anmerkungen zur historischen Semantik von China, Nation und chinesischer Nation im modernen Chinesisch,” in: Turk, Schultze, and Simanowski 1998, 323–338.
- , Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz (eds.). 2001. *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*. Leiden: Brill.
- and Natascha Vittinghoff (eds.). 2004. *Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China*. Leiden: Brill.
- Laitinen, Kauko. 1990. *Chinese Nationalism in the late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Mandchu Propagandist*. London: Curzon.
- Legge, James. 1860–1872. *The Chinese Classics*, Vol. 5: *The Ch'un T's'ew, with the Tso Chuen*. 2 vols. London: Henry Frowde.
- Leibold, James. 2006. “Competing Narratives of Racial Unity in Republican China: From the Yellow Emperor to Peking Man,” *Modern China* 32.2, 181–220.
- . 2007. *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes Became Chinese*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levenson, Joseph R. 1959. *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- . 1968. *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*. [First combined edition. Vol. 1: *The Problem of Intellectual Continuity* (1958); Vol. 2: *The Problem of Monarchical Decay* (1964); Vol. 3: *The Problem of Historical Significance* (1965)]. Berkeley, Cal: University of California.
- Li Guoqi 李國祁 (ed.). 1985. *Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwulun: minzuzhuyi* 近代中國思想人物論：民族主義. Taipei: Shibao wenhua.
- Li Xiaodong 李曉東. 2005. *Kindai Chūgoku no rikken kōsō: Gen Puku, Yō Do, Ryō Keichō to Meiji keimō shisō* 近代中國の立憲構想：嚴復・楊度・梁啓超と明治啓蒙思想. Tōkyō: Hōsei daigaku.
- Lie, John. 2001. *Multiethnic Japan*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Liew, K.S. 1971. *Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Litzinger, Ralph. 1998. “Memory Work: Reconstituting the Ethnic in Post-Mao China,” *Cultural Anthropology* 13.2, 224–255.
- Liu Fengyun 刘风云, Dong Jianzhong 董建中, and Liu Wenpeng 刘文鹏 (eds.). 2012. *Qingdai zhengzhi yu guojia renting* 清代政治与国家认同 / *Politics and National Identity in the Qing Dynasty*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian.
- Liu, Lydia H. [Liu He 劉禾]. 1995. *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity: China, 1900–1937*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- (ed.). 1999. *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulation*. Durham&London: Duke University.
- . 2004. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Liu Qingfeng 劉青峰 (ed.). 1994. *Minzuzhuyi yu Zhongguo xiandaihua* 民族主義與中國現代化. Hongkong: Zhongwen daxue.

- Liu, Xiaoyuan. 2004. *Frontier passages: Ethnopolitics and the Rise of Chinese communism, 1921–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- Luo Bingliang 羅炳良 (ed.). 2002. *Chen Tianhua: Jingshizhong, Menghuitou* 陳天華: 警世鐘, 猛回頭. Beijing: Huaxia.
- Luo, Zhitian [罗志田]. 2008. "From 'Tianxia' (All Under Heaven) to 'the World': Changes in Late Qing Intellectuals' Conceptions of Human Society," *Social Sciences in China* 29.2, 93–105.
- Ma Yong 马勇 (ed.). 2003. *Zhang Taiyan shuxin ji* 章太炎书信集. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin.
- Machetzki, Rüdiger. 1973. *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao und die Einflüsse deutscher Staatslehren auf den Monarchischen Reformnationalismus in China nach 1900*. Hamburg: Unpublished Ph.D. thesis.
- Masini, Federico. 1993. *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898*. Berkeley: Project on Linguistic Analysis, University of California.
- Mateer, Ada Haven. 1913. *New Terms for New Ideas. A Study of the Chinese Newspaper*. Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission.
- Matten, Marc Andre. 2004. "Hermeneutics of Translation: A critical Consideration of the Term *Dao* in Two Renderings of the Analects," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 31.3 (Sept. 2004), 329–347.
- . 2009. *Die Grenzen des Chinesischen: Nationale Identitätsstiftung im China des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz-Verlag.
- . [Wang Make 王马克]. 2012. "Zuwei minzu rentong fuhao de Huangdi: bei chuangzao de chuantong?" 作为民族认同符号的黄帝: 被创造的传统?, in: Liu Fengyun 2012, 76–110.
- Moloughney, Brian, and Peter Zarrow (eds.). 2011. *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*. Hong Kong: Chinese University.
- Mullaney, Thomas. 2011. *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Murata Yūjirō 村田雄二郎. 2005. "Sun Zhongshan yu xinhai geming shiqi de 'wuzu gonghe' lun" 孙中山与辛亥革命时期的「五族共和」论, *Fuyin baokan ziliao: Zhongguo jindaishi*, 2005.1, 84–91 [reprint from *Guangdong shehui kexue* 2004.5, 121–128].
- Onodera Shirō 小野寺史郎. 2011. *Kokki, kokka, kokkei: Nashionarizumu to shinboru no Chūgoku kindaiishi* 国旗・国歌・国慶: ナショナリズムとシンボルの中国近代史. Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku.
- Onogawa Hidemi 小野川秀美. 1970–1972. *Minpō sakuin* 民報索引. 2 vols. Kyōto: Kyōto daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjō.
- . 1972. "Zhang Binglin de pai Man sixiang" 章炳麟的排滿思想 (Zhang Binglin and his anti-Manchu thought), *Dalu zazhi* 44.3, 155–176.
- Pan Guangzhe 潘光哲. 2008. "Geming liyou de lilun lüxing: Meiguo Duli xuanyan zai wan Qing Zhongguo" 「革命理由」的「理论旅行」: 美国《独立宣言》在晚清中国, in: Sun Jiang 2008, 144–188.
- Peng Yingming 彭英明. 1985. "Guanyu woguo minzu gainian lishi de chubu kaocha" 关于我国民族概念历史的初步考察, *Minzu yanjiu* 1985.2, 5–11.
- Pierson, John D. 1980. *Tokutomi Soho, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Pusey, James Reeve. 1983. *China and Charles Darwin*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1960. *Word and Object*. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Rawski, Evelyn S. 1996. "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55.4, 829–850.

- Reilly, Thomas H. 2004. *The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire*. Seattle: University of Washington.
- Rhoads, Edward J.M. 2000. *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*. Seattle: University of Washington.
- Richter, Melvin. 1987. "Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, 247–263.
- . 1990. "Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe," *History and Theory* 19, 38–70.
- . 1995. *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University.
- Rui Yifu 芮逸夫. 1972. *Zhongguo minzu jiqi wenhua lungao* 中國民族及其文化論稿. 3 vols. Taipei: Yiwen.
- Sakamoto Hiroko 坂元ひろ子. 2004. *Chūgoku minzokushugi no shinwa: jinsbu –shintai – jendā* 中國民族主義の神話: 人種・身体・ジェンダー. Tōkyō: Iwanami.
- Sanetō Keishū 実藤忠秀. 1981. *Chūgokujin: Nihon ryūgakushi* 中国人: 日本留学史. Tōkyō: Kuroshio.
- Sautman, Barry. 2001. "Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropological Nationalism in China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 60.1, 95–124.
- Schneider, Axel. 1997. *Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identität für China*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- . 2011. "Nation, History and Ethics: The Choices of Post-Imperial Historiography in China," in: Moloughney and Zarrow 2011, 271–302.
- Schubert, Gunter. 2002. *Chinas Kampf um die Nation: Dimensionen nationalistischen Denkens in der VR China, Taiwan und Hongkong an der Jahrtausendwende*. Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg, 357. Hamburg: IfA.
- Schwarcz, Vera. 1986. *The Chinese Enlightenment – Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Seyschab, Carl-Albrecht, Armin Sievers and Sławoj Szynkiewicz (eds.). *Society, Culture, and Patterns of Behaviour*. East Asian Civilizations: New Attempts at Understanding Traditions, 3/4. Unkel am Rhein: Horlemann.
- Shen Songqiao [Shen Sung-chiao] 沈松僑. 1997. "Wo yi wo xue jian Xuanyuan: Huangdi shenhua yu wan Qing de guozu jiangou" 我以我血薦軒轅: 黃帝神話與晚清的國族建構, *Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan* 28, 1–77.
- . 2002. "Jindai Zhongguo minzuzhuyi de fazhan: jianlun minzuzhuyi de liangge wenti" 近代中國民族主義的發展: 兼論民族主義的兩個問題, *Zhengzhi yu shehui zhaxue pinglun* 3, 49–119.
- Shen, Sung-chiao [Shen Songqiao], and Sechin Y.-S. Chien [Qian Yongxiang 錢永祥]. 1999. "Delimiting China: Discourses of 'Guomin' (國民) and the Construction of Chinese Nationality in Late Qing," paper presented at the "Conference on Nationalism: The East Asia Experience," May 25–27, 1999, Institute of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Taipei.
- Shimada, Kenji [島田虔次]. 1990. *Pioneer of the Chinese revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism* (translated by Joshua A. Fogel). Stanford, Cal: Stanford University.
- Skinner, Quentin. 1969. "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory*, 8, 3–53.
- Smith, Anthony David. 1971. *Theories of Nationalism*. New York: Harper and Row.
- . 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge.
- . 2001. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Sōgō Masaaki 惣郷正明 and Hida Yoshifumi 飛田良文. 1986. *Meiji no kotoba jiten* 明治のことは辞典. Tōkyō: Tōkyōtō.
- Stalin, Joseph V. 1954. *Works*, Vol. 2. Moskau: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Sun Jiang 孙江. 2008. *Xin Shixue*, Vol. 2: *Gainian, wenben, fangfa* 新史学: 概念·文本·方法. Beijing: Zhonghua.
- Tanaka Masayoshi sensei taikan kinen ronshū kankōkai 田中正美先生退官記念論集刊行会 (ed.). 1984. *Chūgoku kingendaishi shomondai: Tanaka Masayoshi sensei taikan kinen ronshū* 中国近現代史諸問題: 田中正美先生退官記念論集. Tōkyō: Kokusho kankōkai.
- Tang Xiaobing [唐小兵]. 1996. *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. 1977. *Zhang Taiyan nianpu changbian* 章太炎年譜長編. Beijing: Zhonghua.
- . 湯志鈞. 1990. *Gailiang zu geming de Zhongguo qinghuai: Kang Youwei yu Zhang Taiyan* 改良與革命的中國情懷: 康有為與章太炎. Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu.
- Teng, Ssu-yü [Deng Siyu 鄧嗣禹], and John K. Fairbank. 1979. *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Townsend, James. 1992. "Chinese Nationalism," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 27, 97–130.
- Trauzettel, Rolf. 1977. "Individuum und Heteronomie: Historische Aspekte des Verhältnisses von Individuum und Gesellschaft in China," *Saeculum* 28.3, 340–364 (English translation: "Historical Aspects of the Individual-Society Relationship in China," in: Scyschab, Sievers and Szykiewicz 1990, 25–70).
- Tsou, Jung [Zou Rong 鄒容]. 1968. *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*. Translated and annotated by John Lust. The Hague: Mouton.
- Türk, Horst, Brigitte Schultze, and Roberto Simanowski (eds.). 1998. *Kulturelle Grenzziehungen im Spiegel der Literaturen: Nationalismus, Regionalismus, Fundamentalismus*. Göttingen: Wallstein.
- Vierheller, Ernstjoachim. 1968. *Nation und Elite im Denken von Wang Fu-chih (1619–1692)*. Hamburg, Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1968.
- Wagner, Rudolf G. 1982. *Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: The Role of Religion in the Taiping Rebellion*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Wang Ke 王柯. 2001. *Minzu yu guojia: Zhongguo duominzu tongyi guojia sixiang de xipu* 民族與國家: 中國多民族統一國家思想的系譜. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue.
- . 2003. "Minzu: yige laizi Riben de wuhui" 「民族」: 一個來自日本的誤會, *Ersbiyi sbiji* 77 (June 2003), 73–83.
- . 2005. *Taminzoku kokka: Chūgoku* 多民族国家—中国]. Tōkyō: Iwanami.
- . 2006. *20 seiki Chūgoku no kokka kensetsu to "minzoku"* 20世紀中国の国家建設と「民族」. Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku.
- Wang Shumin 王樹民. 1985. "Zhonghua minghao suyuan" 中华名号溯源, *Zhongguo lishi dili luncong* 1985.1, 10–20.
- Weber, Eugen. 1979. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Wheaton, Henry. 1863. *Elements of International Law*. 2nd annotated edition by William Beach Lawrence. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Wilbur, Martin. 1976. *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University.
- . 1983. *The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923–1928*. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University.
- Wong, Young-tsu [Wang Rongzu 汪榮祖]. 1989. *Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936*. Hong Kong: Oxford University.
- Xiong Shili 熊十力. 1994. *Zhongguo lishi jianghua* 中國歷史講話. Taipei: Mingwen.

- Yang Xiaonong 楊筱農. 1934. *Yili geming huiyilu* 伊犁革命回憶錄, *Tianshan* 天山 1.1, 17–25.
- Zarrow, Peter (2001): Political Ritual in the Early Republic of China, in: Chow, Doak and Fu 2001, 149–188.
- . 2012. *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–1924*. Stanford, Cal: Stanford University.
- Zernatto, Guido. 1944. “Nation: The History of a Word,” *The Review of Politics* 6.3, 351–366.
- Zhang Haipeng 张海鹏 and Gong Yun 龚云 (eds.). 2005. *Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu* 中国近代史研究. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin.
- Zhang Jinfan 张晋藩. 2005. *Zhongguo xianfa shi* 中国宪法史. Changchun: Jilin renmin.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University.